Subjective sensory reflection of reality. Perception and sensations as a sensually objective reflection of reality. Altered States of Consciousness
Moral (moral) feelings - the highest feelings, experiences associated with a person's attitude to other people, to society and to their social duties.
A person experiences moral feelings when perceiving the phenomena of reality from the point of view of moral value orientations developed by society. Such feelings arise when a person has not only ideas about duty, but also the need to comply with the moral requirements of society. A developed sense of duty creates conscience - moral responsibility for one's behavior before other people, society.
Everything that determines the communication of people belongs to the field of moral feelings: attitude towards oneself, towards others. These include: sympathy, a sense of trust and disposition towards people, a sense of camaraderie, friendship. A special feeling that develops between people is love. This is a feeling that arises between a man and a woman, between parents and children, etc.
Moral feelings also include feelings of national pride, international feelings, love for the motherland and for people representing other cultures and traditions.
Among moral feelings, moral and political ones stand out - these are experiences associated with a person’s emotional attitude to social institutions, to the state, system, etc. Such experiences, when coincident moral values unite people and give them a "sense of comradeship", solidarity - a single moral "we".
It is very important for a person to be able to defend his moral “I” in relationships with others and be able to solidify, gain a sense of “we” with those who adhere to value orientations that are of social significance.
73. SIGNS OF MORAL FEELINGS
In the following sections, I will discuss several aspects of the three stages of morality in more detail. The concept of the moral sense, the nature of the three psychological laws, and the process by which they are carried out require further comment. Turning to the first of these questions, I must explain that I will use the old term "sentiment" to designate permanent ordered families of governing dispositions, such as the sense of justice and human love (§ 30), as well as permanent attachment to particular individuals or associations, which is central to human life. So we have moral and natural feelings. I use the term "attitude" more broadly. Like feelings, attitudes are ordered families of dispositions, moral or natural, but they are not fixed or regulative. Finally, I will use the phrases "moral feeling" and "moral emotion" to refer to the feelings and emotions that we experience on specific occasions. I want to clarify the connection between moral feelings, attitudes, on the one hand, and the corresponding moral principles, on the other.
The main features of moral sentiments can probably be the best way clarified by considering the various questions that arise when trying to characterize them, and the various experiences in which they appear. It is worth considering their difference both from each other and from those natural attitudes and feelings with which they can be confused. So, first of all, the following questions arise, (a) What are the linguistic expressions that are used to express a particular moral feeling, and what are the significant variations, if any, of these expressions? (b) What are the characteristic behavioral signs of this feeling, and what are the ways in which a person usually shows how he feels? (c) What are the characteristic sensations and kinesthetic feelings, if any, that are associated with moral emotions? When a person is angry, for example, he feels hot; he may tremble and experience abdominal cramps. He may be unable to speak without a tremor in his voice; and perhaps he cannot refrain from gesturing. If there are such characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations of a moral feeling, they do not constitute feelings of guilt, shame, indignation, etc. These characteristic sensations and manifestations are neither necessary nor sufficient in specific cases of guilt in a person, shame or indignation. This is not to deny that certain characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations of excitement may be necessary if a person is overwhelmed with guilt, shame, or resentment. But for these feelings to be present, it is often sufficient that the person sincerely says that he feels guilty, ashamed, or resentful, and that he is willing to give a suitable explanation for why he feels this (assuming, of course, that he accepts this explanation as correct).
This last observation raises the main question about distinguishing moral feelings from other emotions and from each other, namely: (d) What is the defining type of explanation required for having a moral feeling, and how does an explanation of one feeling differ from an explanation of another? So, when we ask someone why they feel guilty, what answer do we expect? Of course, not every answer is acceptable. Simply pointing out the intended punishment is not enough; this could be an explanation for fear or dread, but not guilt. Similarly, the mention of harm or trouble that a person has experienced as a result of his past actions explains feelings of regret, but not guilt, and, all the more, not a feeling of remorse. Of course, fear and fear often accompany feelings of guilt for obvious reasons, but these emotions should not be confused with moral feelings. We must not assume, therefore, that the experience of guilt is something like a mixture of fear, dread, and regret. Fear and fear are not moral feelings at all, and regret is associated with some vision of our own good, being the result of, say, failure in advancing our interests by some prudently. Even phenomena such as neurotic guilt and other special cases are perceived as feelings of guilt, and not just as irrational fears and fears with a special explanation for the deviation from the norm. In such cases, it is always assumed that the deeper psychological research will reveal (or has already discovered) the essential similarity of these feelings of guilt.
In general, a necessary feature of moral feelings, and part of what distinguishes them from natural attitudes, is that a person's explanation of his experiences is based on moral concepts and principles associated with them. His explanation of his feelings comes down to knowing right and wrong (what is good and what is bad). When we question this explanation, we tend to cite various forms of guilt as counterexamples. This is understandable, since the most early forms Guilt feelings are authoritarian guilt feelings, and one can hardly grow up without having what might be called residual guilt feelings. For example, a person raised in a strict religious sect may have been taught that going to the theater is wrong. Although he doesn't believe it anymore, he still feels guilty about going to the theatre.
But this is not true guilt, as he has no intention of apologizing to anyone and decides never to go to plays again, etc. Indeed, he would rather say that he feels some awkwardness and similar feelings he experienced during the feeling of guilt. Assuming the validity of the contract doctrine, explanations of some moral sentiments rely on the principles of rightness that would be chosen in the original position, while other moral sentiments are associated with the notion of the good. For example, a person feels guilty because he knows he has taken more than he is entitled to (by some fair scheme) share, or because he has been unfair to others. Or a person feels ashamed because he was afraid and did not express his opinion. He failed to live up to the concept of moral worth he set out to achieve (§ 68). Moral feelings differ from each other in principles and their violations (faults), which are referred to when explaining feelings. For the most part, the characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations are the same, representing psychological disorders and having common features those.
It is worth noting that the same action can excite several moral feelings at once, if, of course, as it often happens, a suitable explanation can be given to each (§ 67). For example, a person who cheats may feel both guilty and ashamed; guilt due to the fact that he abused trust and unfairly took advantage of himself, and guilt is a reaction to the damage to others; shame, because by using such means he appeared in his own eyes (and the eyes of others) as a weak and unreliable person who resorts to dishonest and unworthy means to achieve his goals.
These explanations appeal to different principles and values, making it possible to discern the corresponding feelings; both explanations are often correct. We may add that it is not necessary for a man to have a moral sense that every statement in his explanation be true; it is enough that he accepts this explanation. A person can thus be deluded into thinking that he has taken more than he is entitled to. He may be innocent. However, he feels guilty because his explanation is the right kind, and although it is wrong, the person's opinions are sincere.
Further, there is a group of questions about the relationship of moral attitudes to actions: (e) What are the characteristic intentions, efforts and inclinations of the person experiencing this feeling? What kind of things does he intend to do, or find he cannot do? A person in anger will typically try to strike back or block the targets of the person they are angry with. When tormented by, say, guilt, a person desires to act properly in the future and seeks to modify his behavior accordingly. He is inclined to admit what he did and ask for the restoration of the original position, ready to accept punishment and demands for damages; he finds himself less inclined to judge others when they do wrong. The particular situation will determine which of these dispositions will be implemented; and we may also assume that the family of inferred dispositions varies according to the morality of the individual. It is clear, for example, that typical expressions of guilt and suitable explanations will differ as the ideals and roles of association morality become more complex and demanding; and these feelings, in turn, will be different from the emotions associated with moral principles. In justice as honesty, these variations are explained, first of all, by the content of the corresponding moral view. The structure of prescriptions, ideals and principles shows what kind of explanation is required.
We can further ask: (f) What emotions and reactions does a person experiencing a particular feeling expect from other people? How does he anticipate their reactions to him, say, in his various distorted interpretations of others' behavior towards him? Thus, a person who feels guilty, admits that his actions are a crime against the legitimate claims of other people, expects these others to condemn his behavior and try to punish him in various ways. He also assumes that a third party will treat him with resentment. The guilty person is thus sympathetic to the judgment and resentment of others and the ambiguities that arise from it. On the contrary, a person who feels shame expects ridicule and contempt. He is devoid of standards of perfection, succumbed to weakness, and showed himself unworthy of the association in which people who share his ideals are made. He fears that he will be rejected, become the object of contempt and ridicule.
Precisely because different principles are used in explanations of guilt and shame, we anticipate different attitudes in different people. Generally speaking, guilt, resentment, and resentment appeal to the concept of right, while shame, contempt, and ridicule appeal to the concept of the good. These remarks obviously extend to feelings of duty and obligation (if any) and to appropriate pride and self-esteem.
Finally, we may ask: (g) What are the characteristic urges to act that give rise to a moral feeling, and how is this feeling usually explained? Here again the already noted differences between moral emotions occur. Feelings of guilt and shame have different contexts and are overcome different ways, and these variations reflect the defining principles with which they are associated and their particular psychological basis. Thus, for example, guilt is alleviated by reparation and forgiveness, which can lead to reconciliation; shame passes due to the correction of vices, the renewal of faith in the perfection of the individual. It is also clear that indignation and resentment have their characteristic modes of resolution, since the former is caused by what we consider to be an injury done to us, and the latter refers to an injury done to another.
Yet the differences between feelings of guilt and shame are so great that it is useful to note how they correspond to the distinctions made between different aspects of morality. As we have seen, the lack of any virtue can lead to shame; it is enough for a man to highly appreciate those actions that he ranks among his perfections (§ 67). Likewise, doing wrong always leads to guilt if others are harmed in some way or their rights violated. Thus, guilt and shame reflect the preoccupation with others and with oneself that must always be present in moral behavior. Nevertheless, some virtues, and hence the moral qualities that give them significance, are more typical of one sentiment than another, and therefore more closely related to it. Thus, in particular, the moral qualities of actions that go beyond duty ensure the appearance of shame; indeed, they represent higher forms of moral perfection, human love and self-control, and by choosing them one runs the risk of failing to conform to their essential nature. It would be a mistake, however, to single out one feeling over another completely. moral concept. The theory of rightness and justice is based on the notion of reciprocity, which reconciles the viewpoints of self and others as equal moral persons. This reciprocity leads to the fact that both points of view characterize both moral thinking and feeling in approximately equal measure. Neither concern for others nor our own take precedence, for all are equal; and the balance of personalities is given by the principles of justice. And where this balance shifts to one of the parties, as in the case of actions that go beyond the bounds of duty, it comes from the "I", voluntarily taking on a large part. Thus, while we may represent points of view
"I" and others as characteristics of some moral qualities in historical terms or in terms of a certain perspective within complete concept, the complete moral doctrine includes both. By themselves, the morality of shame or guilt is only part of the moral view.
In these remarks, I emphasized two main points. First, moral attitudes cannot be identified with characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations, even if they exist. Moral feelings require certain types of explanations. Second, the moral attitude involves the acceptance of special moral virtues; and the principles that define these virtues are used to explain the corresponding feelings. The judgments that shed light on different emotions differ from each other in the standards used in the explanation. Guilt and shame, repentance and regret, indignation and indignation either appeal to principles belonging to different parts of morality, or address them from the opposite point of view. Ethical theory must explain and make room for these distinctions, although each theory seems to attempt to do so in its own way.
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Signs of the Three Selves Each of the three Selves is responsible for its own area. The Basic Self maintains and governs the body and provides the instinctive wisdom and energy necessary for a normal life. The conscious self collects and processes information
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1. The Origin of Moral Appraisals 253 An attempt to think about morality without falling under its spell, not trusting the cunning of its beautiful gestures and looks. A world that we can revere, that responds to our natural desire for worship, the truth of which
It reflects the peculiarities of culture in a peculiar way.
Types of feelings and their formation. Psychology does not have a generally accepted classification of the types of feelings. It is customary to distinguish the following types: moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings.
Moral (moral) feelings express the relation of man to man and, more broadly, to society. The basis of the assessment that these feelings objectively receive from others is moral standards regulating the behavior of the individual in all spheres of its public life. Moral feelings include: love (in the broad and narrow sense of the word), compassion, benevolence, humanity, devotion, etc.
The question of the education of feelings, and especially moral ones, remains one of the most important in the work of a teacher. The formation of the moral feelings of the younger generation provides the fundamental basis for a person's high citizenship.
Intellectual Feelings express and reflect the attitude to the process of cognition, its success and failure. In psychology, deep connections have been revealed between mental and emotional processes that develop in unity. In the interaction of these processes, the role of feelings is that they act as a kind of regulator of intellectual activity. Both in phylogenesis and ontogenesis, the development of feelings occurs in unity with the cognitive activity of a person, which gives rise to an emotional response, experiences in him, is associated with an assessment of the process of cognition and its results.
Intellectual feelings include surprise, curiosity, doubt, the joy of discovery, love of truth, etc. Thus, thanks to the feeling of surprise, a person begins to carefully analyze, evaluate a new situation, navigate it, strive to resolve the contradiction that has arisen.
V.A. Sukhomlinsky, implementing the method of emotional “awakening of the mind”, he brought up in children surprise in front of “phenomena of nature, in front of objects that seemed to be known, but full of new, mysterious - ancient mounds, a click of cranes, the night sky, etc., emphasizing that the absence or loss of a sense of surprise in a child does not stimulate the knowledge of the mysteries of being, impoverishes his inner world. "The most beautiful and deepest emotion that we can experience is a sense of mystery. In it is the source of all true knowledge," wrote A. Einstein.
In the process of cognition, a person constantly puts forward hypotheses, refuting or confirming them, looking for the most correct ways to solve the problem, sometimes he is mistaken and again goes on the right track. The search for truth can be accompanied by a feeling of doubt - an emotional experience of the coexistence of two or more opinions competing in the mind of the subject about possible ways to solve the problem ("doubt"). Finally, the very solution of the issue, the discovery of the truth (or its assimilation) can be accompanied by a sense of certainty. The feeling of confidence in the justice of the idea, in the truth of what a person has known, is support for him in difficult moments of the struggle to put into practice the convictions that he came to through active cognitive activity.
aesthetic feelings reflect and express the attitude of the subject to various facts of life and their reflection in art as something beautiful or ugly, tragic or comic, sublime or vulgar, elegant or rude. These feelings are manifested in appropriate assessments, in artistic tastes and are experienced as emotions of aesthetic pleasure and delight, or, if their object is inconsistent with the aesthetic criteria of the individual, as emotions of contempt, disgust, etc. Aesthetic feelings are a product of the cultural development of man, the process of formation of his consciousness. The level of development and content of aesthetic feelings (as, indeed, moral and intellectual feelings) acts as an essential indicator of its social maturity.
As an example of a specific aesthetic sense, a sense of humor can be considered, which is based on the ability of a person to notice their comical aspects in phenomena, responding emotionally to them. A sense of humor is associated with the ability of the subject to notice, and sometimes exaggerate, the opposite of positive and negative traits in any person, the paradoxical nature of their combination, the apparent significance of someone and behavior that does not correspond to it, etc. A sense of humor implies that its subject has a positive ideal, without which it degenerates into negative phenomena: vulgarity, cynicism, anger, etc. One can judge the presence or absence of a sense of humor by the way a person understands jokes, witticisms, cartoons, caricatures, catches the comedy of the situation, whether he is able to laugh not only at others, but also at himself. The absence or insufficient severity of a sense of humor indicates a reduced emotional level and underdevelopment of a person's personality. The sometimes weak development of a sense of humor in adolescents and young men, as well as its degeneration into cynicism and vulgarity, is an alarming signal for teachers and parents.
Moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings are experienced by a person in activity and communication and are sometimes referred to as higher feelings, in view of the fact that they contain all the richness of a person's emotional relationship to reality. Calling feelings “higher” emphasizes their generality, stability and irreducibility to momentary emotional experiences, their specifically human character, since animals do not have even remote analogues of higher feelings.
At the same time, the conventionality of the concept of “higher feelings” should be emphasized, since they include not only, for example, moral, but also immoral feelings (selfishness, greed, envy, etc.), i.e., in essence, low emotional manifestations of personality. Finally, in the absence of a precise classification criterion, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings can hardly be differentiated in psychological analysis. The sense of humor, being aesthetic, at the same time can be considered as an intellectual (if it is associated with the ability to notice contradictions in the surrounding reality) and at the same time as a moral sense. All this emphasizes the unity of the emotional sphere of a person's personality.
Emotions and feelings are a person's experience of his attitude to what he perceives or imagines, what he thinks or says, what he does, what he strives for. Subjectively, these relationships are experienced as pleasant (pleasure) or unpleasant (displeasure).
Feelings- this is one of the forms of reflection of the objective world in the mind of a person, experiencing by him his attitude to everything that he knows and does, to what surrounds him.
Sources of emotions and feelings are objectively existing objects and phenomena, activities performed, changes occurring in our body. At different times, the significance of the same objects for a person is not the same. The peculiarity of emotions and feelings is determined by the needs, aspirations, intentions of a person, the characteristics of his will, character. With a change in motives, his attitude to the subject of need also changes. This shows the personal attitude of a person to reality.
The concepts of "feelings" and "emotions" mean two different, albeit interconnected, phenomena of the emotional sphere of a person. Emotions are considered to be a simpler, immediate experience at the moment, associated with the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of needs (fear, anger, joy, etc.). Emotions associated with the satisfaction of organic needs are also present in animals. But in man, even these emotions bear the stamp of social development. Manifesting as direct reactions to objects of the environment, emotions are associated with initial impressions. So, the first impression of meeting a new person is purely emotional, is a direct reaction to some external manifestation of his needs.
A feeling is more complex than emotions, a constant, well-established attitude of a person (a sense of patriotism, collectivism, duty and responsibility for the assigned work, conscience, shame, love of work, pride). Being a complex form of reflection that generalizes emotional reflection and concepts, feelings are peculiar only to a person. They are socially conditioned. Feelings are expressed in emotions, but not continuously, and may not be expressed in any particular experience at the moment.
Common to emotions and feelings are the functions that they perform in the life of humans and animals. Thus, animal studies have established that emotions perform signaling and regulatory functions. The same functions are performed in humans by emotions and feelings. The signal function of emotions and feelings is associated with the fact that they are accompanied by expressive movements: mimic (facial muscle movements), pantomime (body muscle movements, gestures), voice changes, vegetative changes (sweating, redness or blanching of the skin). These manifestations of emotions and feelings signal to other people what emotions and feelings a person is experiencing.
The regulative function of feelings is expressed in the fact that persistent experiences direct our behavior, support it, and force us to overcome obstacles encountered on the way. Regulatory mechanisms of emotions relieve excess emotional arousal. When emotions reach extreme tension, they are transformed into processes such as the secretion of lacrimal fluid, contraction of facial and respiratory muscles. Crying usually lasts no more than 15 minutes. This time is quite enough to discharge the excess voltage. Following this, a person experiences some relaxation, slight stupor, stupefaction, which is generally perceived as a relief.
TO types of higher senses include intellectual, moral and aesthetic feelings.
Intellectual Feelings are feelings associated with cognitive activity person. The existence of intellectual feelings (surprise, curiosity, curiosity, a sense of joy about the discovery made, a feeling of doubt about the correctness of the decision, a feeling of confidence that the proof is correct, etc.) is a clear evidence of the relationship between human intelligence and emotions.
moral feelings(moral feelings) - these are feelings that reflect a person's attitude to the requirements of public morality. Moral feelings are the most important regulator of behavior human motivational basis of interpersonal relationships.
TO moral feelings include: a sense of duty, humanity, benevolence, love, friendship, patriotism, sympathy, etc. Separately, one can distinguish moral and political feelings This group feelings manifests itself in emotional attitudes towards various public institutions and organizations, as well as towards the state as a whole. TO immoral feelings greed, selfishness, rigidity, malevolence, etc. can be attributed.
aesthetic feelings- these are the feelings that arise in a person in connection with the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of his aesthetic needs. These are the feelings that reflect and express the attitude of the subject to various facts of life and their reflection in art as something beautiful or ugly, tragic or comic, sublime or past, elegant or rude.
