Anthropology Gehlen. Philosophical anthropology A. Gehlen. Crisis of modern culture
Anthropological views Helena originally developed in line with inspired philosophy life conservative cultural criticism. They are most fully formulated in the main work Helena"Man. His nature and place in the world" (1940). Philosophical anthropology, according to his plan, should bring together the data of individual sciences about man. Gehlen following Scheler and Plesner, he seeks to identify the specifics of the position in the world of man as a specially organized living being, but it is precisely Gehlen refuses to use the "ladder of creatures" in the study of man, which essentially reflects the stepped structure of the organic world ("plant" - ("zoophytes") - "animal" - "man"). Gehlen emphasizes the originality of the human organization as an interconnected system of functions. Following I. G. Herder, G. calls man an "insufficient" being. Unlike an animal, it is deprived of full-fledged instincts, that is, it does not have stable stimuli outside and equally stable reactions in itself; does not stay in harmony with nature from birth, is not in mutual correspondence with the "surrounding world", that is, with a segment of the world as such, specifically significant for this type of living beings. Man is open to the whole world. The absence of a specifically significant "surrounding world" is associated with an internal excess of motives in a person. Thus, an unbearable burden of survival and self-determination falls on a person. Therefore, the main thing for him is "unloading", which makes it possible to relate more indirectly, definitely to the environment and to himself. An excess of motives makes it impossible for them to be realized simultaneously. The implementation of some delays others. There is a "self-distancing" that allows a person, in contrast to the direct life of animals, not just "live", but "lead a life", systematically and prudently change himself and the environment by his actions.
Action as a unity is the main anthropological characteristic of man. There is no dualism in action process and result, subject and object, soul and flesh, etc. Progressive unloading, understood as active self-fulfillment, frees action more and more from situational certainty, and at a higher level the necessary function is performed in a "symbolic" way. Vision takes on a leading role among the senses, allowing you to navigate without direct contact with things, language further removes from the details of the situation. Acting, a person creates a culture, which belongs precisely to human nature and cannot be "thought out" from it. Action, correlated with other actions and "cooperating" with them, allows us to speak of different types of "community". The concept of action makes it possible to move from the "initial anthropology" of the book "Man" to the doctrine of institutions, that is, fixed forms anthropological organization, which is most fully described in the work Primitive Man and Late Culture (1956). The action is motivated by expediency, but its constant repetition can be useful in another way. Unforeseen expediency can, by its objective usefulness, arouse motives for further stabilization of the result obtained. Thus, the archaic institutions of the family, animal husbandry, agriculture, etc., are the unforeseen result of a religious-ritual, pictorial action that satisfies the fundamental need to maintain the stability of the world through its ritual depiction-fixation. The instincts that have arisen in this way not only "unload" a person from dangers, but also allow him to act instinctively, determining his consciousness and will. Gehlen distinguishes three cultural epochs in history: the culture of hunters, the culture of farmers and modern industrial culture, which arose about 200 years ago. Following M. Weber, he describes the progressive rationalization of instincts (the leading role, according to Gehlen, technology plays here). But at the same time, the instincts are more and more subject to immanent laws; there is no longer an instance connecting the cumulative interpretation of the world and the regulation of behavior, as it was in the archaic era. The lack of mutual coordination of in-t among themselves and with the moral life of a person means for the latter a heavy burden of the need to make decisions at his own discretion. Together with the progressive liberation of people from dangers, physical labor, etc., this provokes the development of "modern subjectivism."
conservative social criticism is fully framed Gehlen in the concept of "pluralistic ethics" (the book "Moral and hypermoral", 1969). He postulates the existence of four independent sources of morality, "ethos": the desire for reciprocity, "physiological virtues" (an instinctive desire for well-being, turning into eudemonism), a generic (clan) morality of brotherly love, ultimately expressed in the morality of humanity; institutional ethos. In the course of the rationalization of instincts, forcing them to rely more and more on their internal order and to solve objective problems, in accordance with the pressure of circumstances, clan (humane) morality is universalized and comes into conflict with the ethos of political institutions. The situation is aggravated by intellectuals who hide their own thirst for power behind the preached morality of brotherhood. In the 70s. Gehlen turned out to be the leading ideologist of neo-conservatism in Germany, which aroused new interest in his theoretical work.
Op.: 1) Der Mensch. Seine Nature u. seine Stellung in der Welt. Fr./M,- Bonn, 1962. 2) Ur-mensch u. Spatculture. Fr./M.-Bonn, 1964. 3) Moral u. hypermoral. Fr./M.-Bonn, 1969. 4) Gesam-tausgabe. bde. 1-4-7-. Fr./M., 1978-1983.
Gehlen Arnold
(1904-1976) German. philosopher, one of the largest representatives of philosophical anthropology. In 1923-27 he studied philosophy, as well as German studies, art history, physics and zoology in Leipzig. In 1925-26 he attended lectures by Scheler and N. Hartmann in Cologne. In 1927 he defended his thesis under the supervision of Driesch. Then he studied natural sciences for several more semesters. From 1930 he was an assistant to Hans Freyer at the Sociological Institute of Leipzig University. In May 1933 he joined the NSDAP. In the summer semester of 1933, he occupied the chair in Frankfurt am Main, previously headed by Tillich. Since 1940 in Vienna, where he heads the Institute of Psychology. In 1944 he was sent to the Eastern Front, in 1945 he was wounded.At the end of the war, he was removed from his post, but after some time he became a corresponding member. Austrian Academy of Sciences. In 1962-69 prof. sociology at the Technische Hochschule Aachen.
G.'s first philosophical works, The Theory of Free Will (1932), State and Philosophy (1935), and others, were written from a Fichtean standpoint. In the late 1930s, his attention was focused on anthropological issues, and G. tried to connect its philosophical aspects with empirical ones. As a result, a treatise "Man. His nature and position in the world" (1940) appeared, the provisions of which were refined and developed in the essay "Primitive Man and Late Culture" (1954). The topics of criticism of culture and the philosophy of technology, touched upon in the second of these books, are further developed in the work "The Soul in the Technical Age" (1957), as well as in the cultural-critical collection "Pictures of the Time. Toward the Sociology and Aesthetics of Modern Painting" (1960) . The final work of G. can be considered book. "Moral and hypermoral" (1969), where G. gives a systematic presentation of his concept of "pluralistic ethics" and criticizes the left student movement.
Giving an answer to the basic question of philosophical anthropology, "What is a man?", G. methodically distinguishes himself from theological and evolutionary explanations. Man is not, according to G., neither a divine creation, nor the result of the evolution of the animal world. G. tries to understand human development on the basis of the relationship between subjective and objective, necessary conditions of life. G. is looking for categories that would link such factors as bipedalism and morality within a single system.
Its starting theoretical point is coming from J.G. Herder's concept of man as "insufficient being". Compared to the animal, man is endowed with very few instincts. Another manifestation of the insufficiency of man as a natural being is his special "morphological position". Sensory organs exposed to excessive irritations (reizuberflutete) and a relatively weak motor apparatus speak of a person's non-specialization in biological and ontogenetic terms. This means that man is not "destined" to live in some particular environment or in a particular biotope. On the other hand, he has a constitutional and chronic excess of impulses (Antriebsuberschlu?). These features of insufficiency, on the one hand, and excess of motives, on the other, allow us to introduce such a characteristic of a person as "openness to the world." The latter is the situation of man, with which he has to deal from the very beginning and with which he must cope.
The situation of "openness to the world" turns a person into an active being. The category "action" captures a structure that is constitutive for the most diverse strata. human life. To act means not simply to live without distance from one's own life activity, but above all to "lead a life." Leading life (Lebensfuhrung) involves self-interpretation (Selbstdeutung). Self-interpretation, which is vital for an active being, thematizes his own motives and properties, as well as his attitude towards his own kind. The conduct of life based on self-interpretation is, in turn, in a conditional relation to the ability to distinguish signals from their meaning, i.e. opportunities to act and think symbolically. The "use of symbols" in social communication is language. It makes possible spatial and temporal communication at a distance and the accumulation of knowledge, theoretical and hypothetical thinking and taking into account the views of another person. Language and linguistic thinking made a person capable of action, free from the direct pressure of needs, made it possible to plan life regardless of momentary needs.
Symbolic, self-interpreting action allows you to direct and indicate ways out of a situation of excess urges. Needs are limited, and the way and circumstances of their satisfaction deliberately vary in their content. Breaking the direct connection between action and elementary needs allows a person to pursue long-term "interests" and to direct his aspirations in different ways. Aspiration loses its attachment to an external object. It can be aimed at achieving subjective states, including those that are acquired through the techniques of asceticism and ecstasy.
This structure of self-interpreting, symbolic and interest-guided action defines man as a being who by nature is a "cultural" (Kulturwesen) being. Man lives in his own created world in a world filled with symbolic meanings.
Certain human interests must be pursued continuously, or at least over long periods of time. The correlates of these enduring interests are "institutions". Institutions serve the purpose of a more or less conscious organization of drives. They, thanks to "external stabilization" contribute to the formation of "habits" and the enrichment of motives.
In their stabilizing effect, institutions act as a kind of substitute for instinct, since they guarantee regularity, reliability, and predictability of behavior. Therefore, the rules set by institutions retain their indisputable significance as long as they provide "reasonable expediency" and "intersubjective consistency."
Claiming the coexistence in a person of several functionally different, genetically independent socio-regulatory instances, G. puts forward the thesis of "ethical pluralism". According to this thesis, any "monolithic ethics" is a one-sided stylization of thought, feeling, and behavior. Sociologically, the multiplicity of possible stylizations is revealed in the form of morally opposed groups or hostels. G. distinguishes four ethical dispositions: "a sense of reciprocity," "a sense of psychological regulators," "a sense of family or clan," and "a sense of institutions."
"Reciprocity" is the basis of social regulation in societies free from domination. Mutual rewards, speech relationships, and equivalent exchange limit behavior that does not meet social expectations. These relationships of mutual recognition must leave room for choice of action, eliminate debilitating conflicts, and realize the benefits of cooperation.
The feeling of "psychological regulators", called G. also psychological virtues, is extremely multifaceted. This includes the need for protection and care, which is especially acute in a child, and a sense of duty, and compassion, and an "affirming sense of life." Describing the latter, G. emphasizes its irreducibility to utility and pleasure. Based on Nietzsche, Scheler, and also on Mahatma Gandhi, G. criticizes the leveling of the sense of life in that orientation towards the pleasant and useful, which prevailed in modern times.
"Feeling of the family", called G. also "group feeling" and "internal morality", is of interest to G. primarily in connection with the so-called "humanitarianism". "Humanitarianism" is a normative orientation toward the life of mankind as a species, toward the community of mankind; it is associated with the idea of the equality of people, and thus with the "mass eudemonism" inherent in modernity. The latter is inseparable from women's emancipation, pacifism and anti-statehood, the main targets of G.
The disposition, which G. prefers, is a "sense of institutions." Thanks to this feeling, social regulation is carried out, based on the formation of hierarchies and the reduction of individual options for choosing an action. A single person is offered patterns of behavior that are devoid of individual measurement. Following these patterns, the individual is "absorbed" by institutions. Service to institutions carries "performance value". In addition, in service there arises an attitude called "responsibility." It should be understood as identification with institutionally fixed guilt, which also arises in cases where there is no personal fault.
G. considers the modern era through the prism of two mutually determined processes of the collapse of institutions and a general orientation towards "subjectivity". The increase in the meaning of "subjectivity" entails excessive individualism and selfishness. The "humanitarianism" associated with these processes leads to the elimination of state institutions and a sense of responsibility. Mass eudemonism is the ethical basis for reducing the functions of the state to simple execution social tasks. Philosophical and socio-scientific reflexive potential turns traditional attitudes into concepts that are no longer considered indisputable and become the subject of endless "discourses of justification". These processes result in an all-pervading uncertainty: the fear that weighs on a person takes on a chronic character.
Art reveals a steady tendency towards "demoralization" and "formalization". Atonal music and abstract painting confirm that art has lost its pictorial function. Nothing deserves saving and longevity. Art only serves the mass "thirst for experiences" and the need for constantly new things.
Only strong institutions can counteract the "arbitrary freedom of subjectivity". human freedom has as its condition a stable "liberation from the burden" (Entlastung) provided by institutions, but institutions also form the channel along which this freedom must be directed. It is "freedom within institutional limits" that corresponds to human nature.
Peter Fischer (Leipzig)
On the systematics of anthropology // The problem of man in Western philosophy. M., 1988; Gesamtausgabe in 10 Bde., Fr./M., 1978.
P.Jansen. Arnold Gehlen. Die anthropologische Kategorienlehre. Bonn, 1975; F. Jonas. Die Institutionenlehre Arnold Gehlens. Tubingen, 1966; J. Weiss. Weltverlust und Subjektivitat. Zur Kritik der Institutionenlehre Arnold Gehlens. Freiburg, 1971.
(January 29, 1904, Leipzig January 30, 1976, Hamburg) - German philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of philosophical anthropology as a special discipline. Disciple X. Drisha. Experienced the influence of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, N. Hartmann, phenomenology. Professor in Leipzig (since 1934), Koenigsberg (since 1938), Vienna (since 1940), Speyer (since 1947), Aachen (1962-69). The anthropological views of Gehlen initially developed in line with the conservative criticism of culture, characteristic of the philosophy of life. They are most fully formulated in his main work “Man. His nature and place in the world” (Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, 1940). Philosophical anthropology, according to Gehlen, should bring together the data of individual sciences about man. Following M. Scheler and H. Plesner, he seeks to identify the specifics of the position of a person in the world as a specially organized living being, without, however, referring to the idea of a "ladder of beings" that reflects the stepped structure of the organic world ("plant" - "animal" - "Human"). Following I. G. Herder, Gehlen calls a person an “insufficient” being: unlike an animal, a person is deprived of full-fledged instincts, that is, he does not have stable stimuli outside and equally stable reactions in himself; he is not in original harmony with the "surrounding world", i.e., in mutual correspondence with the environment, which is specifically significant for this type of living beings: a person is open to the whole world.
The absence of a specifically significant “surrounding world” is associated with an internal excess of motives in a person, and their “unloading” becomes the main thing for him, which makes it possible to relate more indirectly to the environment and to himself. An excess of impulses makes it impossible for them to be realized simultaneously (the realization of some delays others, etc.). There is a "self-distancing" that allows a person, in contrast to the direct life of animals, not just "live", but "lead a life", systematically and prudently change himself and the environment by his actions. Action as a unity is the main characteristic of a person: in action there is no dualism of process and result, subject and object, soul and flesh, etc. the function is executed in a "symbolic" way. Vision takes on a leading role among the senses, allowing you to navigate without direct contact with things, language further removes from the details of the situation. Acting, a person creates a culture that belongs precisely to human nature and cannot be “thought out” from it. Action correlated with other actions and "cooperating" with them allows us to speak of different types of "community". The concept of action allows Gehlen to move on to the doctrine of institutions, that is, fixed forms of anthropological organization ("Primitive Man and Late Culture" - Urmensch und Spatkultur, 1956). The action is motivated by expediency, but its constant repetition can be useful in another way: unintended expediency can awaken motives for further stabilization of the result obtained. Thus, the archaic institutions of the family, animal husbandry, agriculture, etc., are an unforeseen result of a religious and ritual pictorial action that satisfies the fundamental need to maintain the stability of the world through its ritual image-fixation. The emerging institutions not only “unload” a person from dangers, but also allow him to act instinctively, determining his consciousness and will. Gehlen distinguishes three eras in history: the culture of hunters, farmers and industrial culture, which arose about 200 years ago. Following M. Weber, he describes the progressive rationalization of institutions, giving the leading role to technology. At the same time, institutions are increasingly subject to immanent laws: there is no longer an instance that connects the cumulative interpretation of the world and the regulation of behavior, as it was in the archaic era. The lack of mutual coordination of institutions among themselves and with the moral life of a person means for the latter a heavy burden of having to make decisions every time at his own discretion. Together with the progressive liberation of people from dangers, physical labor, etc., this provokes the development of "modern subjectivism."
Gehlen's concept of "pluralistic ethics" ("Moral and Hypermorality" - Moral und Hypennoral, 1969) has been stamped by conservative social criticism. He postulates the existence of four independent sources of morality (“ethos”): the desire for reciprocity; "physiological virtues" (an instinctive desire for well-being, turning into eudemonism); tribal (clan) morality of brotherly love, ultimately expressed in the morality of humanity; institutional ethos. In the course of the rationalization of institutions, forcing them to rely more and more on their internal order and to solve objective problems, in accordance with the pressure of circumstances, clan (humane) morality becomes universal and comes into conflict with the ethos of political institutions. The situation is aggravated by intellectuals who hide their own thirst for power behind the preached morality of brotherhood. In the 70s. Gehlen became the leading ideologue of neoconcern atish in the FRG. Cit.: Gesamtausgabe, Bd 1-10. Fr./M., 1978.
A. F. Filippov
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German philosopher and sociologist. He studied philosophy in Leipzig and Cologne, a student of G. Driesch. Since 1934 - prof. in Leipzig, from 1938 - in Cologne, from 1940 - in Vienna. Since 1942 - prof. sociology at the Higher School of Management Science, since 1962 - at the Higher Tech. school in Aachen. G.'s scientific evolution began with a period of “absolute phenomenology” in the spirit of the ideas of Fichte, Hegel, and Herbart (“Real and Inactive Spirit,” 1931; “Theory of Free Will,” 1933). Gradually, under the influence of the philosophy of English. empiricism and Amer. pragmatism (most of all - the works of Dewey), his views are becoming less and less spiritualistic ("On the concept of experience", 1936; "Schopenhauer's results", 1938).
Main essay G. - “Man. His nature and his position in the world. Already in the first year of its appearance (1940) it went through two editions; in total during the life of G. - at least 12 times.
Basic for philosophy. Anthropology G. is an idea of the structure of human. motives. A person lacks the instinct of self-preservation, the result of which is an excess of motives (which is especially clearly seen in the example of human movements). The thesis about the dominant value of the unconscious-vital sphere and Nietzsche's position about a person, “as an undecided animal” served G. biol. justification for specific human nature. According to G., man is a “biologically deficient” being, because he lacks instincts, because he is “incomplete” and “loose” in the animal biol. organization, and therefore deprived of the opportunity to conduct exclusively natural. existence. Man is forced to look for means of reproduction of his life other than animals; history, about-in and its institutes also are the forms filling biol. human insufficiency and optimally realizing his semi-instinctive aspirations.
Bioanthropol. the predetermination of cultural forms is being developed in a pluralistic form. ethics, to-ruyu can be regarded as a kind. reaction to the growing role of intelligence in human. life. The latter leads to a weakening of the instinctive functions of a person, deprives him of the sensation of directness. fusion with the world. G. rejects the concepts of universal humanity that appeal to reason. morality as an abstract and a lifeless humanitarianism devoid of real foundations and impulses. He considers morals. behavior from two sides: biological - with the help of specials. natural science categories; cultural-historical - studying in this case the spiritual essence as a special product of tradition, specifically historical. situations. Its community conclusion states that the cultural and social life- no more than an epiphenomenon of vital bases - genetically given to a person biol. premises and its semi-instinctive dispositions and attitudes.
IN last years G. worked on the development of the concept of social institutions ("Primitive man and late culture", 1956, etc.). Since man cannot be regarded as a “thinking being”, and
lovech. life needs guidance, then the social institution is the regulatory institution that directs the actions of people in the def. channel just as instinct guides the actions of animals. The ordering of people's behavior by sociocultural institutions is based on the assertion that the proposed paths of action are the only possible ones. Main G. considered the problem of industrial society to mean the deinstitutionalization of the private sphere in comparison with the sphere of public activity.
Cit.: Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in derWelt. Fr./M.; Bonn, 1962; On the systematics of anthropology // The problem of man in the app. philosophy. M, 1988.
Lit .: Bondarenko L.I., Kultaeva M.D. To the analysis of the methodological foundations of German cultural anthropology//Vestn. Kharkiv. university 1978. No. 166. V. 12: Philosophy; They are. On the Criticism of the Concept of Tradition in Modern German Cultural Anthropology // Ibid. 1981. No. 208. V. 15: Logic and methodology scientific knowledge; Burzh. philosophy anthropology of the 20th century. M., 1986; Grigoryan B.T. Philos. anthropology. M., 1982; Kurkin B.A. Contradictions of “rationalized culture in the philosophical anthropology of A. Gehlen,” VF, 1982. No. 1.
B.T. Grigoryan
GENIUS
Philos.-aesthetic. a concept that was formed in modern times (16-18 centuries) on the basis of the ancient idea of “genius” - “spirit” (Greek, lit. “endowing”; lat. genius) as given to a person as a deity expressing his personality and destiny , deities. double, guardian, as well as the word ingenio, which has the same root as genius (included in the European rhetorical theory), meaning innate (own, obtained at the birth of the spirit) abilities, talents, ingenuity, sharpness of mind. According to the teachings of Diotima in Plato's "Feast" (202 e), the "daimon" spirits are "the middle ground between God and mortal" and have the power "to be interpreters and transmitters of human beings." deeds to the gods, and divine to people, requests and sacrifices to one, orders and rewards for sacrifices to others”, thanks to which the whole being is connected together. Plato emphasizes the connection with the "daimon" creative. functions - everything related to "sacrifices, sacraments, spells, divination, sorcery." In "Phaedra" (242 s) Socrates tells about his "daimonion", giving him signs. The actions of the “daimon” are expressed primarily in divination, and the ability of divination is also conjugated with the soul in such a way that deities are supplied from outside. the signs turn out to be the same. and “int. voice" of personality. Thus, ideas about the “daimon” and resp. Roman "geniuses" (themselves extremely diverse in popular beliefs and literary evidence over the centuries) in their philosophy. interpretation, as their main. implications suggest: creative. the nature of G. as a force of inspiration, insight; the implementation of the relationship of the whole, ensuring its existence; not just G.'s attachment to the individual, but G.'s conjugation with the “soul” as an internal. beginning of man, personality. All these points are preserved and reflected in the new Europe. concept G., in other respects breaking with tradition. All of them were developed only in the growth of individualism in the new Europe. culture, through the Renaissance idea of the deification of man and the concept of the artist as a “second god”.
In the 18th century the process of interiorization of G. as a deity guiding man, coming from outside, is taking place - now G. is beginning to be understood as internal, immanent to the soul of the creative. ability. mediator between the humanist heritage and it. The philosophy of the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, which played a decisive role in the rethinking of G., was Shaftesbury, who wrote: “The poet is already the second Creator, a genuine Prometheus walking under Jupiter. Like this supreme artist, or the world plastic. nature, he creates the form of the whole, commensurate and proportional in itself ... ”(“ Soliloquia ”, I, III). In the late 18th century (especially in the so-called “brilliant” era of “Sturm und Drang” of the 1770s in Germany), due to the strengthening of anti-rhetoric, trends in creativity and aesthetic theory, the idea of an individual arises. and the original (original) G., which creates a rule and then follows it, i.e. autocratically creates a special, original artist. world. Such an idea, losing the polemical extreme, goes into it. classical philosophy and German Neo-humanism at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, G. is balanced with nature, and “internalized” G. never breaks ties with G. as traditional. mythological representation. G.'s activity is deeply intertwined with the activity of nature, G. the artist plastically sculpts being like a god or nature; cf. at K.F. Moritz (On plastic imitation of beauty, 1788): “Plastic. a genius should, as far as possible, grasp all the proportions of the great harmony sleeping in him, the volume of which is wider than his individuality ”- Moritz K. Ph. Schriften zur Asthetik und Poetik. Tub., 1962; 84). Kant defined G. as “talent (natural gift), which gives the rule to art”, or, in other words, as “the inborn inclinations of the soul”, through which nature gives the rule to art (Criticism of the ability of judgment). That. between external and internal. the origins of G., genius, a balance is established. Resp. in Schelling's "Philosophy of Art": "... the eternal concept of man in God as immediate. the cause of its (human) production (creativity) is what is called genius, it is, as it were, genius, the divine dwelling in man. In Kant’s concept of G., generalizing the long process of a new understanding of G., includes both the “originality” of creativity, and its unconsciousness, non-reflectivity (whence Schiller’s connection between G. and “naive”, i.e. poetry that does not reflect itself), and his impersonality (nature itself speaks in the artist). G. belongs to Kant only to the “fine art”, which alone does not obey a known rule.
In the 19th century creates a neutral with respect to the traditional
tion idea of G., of genius as the highest creative. abilities, in isolation from the internal. forms of the word “G.”, from G. as a mythologeme, from the tradition of its rethinking. As a result, G. could become commonplace, optional. representation inherent in the mass aesthetic. consciousness, but at the same time and present. problem of philosophy and psychology of creativity. Here G. acts as, in fact, a new concept that has developed in the depths of the traditional and has included in itself a certain final meaning of it. Jean-Paul, distinguishing G. from talent (Preparatory School of Aesthetics), actually uses a new concept. Similarly, Hegel in his Aesthetics understands G. as self-conscious. creativity, not at all connecting G. with traditional. a mythologeme of an inspiring deity, or a natural principle, and removing any “restrictions” on G.’s activity, which can manifest itself in any field, not only in art. In the 19th century the idea of G. is partly connected with the cult of the “hero” as a superhuman. personality (already in Carlyle, Nietzsche), opposed to network. and hostile to the artist, genuine art, the masses, the “crowd”. Such a cult of G.-“hero” becomes an indispensable moment of the average bourgeois, brought to the point of absurdity. consciousness. At the same time, the era of a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of G. begins. Since the new concept of G. differs from the previous one primarily in the immanence of G. of the personality, the study of psychophysiol. G.'s substrate led to irrationalism. currents of science and philosophy to ideas about deviating from the norm, pathological. G.'s nature (which, however, corresponds to the traditional notion of "obsession" with a deity, of the proximity of "inspiration" and madness). It is more natural, however, to consider G. a phenomenon that does not go beyond the normal: a brilliant personality is endowed with a rare and each time individually structured set of properties and abilities that predispose the personality to creativity (usually in various fields of activity), but usually allow making decisions. choice in favor of one type of activity. It is obvious that genius is predetermined not only by the outstanding strength (thus going beyond the limits of the usual) abilities, but, perhaps, even more so by the unusual dynamics of their combination in the personality. At the same time, different properties, inclinations, abilities should be in this person in a truly rare state, in which their obvious disharmony, leading to an equilibrium, harmonious. state, and imbalance on the c.-l. level of personality, in any case, compensated at the highest. creative its level - where it acts as creating masterpieces of creativity. The creativity of a brilliantly gifted person is tactful. resolution of the contradictions inherent in his personality. The absence of a completely unusual correlation of properties and abilities would lead to the fact that a more or less uniform development of a wide variety of abilities would not allow one main one to stand out, concentration on which is completely inevitable for a brilliantly gifted person (versatile giftedness, at the same time, internally certainly affects the result of brilliant activity - as a special wealth, the versatility of what is being created). The presence of only one sharply expressed ability, on the contrary, would not allow the formation of final harmony. The often observed “strangeness”, imbalance, worldly disorder, uncommunicativeness of a brilliant personality comes from its concentration on creativity, where the final (exceeding the usual level) harmonization of the forces and abilities of the personality takes place, while at the everyday (“everyday”) level, such a person can act as “uncompensated”, disharmonious. Properties and abilities of G., to-rye are shown, as a rule, on healthy psihofiziol. basis, can be very rare - for example, it can be the ability for an intense, directly fresh perception of art. phenomena without attenuation of the original. impressions, but, on the contrary, with their deepening; the ability to intuitively perceive and realize, comprehend as a whole huge masses of artistically ordered material (Mozart spoke of his ability to cover the whole part of a symphony with a single, instantaneous glance); ability to unusual association decomp. phenomena, their sides, seemingly distant, leading to a non-trivial art. or scientific thinking, to discoveries in science, technology, art, etc. The ability to instantly realize one's creativity. activity without disturbing its spontaneity. The manifestation of G.'s abilities each time is individual and unique. It is indicative and goes back to a deep tradition of comparing the activities of G. with lightning: “Int. the idea and realization of a brilliant fantasy simultaneously appear to us as a lightning strike in their instantaneous interpenetration and elusive vitality” (Hegel, see Aesthetics, vol. 3. M., 1971, p. 341). Thanks to such qualities, a brilliantly gifted person in art, science, philosophy, etc. begins to express his story. an era with a special, maximally accessible to a person, depth, without being connected by many secondary ones, is insignificant. its moments, circumstances; attitude G. by his time it is always paradoxical, because G. sees the essence of what is happening deeper, wider, more multifaceted than his contemporaries.
Lit .: Goncharenko N.V. Genius in art and science. M., 1991; Zilsel E. Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs. Tub., 1926; Nowak H. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Begriffs Daimon: Diss. Bonn, 1960; Schmidt-Dengler W. Genius: zur Wirkungsgeschichte antiker Mythologeme in der Goethezeit. Munch., 1978; Schmidt J. Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens in der deutschen Literatur, Philosophie und Politik 1750-1945. bd. 1-2. Darmstadt, 1988; Zilsel E. Die Geniereligion. Ein kritischer Versuch iiber das moderne Personlichkeitsideal, mit einer historischen Begrundung. Fr./M., 1990.
A.B. Mikhailov
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Grigoryan B. From the book "Philosophical Anthropology" (fragment)
PHILOSOPHICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (A. GELEN)
Man as an "insufficient" being. The thesis about the dominant significance of the unconscious-vital sphere of human existence and Nietzsche's position about man as "an animal that has not yet been determined" serve as the starting point for the philosophical and anthropological concept of A. Gehlen (1904-1976) and for other main representatives of modern philosophical anthropology. Gehlen's concept can be viewed as a kind of attempt to initially biological substantiation of a specific, exclusive nature for the animal world, a human being, his vital predestination to active activity. And he establishes this fundamental difference between man and animal through a comparative analysis of their biological organization. Gehlen rejects Scheler's dualism of life and spirit, although he recognizes spirituality as a distinctive human property. Spirituality for Gehlen is not some kind of extra-life principle, but a real possibility of the most vital human nature.
According to one of the fundamental theses of Gehlen's concept, man is a biologically insufficient being, since he is extremely poorly equipped with instincts, "incomplete" and "unfixed" in his animal-biological organization. The biological insufficiency of a human being predetermines his openness to the world. An animal is rigidly and narrowly regionally connected with a certain environment, while a person does not have such an unambiguously determining environment, he has extraordinary plasticity, the ability to learn. Biological uncertainty and human openness to the world are characterized by Gehlen as defining features of human existence. Dropped out of the reliable and stable forms of animal existence, man found himself faced with the necessity of defining himself. In order to preserve himself, he must create new conditions, a new environment suitable for his life, he must make of himself something that is capable of coexisting and developing in this artificial environment. So the biological non-specialization and "insufficiency" of man are used by Gehlen to substantiate his thesis about man as an active being. The essence of the main thesis of Gehlen's concept is thus reduced to the proposition that nature predetermined man to "humanity" by the fact that she did not determine him to be animals. In such a formulation, which quite adequately reflects the essence of Gehlen's anthropological concept, its negative one-sidedness is especially clearly manifested. Of course, in the non-specialization of a humanoid ancestor, one can see a kind of genetic prerequisite for his subsequent cultural creativity and way of life, a kind of negative basis for his freedom and new creative opportunities. But this negative reason is only sufficient to force the anthropoid to choose a different way of life for the sake of self-preservation, but it does not say anything about what this way of life should be, and in no case can it in itself ensure the implementation this lifestyle.
In contrast to Scheler, who allowed himself a sharp leap from the concrete data of biological and psychological science into the field of metaphysics. Gehlen in every possible way emphasizes his cautious attitude to the conclusions of a metaphysical order, characterizes his philosophy as an empirical science, within which he is content only with highlighting various new phenomena of human existence, expresses some hypotheses related to them. Perhaps these were indeed his intentions, but the conclusions drawn by Gehlen on the narrow ground of the biological and psychological characteristics of a human being are of an unusually broad character and are full of an unexpectedly "deep" metaphysical meaning. The main theses of his philosophical and anthropological concept - "man is a biologically insufficient being", "man is an active being" - are both scientific and factual statements and, at the same time, philosophical and metaphysical formulas that determine the essence of man. In general, such a stretching of a specific feature of a person into a certain general philosophical understanding of him is a very common phenomenon in philosophical anthropology. Moreover, this method of cognizing human integrity through its specific feature, in a certain sense, constitutes the very essence of the philosophical-anthropological method.
pluralistic ethics. Gehlen's idea of anthropological predetermination of cultural forms of human existence is developed in his pluralistic ethics. It combines the position of human biological insufficiency with another fundamental thesis, according to which a person has a specific bodily organization, already designed and adapted by nature for the cultural form of his existence.
o- Helen seeks to support his pluralistic ethics of the vital-life justification of the cultural and moral behavior of a person with data from modern behavioral sciences. The critical edge of Gehlen's ethical pluralism is directly or indirectly directed both against the Marxist class and concrete historical justification for ethical pluralism, and against the humanistic doctrine of the principles of universal morality, presented in certain spiritual norms and values, appealing to human consciousness and rationality.
In the concept of ethical pluralism, Gehlen proceeds from the assumption that a person has "many functionally independent, instinct-like impulses - springs social behavior, which are the subject of the empirical doctrine of social regulations, or ethics. "To the innate impulses that determine the strength and direction of social behavior, Gehlen also ranks the instinct of aggressiveness, the energy of which is transformed into various modes of behavior.
Gehlen illustrates the rootedness of various forms of moral and social behavior, as well as the corresponding customs and institutions in the instinctive sphere of human existence, in particular, using the example of the so-called instinct of reciprocity, / the innate tendency of a person to act taking into account the interests of another. Gehlen's reciprocity instinct acquires the strength and significance of a universal fundamental principle, which ultimately determines the nature of almost all forms of human life. Such an instinctive-vital origin of moral and legal norms that regulate human behavior, in his opinion, is especially clearly confirmed by the establishment of "natural law", which appeals to "innate", "natural" forms of behavior. The requirements to comply with accepted treaties, to keep a given word, to recognize another equal to oneself by nature, having the same rights as oneself, and many other historically established provisions of "natural law" are perceived by Gehlen as ideal expressions of the corresponding innate instinctive inclination of a person to reciprocity, as such imperatives of consciousness, which are called upon to compensate for the insufficient effectiveness of instinct in man. Approximately in the same way, all other forms of social relations are explained and characterized, built on the observance of the principle of reciprocity, aimed at maintaining a certain balance and equality in the system of human relations. Establishments of criminal law prescribing compensation for damages to the injured party, the terms of the exchange of goods, the custom of blood feud, marriage relations, religious rites and holidays - all these, according to Gehlen, are types of institutionalization of the instinct of reciprocity.
Gehlen does not forget about the anthropobiological foundations of human life even when he turns to the consideration of the institutional forms of cultural and historical reality. He does not deny the effectiveness and significance of the factors of cultural and historical substantiation of various models of family institutions, property, management, military affairs in the past and present. His institutions act as a kind of "enterprises", historically conditioned ways of mastering the vital tasks and circumstances of human existence (such as maintenance, reproduction, security, and, accordingly, orderly and long-term cooperation of people). They serve as stabilizing forces, the forms that "the inherently perilous, unstable and affectively burdened human being" finds in order to make coexistence with their own kind possible.
Having paid "due" to the socio-historical conditioning of human behavior, Gehlen again demands that in all cases the anthropological nature of the institutions themselves should not be lost sight of. In this regard, his arguments about the responsibility of a person who unintentionally violated institutional regulations are quite remarkable. These arguments not only reaffirm the a priori-biological orientation of Gehlen's ethics and his entire social philosophy, but also reveal the quite definite ideological and political aspirations of this philosophical anthropologist. Developing the idea of G. Greifenhagen, expressed in the article about the trial of Oedipus 11, Gehlen comes to the conclusion that the responsibility for objective anti-institutional offenses does not decrease even in those cases when the person who violated institutional regulations is subjectively innocent. Oedipus unwittingly becomes the culprit in the death of his son. He cannot be accused even of negligence, he has no legal fault. But all this does not free him from his own reproaches against him, since he, as a father, is responsible for the life of the child and cannot free himself from guilt. He violated the integrity of the institution and therefore is responsible for it. Responsibility is inevitable, according to Gehlen, in this case too, since the obligations imposed by the institution are of anthropological origin.
Further, the principle of anthropological substantiation of the integrity of institutions receives a very unexpected, but quite consistent with the ideological guidelines of Gehlen, political application. Guided by his anthropological principle, he lays the blame for the destruction (after 1933) of the integrity of the institution called the "German Reich" equally on both the National Socialists and their opponents. In Gehlen's view, those who actively contributed to this cannot absolve themselves of the consequences of their actions, even if they did not realize they were wrong or acted out of a consciousness of a higher humanistic right. "Responsibility is justified anthropologically, we are talking about institutional morality, and it is indifferent to other gods" .
In accordance with this understanding of institutions, the life of human society is stabilized through the medium of order and rules, as if arising from themselves. However, the guiding mechanism of all these processes, Gehlen once again warns, should be sought in a sphere close to instinctive, and in no case in reasoning about reasonable expediency. To confirm this thesis, he uses those data from the behavioral sciences that record in the instinctive sphere of animals and people the presence of factors that establish the order and regularity (regularity) of the action of certain animal mechanisms. Mechanisms that neutralize mutual individual aggression, or the so-called displacement reaction of animals in relation to those members of the group whose behavior clearly deviates from the norm, are meant by the formation of hierarchical orders.
Emphasizing the anthropological, semi-instinctive origin of the institutions that ensure the normal functioning of various human communities, Gehlen calls for a prudent and extremely cautious approach to changing existing institutions, since modern science of the biological mechanisms of human nature has come to the assumption that "social unrest unleashes aggression against members of their own social group". This conclusion of behavioral science seems to Gehlen to be especially significant, since, in his opinion, "today there are no restraining cultural factors and cruelty can take the most unrestrained forms."
This is how Gehlen's anthropological philosophy explains the nature of social conflicts, various class attitudes and aspirations. The pluralism of class political and ethical attitudes is replaced by a pluralism of semi-instinctive anthropological dispositions, independent of each other, motives that predetermine the nature of the moral impulse, and, ultimately, of any social and cultural activity. Considering modern humanistic ethics with its principles and norms of a universal character only as an ethics of family, blood relations, expanded and weakened by the strength of its impact, as an idealization and cultural stylization of certain requirements of anthropobiological origin, Gehlen actually comes to the denial of those values and ideals of modern humanity, under the banner which today it seeks to solve its vital problems, the problems of peaceful, equal and democratic cooperation. History itself, sociocultural reality in this anthropological philosophy are deprived of their independent meaning and significance and appear only as those forms that a person invented to make up for his biological insufficiency or for the optimal realization of his semi-instinctive aspirations.
Gehlen's thinking is permeated with deep disbelief in cultural, spiritual and moral possibilities. modern humanity. Convinced that a person in his actions is driven by blind vital-instinctive impulses, he turns to this very sphere of his being, to the sphere of the unconscious, and tries to explain all his life activity by the mechanisms of the biopsychological nature of a person. Under the flag of criticism of political and ideological extremism, which is unpopular today, he seeks to discredit any form of consistent defense of this or that social and moral ideal. Speaking against the so-called cultural super-specializations, against the radicalization of any way of thinking, Gehlen first of all takes up arms against modern pacifism and the national liberation movement (radicalization of nationalism). And here we find a completely definite ideological orientation of his "pluralistic ethics" and the social philosophy based on it. This ideological orientation of the anthropological philosophy of Gehlen is especially clearly manifested in his reasoning about the nature and functions of the state, and in particular the imperialist state. The state, like other institutions, according to Gehlen, is called into being to satisfy some "pre-political" and even "pre-human need" to ensure one's own security. Gehlen explains many of the foreign policy actions of the imperialist states by the same need for a secure existence. “Imperialism,” Gehlen writes, “is driven by the biological pressure of the growing masses,” and in this, in his opinion, “the truth that life feeds on life” finds its expression.
Such an interpretation of the nature of imperialism fully corresponds to Gehlen's anthropological and biological understanding of man, his desire to explain all social, spiritual and moral human activity by factors of vital biological origin. The biological one-sidedness of his conception of man is obvious. The social orientation of such a philosophical solution to the problem of man is also clearly visible.
