The main criterion of truth in dialectical materialism is. Dialectics is a materialistic conception of truth. A complete, comprehensive understanding of the subject
The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge is based onknowledge of the objective existence of the material world and its reflections in the human mind.
But if the world exists objectively, outside of us and independentlyfrom us, then its true reflection in consciousness, that is, our true knowledge about objects, phenomena real world, in their content are also objective, independent of the will and consciousness of any dey. After all, a person can think only about objects, phenomena ortheir elements that really exist. And this means that in our thoughts contain a lot of things that depend not on us, but on the things we think about.
V. I. Lenin said that objective truth- it's like that the content of human knowledge that does not depend on consciousnessand the will of people and corresponds to reflected objects, phenomena of the material world. Objective truth is a correct reflectionnotion of objective reality in human ideas,concepts, ideas and theories.
The ideal is nothing but the material, transplantedinto the human head and transformed in it, wrote K. Marx.Therefore, our sensations, ideas, concepts, since they arose due to the impact of material objects on our senses, are not the fruit of an empty fantasy that wears purely subjective. They are in their content have such sides, moments that reflect objects, phenomena of the material world. But since our thoughts are are objects “transplanted into a human head and transformed in it", they contain something that introduced into them by human consciousness, that is, elements, momentssubjective. The presence of subjective elements in thoughts explain nyatsyathe fact that knowledge of the objective world is always humanchess knowledge. It follows that the depth and reliability reflections of the material world in consciousness to a certain extent depend on the cognizer, on the level of his development, on the presence of experience and knowledge, from the personal abilities of the researcher.
Sensations, ideas, concepts, said V. I. Lenin, these are subjective images of objective objects of the material world. These images cannot be called absolutely identical with the previous ones.metaphors that they reflect, nor completely different from them.
In this regard, the question arises: does objective truth givecomplete, exhaustive knowledge about the subject, or does it contain incomplete, approximate knowledge about it? Answers correctly this question is the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the absolute and relativestrong truth.
absolute truth This is such an objective truth that contains a complete and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of objects,phenomena of the material world. Because of this, the absolute truthcan never be refuted. Cognizing objects, phenomena, patterns of the objective world, a person cannot comprehend the absolute truth at once in its entirety, finally, but masters it gradually. The movement towards absolute truth is accomplished throughcountless relative truths, that is, suchty, positions, theories, which basically correctly reflectphenomena of objective reality, but in the process of development science and social practice are continuously refined, specific tyzed, deepened; they make up a moment, a side, a stustump on the way to mastering the absolute truth.
Absolute truth, wrote V. I. Lenin, “is made up of sumswe are relative truths. Each stage in the development of science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, being oncemoved, then narrowed by the further growth of knowledge” 1 .
The limits of our knowledge are historically limited, but asdevelopment and improvement of the practice of humanity all the time approaches absolute truth, never exhausting it toend. And this is quite understandable. The objective world is in constanta dynamic process of movement and development. At any stage of thisdevelopment of human thought is not able to cover all the diversitysides of an ever-evolving reality, but is capable of reflectingto see the world only partially, relatively, within the boundaries determined bydevelopment of science and social practice.
This, however, does not mean that absolute truth issome kind of obviously unattainable ideal, to which a personcan only strive, but never reach it. Between
absolute and relative truths there is no abyss,impassable border; its side absolute truth entersinto every objective truth, into every truly scientific into every scientifically based theory. But the objectactive truth contains moments and relativity, not completeness.
In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, summarizing Marksist doctrine of the relationship between absolute and relative truthny, V. I. Lenin wrote: “From the point of view of modern materialism, i.e. Marxism, historically conditional limits closerof our knowledge to objective, absolute truth, but unconditional Butthe existence of this truth is certainly what we are approaching let's go to her. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but what is certain is that this picture depicts an objectively existing model.Historically conditional is when and under what conditions wemoved in their knowledge of the essence of things before the discovery of alizarion in coal tar or before the discovery of electrons in the atom,but what is certain is that each such discovery is a step forward of "undoubtedly objective knowledge." In a word, historically Every ideology is catchy, but what is certain is that every scientific ideology (unlike, for example, religious) corresponds to objective truth, absolute nature" 1 .
The essence of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the absolute and fromrelative truth lies in the fact that it considers the relativephysical truth as a moment, a stage, a stage of cognition of the absolute truth. Therefore, any truly scientific truth isitself at the same time both absolute truth, since it basically correctly reflects a certain side of the objective world, and relative truth, since it reflects this sideobjective reality is incomplete, approximately.
Dialectical-materialistic interpretation of absolute and relativesolid truth is important for the fight against relativism (from lat. relativus - relative), which does not recognize the objectivity of scientific knowledge, exaggerates their relativity, undermines faith in the cognitive abilities of thought cognition and ultimately leads to the denial of the possibility of cognition peace.
But the struggle against relativism does not mean a general denial of the relative nature of this or that truth. V. I. Lenin reemphatically emphasizes that materialist dialectics knows the relativity of our knowledge, but not in the sense of negationobjective truth, but in the sense of the historical conventionality of the limits bringing our knowledge closer to absolute truth.
The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of truth is directed not only against relativism, but also against dogmatists who believe that ourknowledge consists of "eternal" and unchanging truths. It decisively rejects the metaphysical view of truth as a collection of laws.fixed, unchanging provisions that can only be memorizedand apply in all situations. Emphasizing the great importance that laws, concepts, generaltheoretical positions, etc., dialectical materialismat the same time, he notes that they cannot be absolutized. Even suchgeneral propositions, the truth of which has been proven and verified by practicetics, cannot be applied to special cases formally, without taking into account specific conditions of this phenomenon.
Since the world is in a state of constant changenia, development, renewal, then our knowledge about it "can not beabstract, immutable, fit for all time and forall occasions of life. Human cognition is a continuous process of refining old ones and discovering new ones, previouslyunknown aspects of the objective world. To reflect continuous new development of reality, our knowledge must be flexible, mobile, changeable. New, emerging very often does not fit into the framework of old, familiar concepts and ideas. settings. Old truths need to be constantly changedclarifications, reflecting new patterns that are notset in itself is born, new.
TRUE- Correspondence between human knowledge and its subject. Dialectical materialism understands truth as a historical process of reflection of the ever-developing reality by human consciousness.
Materialism and idealism differ not only in the solution of the question of what is original - spirit or nature - but also in the second side of the main philosophical question: can our ideas and concepts be true reflections of reality.
Dialectical materialism considers cognition as a historically developing process of ever deeper and more complete comprehension of the laws of development of nature and society, a more and more faithful reflection of reality. Agnosticism denies the possibility of knowing the objective world. Agnostics argue that we are always given only our subjective experiences and therefore it is impossible to determine whether or not the external world exists.
Subjective idealists identify objective reality with their consciousness.
Objective idealism considers the concept of reason to be true reality. From his point of view, it is not the concept that reflects reality, but "external reality corresponds to its concept."
The problem of truth in the history of philosophy. The problem of truth and its criterion has always been one of the most important questions of philosophy. The first Greek materialist philosophers did not yet realize the complexity of the problem of truth and believed that truth is given directly by perception and reflection. But even they already understood that the essence and appearance of things do not always coincide. So, Democritus (see) writes: “apparently sweet, bitter, warm, cold, colors; in reality, it is atoms and empty space.” Sophists led by Protagoras (see) put forward the doctrine of the subjectivity of truth. Therefore, they denied objective truth. According to Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things." Opponents of the extreme subjectivism of the sophists were Socrates And Plato (cm.). But, reflecting the interests of the aristocratic groups leaving the historical scene, Socrates and Plato took the path of an idealistic solution to the problem of knowledge. Man, according to Socrates, "must look into himself in order to know what truth is." According to the objective idealist Plato, the comprehension of truth is carried out only through thinking, purified from the "chaff" of sensory perception.
Truth itself is understood as an absolute, achievable due to the fact that thought easily comprehends what it itself has produced, that is, the eternal and unchanging world of ideas. The criterion of truth consists in the clarity and distinctness of our mental concepts.
Aristotle (see), fluctuating between materialism and idealism, understood the problem of the relation of knowledge to the external world more sharply than idealists. His natural philosophy is close to materialism, and in it he actually strives for the scientific knowledge of truth. Aristotle gave a broad critique of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, but in solving the problem of truth, he nevertheless turned out to be very close to Plato. The subject of true knowledge for Aristotle can only be the necessary and unchanging, and the truth is known through thinking.
Skepticism (Sextus Empiricus in the 2nd-3rd centuries AD), which developed under the conditions of the decay of Greco-Roman culture, undermined the authority of scientific thinking and thereby facilitated the class task of the growing church - strengthening the authority of faith and revelation.
Medieval philosophy taught that God is the only and eternal truth, for the comprehension of which one must delve into oneself, for true truth is given not in external experience, but through revelation. In the era of the beginning decline of feudalism, in the 13th century, the doctrine of dual truth appeared, recognizing the independence of scientific and philosophical truth from religious. Some position may be true from the point of view of philosophy and false from the point of view of religion, theology, and vice versa. This teaching expressed the desire to escape from the fetters of the boundless authority of priesthood, but did not yet dare to openly refute religious truths.
The materialism of modern times, in its struggle with scholasticism, advances natural science as the only true science. bacon (see) recognizes feelings, not revelation, as an infallible source of knowledge. Bacon considers experience to be the only correct way to reveal the truth, that is, the real laws of nature. Bacon points out that in order to discover the truth, people must overcome a lot of prejudices and delusions. But Bacon understands truth metaphysically, only as absolute truth. Locke (see), giving a deep critique of the theory of innate ideas and substantiating the experimental origin of human knowledge, but stands on a dualistic position in solving the problem of cognition. The knowledge of truth occurs, according to Locke, both through the coordination of our sensory experiences or ideas, and as a result of the internal activity of the soul or reflection. From here, Locke came to the recognition of divine revelation through the revelation of a deity. Locke's contradictions and inconsistencies cleared the way for subjective idealism Berkeley (see) and skepticism Yuma (cm.).
Hume believes that "only perceptions are given to consciousness and nothing can be known to it from experience regarding the connection of these perceptions with external objects." Correspondence between the course of phenomena in nature and the sequence of our ideas is possible only through habit, which governs all our knowledge and all our actions. Thus, there can be no question of any objective, true scientific knowledge. Truth, according to Hume, is incomprehensible either rationalistically or sensationally.
The problem of truth is the central core of philosophy Kant (cm.). Kant's philosophy set itself the task of investigating to what extent thinking is capable of bringing us the knowledge of truth in general. Considering sensory knowledge unreliable, Kant argues that only a priori knowledge, independent of experience, is true. Mathematics is for Kant a model of unconditionally reliable knowledge, acquired independently of any experience.
Recognizing existence objective reality"things in themselves", Kant at the same time considers it unknowable. Reason is the legislator only in the field of phenomena, and its laws have nothing to do with "things in themselves." For Kant, objective knowledge is not knowledge that corresponds to an object, but generally valid knowledge that becomes objective due to the unchanging unity (apperception) of normal human consciousness. The criterion of truth for Kant lies "in the universal and necessary rules of reason", and "that which contradicts them is a lie, since reason contradicts general rules thinking, i.e., to oneself.” Having declared the world of things outside of us, although existing, but forever fundamentally unknowable, Kant, in essence, did not leave the limits of subjectivism in solving the problem of truth. Knowledge does not go beyond phenomena and depends entirely on the cognizing subject.
Lenin says: “The finite, transient, relative, conditional character of human knowledge (its categories, causality, etc., etc.) was taken by Kant as subjectivism, and not for the dialectic of the idea (= nature itself), tearing cognition from the object” (“Philosophical Notebooks”, p. 198). Kant himself admits that he "limited the field of knowledge in order to make room for faith."
Against extreme subjectivism critical philosophy Kant came up with Hegel's system of absolute objective idealism. Hegel made it his task not to discard the content of the concrete real world, like Kant, but to absorb this content into his system, not to take the external world beyond the limits of cognition, but to make it an object of cognition.
He subjected Kant's analysis of the faculty of cognition before and independently of the process of cognition to a devastating critique; he compared this setup to trying to learn how to swim without entering the water. The cognitive abilities of man are revealed in the entire history of knowledge, and "the real form of truth can only be its scientific system." Unlike all previous metaphysical philosophy, which understood truth as something complete, given once and for all, as a given, ready-made, minted coin, Hegel for the first time considers truth as a process. In The Phenomenology of the Spirit, he considers the history of knowledge, developing and rising from the lower levels (sensory certainty) to the highest philosophy of absolute idealism. Hegel is coming close (but only coming) to the understanding that the path to truth lies through the practical, expedient activity of man. For the first time, Hegel considers all past philosophical thought not as a "gallery of delusions", but as successive steps in the cognition of truth. Hegel writes: “Only the unity of opposites is truth. In every judgment there is truth and falsehood.
Engels evaluates the Hegelian doctrine of truth in the following way: “The truth that philosophy was supposed to know, seemed to Hegel no longer in the form of a collection of ready-made dogmatic propositions that can only be memorized once they are discovered; for him, the truth consisted in the very process of cognition, in the long historical development of science, rising from the lower levels of knowledge to the highest, but never reaching a point from which it, having found the so-called absolute truth, could no longer go further ”( Marx and Engels, Soch., vol. XIV, p. 637).
But Hegel was an idealist and considered objective thought to be the essence of things. Thinking, in his opinion, finds in the object the content that it itself produced and cognized. Therefore, the problem of truth is resolved by Hegel very simply, as a matter of course: our mind cognizes only the rational content of nature and through it comes to absolute knowledge. Marx says that truth for Hegel is " machine which proves itself” (Marx and Engels, Soch., vol. III, p. 102). And although Hegel was the first to consider truth as a process, however, idealism led him to the recognition that the process can be completed and absolute truth can be known. Hegel himself declared that absolute truth is given in his - Hegel's - philosophy. The criterion of truth for Hegel is the activity of reason. Thinking itself gives approval and recognizes the object as corresponding to it.
Solution of the problem of truth by dialectical materialism. Proceeding from the recognition of the objective reality of the world outside of us and its reflection in our consciousness, dialectical materialism recognizes objective truth, i.e., the presence in human ideas and concepts of such content, “which does not depend on the subject, does not depend either on the person or on humanity” (Lenin, Soch., vol. XIII, p. 100). Lenin exposes the reactionary, anti-scientific character of all theories that deny objective truth. Machism, which replaces the concept of "objective" with the concept of "generally valid", erases the distinction between science and priesthood, for religion is still "generally valid" to a greater extent than science. For the materialist, however, only science is capable of giving objective truth. Lenin writes that "to every scientific ideology (as distinct from, for example, religious) there corresponds objective truth, absolute nature" (Lenin, Soch., vol. XIII, p. 111).
In understanding objective and absolute truth, dialectical materialism fundamentally diverges from mechanical materialism. Mechanical, metaphysical materialism also recognizes the existence of objective truth, which is a reflection in our consciousness of the external world. But he does not understand the historical character of truth. For a metaphysical materialist, this reflection can be either absolutely correct or absolutely erroneous, false. Objective truth, therefore, can be known in its entirety and without remainder. Relative and absolute truth are thus separated from each other.
Dialectical materialism proceeds from the fact that the reflection of the material world in our minds is relative, conditional, historically limited. But dialectical materialism does not reduce this relativity of human cognition to subjectivism and relativism. Lenin emphasizes that the materialistic dialectic of Marx and Engels includes relativism, but is not reduced to it. It recognizes the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense of the historical conventionality of the limits of our knowledge's approach to this truth. Lenin wrote that human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, isolation, but objective in "the whole, in the process, as a result, in the trend, in the source."
Engels waged a merciless struggle against the recognition of metaphysical eternal truths [ Dühring (see) etc.]. But he by no means denied absolute truth. Engels clearly raised the question of whether the products of human knowledge can have sovereign significance and claim to be unconditionally true, and gave an equally clear answer to it. “Human thinking,” he writes, “exists only as the individual thinking of many billions of past, present and future people ... the sovereignty of thinking is exercised in a number of extremely non-sovereign thinking people... In this sense, human thinking is as sovereign as it is non-sovereign ... It is sovereign and unlimited in its inclinations, in its purpose, in its capabilities, in its historical ultimate goal; but it is non-sovereign and limited in terms of individual realization, in terms of reality given at one time or another” (Marx and Engels, Soch., vol. XIV, pp. 86 and 87).
The same dialectical understanding of the problem of truth is developed by Lenin. “For dialectical materialism,” he says, “there is no intransitive line between relative and absolute truth ... historically conventional limits approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth, but undoubtedly the existence of this truth is certain that we are approaching it. The contours of the picture are historically conventional, but what is certain is that this picture depicts an objectively existing model” (Lenin, Soch., vol. XIII, p. 111). Thus, the absoluteness of objective truth is not at all expressed in the fact that truth reaches the final pinnacle of cognition and final fullness, beyond which nothing remains unseen. Truth is absolute precisely because it has no limit (constantly developing, moving from one stage of development of knowledge to a new, higher one). These stages of development of absolute truth are relative truths. Our knowledge is only approximately correct, because the further development of science will show their limitations, the need to establish new laws in place of those previously formulated. But any relative truth, although incomplete, reflects objective reality. And in this sense, every relative truth contains absolute truth. This is what makes it possible to be guided by this truth in practice, although it is not complete enough.
The solution of the problem of truth by dialectical materialism has nothing in common with the relativistic and agnostic attitude in these matters. Relativism (see) interprets the relativity of truth subjectively, in the spirit of agnosticism. According to him, we cannot know the truth in its objective meaning. Thus, the Machists, denying in general the possibility of going beyond the limits of our sensations and cognizing the objective world, logically come to the denial of objective and absolute truth. All truth, from their point of view, is subjective and relative. There is no need to talk about the reflection of objective reality in truth, because no objective reality exists, or at least we cannot cognize it. Therefore, all truths are subjective and equal. In the realm of politics, relativism is a methodology of unprincipled opportunism and double dealing.
Agnosticism fundamentally denies the possibility of knowing objective truth, puts a limit to human knowledge, limiting it to the study of only the sphere of one's own sensations and denying the possibility of going beyond them.
Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, although it affirms the relativity of any concrete truth, although it denies the possibility of exhausting the knowledge of matter, does not put a limit on human knowledge, but, on the contrary, substantiates and proves its limitless possibilities.
N. Ovander .
The specificity of truth. Truth must be distinguished from formal correctness. Lenin pointed out that such a reflection is possible, which, while grasping some aspects of what is being displayed, is still not a true reflection, is not the truth. Lenin's words "formally correct, but in essence a mockery" are well-known. Truth, as opposed to formal correctness, means revealing the entire depth of reality. True knowledge is ensured only when the phenomenon under study is taken in all its concrete diversity, in all its "connections and mediations". On this basis, Lenin defines the essence of dialectical cognition as the unfolding of the totality of the moments of reality. Only such concrete cognition is opposed to formally correct cognition, which arbitrarily selects certain facts or examples to defend any position and thus directly distorts reality.
Of course, we can never exhaust the totality of facts, but, as Lenin says, "the demand for comprehensiveness warns us against mistakes and deadness." Therefore, the truth is always a concrete truth, reflecting the phenomenon in its specificity, due to the given specific conditions of place and time.
Lenin formulated the demand for concrete thinking as one of the basic requirements of dialectical materialism and severely criticized R. Luxemburg, Plekhanov, Kautsky and others for the abstract-formal approach to resolving the most important questions of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.
In natural science, as in the social sciences, truth is concrete. Attempts to interpret the simplest statements like “2 × 2 = 4” as “eternal” truths reveal only the vulgarity of those who claim this, because they present as something developing science something that is actually very meager and flat in content. Nature itself, developing, changes, and this cannot but be reflected in the actual data of natural science and in the laws formulated by it.
Practice as a criterion of truth. philosophical thought before Marx, it struggled in vain to solve the problem of truth, among other things, because it considered knowledge outside of practice, outside the activity of historical man, pursuing his own goals and actively influencing the surrounding nature to change it in his own interests. Materialist dialectics makes practice, understood primarily in its socio-historical content, the basis of its theory of knowledge. Practice is both the source of knowledge and the criterion of its truth. If the actions performed on the basis of a particular theory are successful, then the objective correctness of the reflection of reality in this theory is confirmed. Practice checks the depth and fidelity of the reflection of reality in knowledge.
In bourgeois philosophy there are also occasional references to the role of practice as a criterion of truth. But the bourgeoisie's understanding of practice is fundamentally different from the Marxist-Leninist one. Practice is understood, firstly, as subjective, and not social and not historical, and secondly, as narrow vulgar practicality and businesslikeness. For example, bourgeois pragmatism (see) identifies truth with practice, understood as the activity of an individual. In the activity of a person, pragmatists consider the satisfaction of his aesthetic, physical, and other needs to be the main one. True, from their point of view, is the judgment that "is beneficial to me", which "works for us." Based on this subjective-idealistic interpretation of practice, pragmatists also consider religious experiences to be "beneficial" and, therefore, true. Most of the bourgeois philosophical currents are looking for a criterion of truth in the very process of thinking. For Kant, the criterion of truth is the universality and necessity of judgments, for Bogdanov - the universal validity of truth, for modern supporters of formal mathematical logic (Ressel and others) - the logical deduction of the concepts of one from the other on the basis of mathematical laws.
Marxism-Leninism considers socio-historical practice as something objective, independent of the consciousness of an individual, although it fully recognizes the active role of the will and consciousness of individuals and groups. In the socio-historical practice of classes, it is possible to check how much the consciousness of individual people or a whole class reflects reality, the knowledge of which class is capable of reflecting with the greatest completeness and correctness of reflection for a given level of development of society, and the knowledge of which class is incapable of this. Lenin emphasizes the importance of practice in the process of cognition, as a link leading from the subjective idea to objective truth, which is the transition of the first to the second, and depicts the development of truth in the process historical development nature and society as follows: “Life gives birth to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying in his practice and technique the correctness of these reflections (about practice), a person comes to objective truth.
Party truth. Since the knowledge of truth is connected with social, industrial practice, truth is class and party. Bourgeois philosophy interprets partisanship as a narrow, limited point of view, incapable of rising above group interests to universal human truth. Objective truth is non-partisan and apolitical. All the leaders of the Second International adhere to this same point of view, and they also deny the class and partisan nature of truth.
Dialectical materialism shows that only the class party point of view of the proletariat can consistently and correctly reflect objective truth, for only the proletariat, which owns the future, is interested in the most correct and profound study of the laws governing the objective development of nature and society. The bourgeoisie, in the period of the general crisis of capitalism, becomes interested in distorting the actual relations between classes, which leads it to the inability to correctly reflect the entire objective reality. Bourgeois science was capable of reflecting objective truth at a time when the bourgeoisie was a revolutionary and progressive class, although even then it was unable to give such a deep and correct reflection of the truth as proletarian science can give. The contemporary bourgeoisie openly renounces most of the scientific tendencies contained (albeit often in a mystified form) in classical bourgeois philosophy and science, and takes the path of open support for clergy. This does not mean that bourgeois science is no longer able to produce this or that discovery, invention, to correctly determine this or that factual data. But in explaining these facts, in philosophical basis, which is subsumed under this explanation, i.e., precisely in what determines the true scientific nature of research, the bourgeoisie reveals its impotence and hostility to objective truth.
Lit.: Marx K., Poverty of Philosophy, in the book: Marx and Engels, Soch., vol. V, M.-L., 1929; Marx on Feuerbach, ibid., vol. IV, M., 1933; Engels F., "Anti-Dühring", "Dialectics of Nature", ibid., volume XIV, M.-L., 1931; V. I. Lenin, Works, 3rd ed., vol. XIII (“Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”), vol. III (“The Development of Capitalism in Russia”, preface to the second edition), vol. XXVI (“On trade unions, on Current Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes”, “Once Again About the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin”), vol. XVII (“On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”); his own, Philosophical Notebooks, [L.], 1934; Stalin, I., Questions of Leninism, 10th ed., [M.], 1935.
G. Tatulov
TSB 1st ed., 1935, v. 29, room 637-644
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM- system philosophical views K. Marx and F. Engels, which Engels characterized as dialectical materialism, opposing it not only to idealism, but also to all previous materialism as a denial of philosophy as a science of sciences, opposed, on the one hand, to all particular sciences, and on the other hand, to practice . “This,” wrote Engels, “in general is no longer philosophy, but simply a worldview, which must find confirmation for itself not in some special science of sciences, but in real sciences” ( Marx K., Engels F. Works, vol. 20, p. 142). At the same time, Engels emphasizes the positive, dialectical character of this negation of all previous philosophy. “Philosophy is thus ‘sublated’ here, i.e. “simultaneously overcome and preserved”, overcome in form, preserved in its actual content” (ibid.).
The dialectical character of Marxist philosophy was directly connected, firstly, with the materialist reworking of Hegel's idealist dialectics and, secondly, with the dialectical reworking of the former metaphysical materialism. Marx wrote: “The mystification that dialectics underwent in the hands of Hegel did not at all prevent the fact that it was Hegel who was the first to give a comprehensive and conscious image of its universal forms of movement. Hegel has dialectics on his head. It is necessary to put it on its feet in order to open the rational grain under the mystical shell” (ibid., vol. 23, p. 22). Marx considered materialist dialectics not as a specifically philosophical, but as a general scientific method of research, which he, as is well known, applied in his Capital. Engels also assessed dialectics in the same way, emphasizing that natural scientists need to master this method in order to solve their scientific problems and overcome idealistic and metaphysical errors. At the same time, he referred to the great natural scientific discoveries of the 19th century. (the discovery of the cell, the law of energy transformation, Darwinism, Mendeleev's periodic system of elements), which, on the one hand, confirm and enrich dialectical materialism, and, on the other hand, testify that natural science is approaching a dialectical worldview.
The dialectical reworking of previous materialism consisted in overcoming its historically conditioned limitations: a mechanistic interpretation of natural phenomena, a denial of the universality of development, an idealistic understanding public life. Solidarizing with the old materialism in recognizing the primacy, non-creation, indestructibility of matter, and also in the fact that consciousness is a property of matter organized in a special way, Marxist philosophy considers the spiritual as a product of the development of matter, and, moreover, not just as a natural product, but as a social phenomenon, as a social consciousness that reflects the social existence of people.
Describing the subject matter of Marxist philosophy, Engels defines it as a universal dialectical process taking place both in nature and in society. Dialectics, he emphasizes, is "the science of the most general laws of any movement" (ibid., vol. 20, p. 582). Movement is considered as the implementation of a universal connection, the interdependence of phenomena, their transformation into each other. In this connection, Engels points out: “Dialectics as the science of universal connection. The main laws: the transformation of quantity into quality - the mutual penetration of polar opposites and their transformation into each other when they are taken to the extreme - development through contradiction, or negation of negation - a spiral form of development” (ibid., p. 343). Materialistic dialectics, or dialectical materialism (these concepts are synonymous), is, therefore, the most general theory of development, which should be distinguished from special theories of development, for example. Darwinism. Marx and Engels use the concept of development without entering into its definition, i.e. accepting it as fully determined in its content thanks to scientific discoveries. However, individual statements of Engels indicate a desire to reveal the dialectical inconsistency of the process of development. Thus, Engels asserts: "Each progress in organic development is at the same time a regression, for it consolidates one-sided development and excludes development in many other directions" (ibid., p. 621). At the same time, this understanding of development, which excludes its reduction to progress alone, does not receive development in its general characteristics historical process. World history, declares Engels, is a process of "infinite development of society from the lowest to the highest" (ibid., p. 275). Such an understanding of social development clearly does not agree with the characterization of the development of a class-antagonistic society, especially capitalism, which is given in other works of the founders of Marxism.
The notion of the laws of dialectics as a special, supreme class of universal laws to which all natural and social processes are subject is, to say the least, problematic. The universal laws discovered by the sciences of nature are not the laws that determine social processes. Should we not, therefore, consider the laws of dialectics as a generalized theoretical expression of the essence of the laws of nature and society? We do not find an answer to this question in the works of Marx and Engels, despite the fact that they repeatedly pointed out the dialectical nature of certain natural and social laws. Meanwhile, without overcoming the Hegelian in its origin idea of a special class of higher laws of everything that exists, it is impossible to do away with the opposition of philosophy to specific scientific research. Engels rightly noted that Marxist philosophy is acquiring a new historical form with each new epoch-making scientific discovery. Marxist philosophy, in the form in which it was created by Marx and Engels, theoretically reflected the outstanding natural scientific discoveries of Ser. 19th century The end of this century and especially the beginning of the 20th century. were marked by new epochal natural scientific discoveries, which V.I. Lenin tried to comprehend philosophically. In Materialism and Empiriocriticism, he analyzes the methodological crisis in physics associated with the discovery of the electron, the explanation of which did not fit within the framework of classical mechanics. The confusion among many naturalists caused by this discovery found expression in idealistic reasoning about the dematerialization of matter. Lenin, defending materialism, argued that the electron is material, even if it does not have the well-known signs of matter, because it exists outside and independently of the consciousness and will of people. In this regard, Lenin proposed a philosophical definition of the concept of matter, designed to retain its meaning regardless of what new, unexpected properties of matter may be discovered in the future. “Matter is a philosophical category for designating an objective reality that is given to a person in his sensations, which is copied, photographed, displayed in our sensations, existing independently of them” ( Lenin V.I. Full coll. cit., vol. 18, p. 131). The definition proposed by Lenin did not contain anything new. It was adhered to by G.V. Plekhanov, K. Kautsky, and in pre-Marxist philosophy by P. Holbach and even the idealist J.-J. matter" ( Rousseau J.-J. Emil, or On Education. SPb., 1913, p. 262). It is also clear that the definition of matter as a sensually perceived objective reality does not prove the materiality of the electron. This sensationalist definition of the concept of matter is just as limited as the sensationalist thesis that objects are knowable insofar as they are perceived by our senses. After all, there are countless material phenomena that are inaccessible to sensations. Linking the concept of matter with sensory perceptions introduces into its definition an element of subjectivity. Thus, the task of creating philosophical concept matter has not been resolved.
The theory of knowledge of Marxist philosophy is usually characterized as a theory of reflection, which pre-Marxist materialism also adhered to. However, in the philosophy of Marxism, reflection is interpreted not as a direct relation of the cognizing subject to the object of cognition, but rather as an indirect result of the cognition process. Marx and Engels dialectically revised the materialist theory of reflection. They made a qualitative difference between theoretical and empirical (and even more so sensory) knowledge, proving that theoretical conclusions are fundamentally irreducible to sensory data and empirical conclusions based on them. Thus, the founders of Marxism overcame the limitations of the sensationalist epistemology of previous materialism. What then allows theoretical research to be relatively independent of empirical data and often even come into conflict with them? Engels points to the importance of natural scientific hypotheses, which often anticipate future observations and experimental data.
The irreducibility of theoretical thinking to empirical data is directly revealed in the categories with which thinking operates. It cannot be said that Marx and Engels paid much attention to the epistemological study of categories. Nevertheless, we find in their works a dialectical understanding of identity as containing difference, a dialectical analysis of causal relationships, the unity of necessity and chance, possibility and reality.
The central point in Marxist epistemology is the theory of truth, the dialectical-materialist understanding of which reveals the unity of the objectivity and relativity of truth. The concept of relative truth, developed by Marxist philosophy, is opposed to the anti-dialectical concept of absolute truth as an unchanging, exhaustive content of the object of knowledge. Absolute truth, insofar as it is understood dialectically, is relative within its limits, since it is made up of relative truths. The opposition between truth and error, if the latter is understood not simply as a logical error, but as a substantive error, is relative.
The problem of the criterion of truth belongs to the most complex epistemological problems. This criterion cannot be found within knowledge itself, but it cannot be found outside the relation of the subject to the object of knowledge. The criterion of truth, according to the philosophy of Marxism, is practice, the forms of which are diverse. This provision was introduced in the Marxist theory of knowledge, but it did not receive a systematic development in the works of Marx and Engels. Meanwhile, it is clear that practice is by no means always applicable to the evaluation of the results of cognition. And like any human activity practice is not free from fallacies. Naturally, therefore, questions arise: does practice always form the basis of knowledge? Can any practice be a criterion of truth? Practice, whatever its form and level of development, is constantly subjected to scientific criticism. Theory, especially in the modern era, tends to outstrip practice. This does not mean, of course, that practice ceases to be the basis of knowledge and the criterion of truth; it continues to play this role, but only to the extent that it masters, absorbs scientific achievements. But in this case, it is not the practice itself, i.e. regardless of scientific theory, and the unity of practice and scientific theory becomes both the basis of knowledge and the criterion of the truth of its results. And since the truths that are meant are relative truths, then practice is not an absolute criterion of truth, especially since it develops and improves.
Thus, Marx and Engels proved the necessity of dialectical materialism, which implies a materialistic reworking of idealist dialectics, a dialectical reworking of previous materialism, and a dialectical-materialist comprehension and generalization of scientific achievements. They laid the foundations for this fundamentally new type of philosophy. The disciples and successors of the teachings of Marx and Engels were Ch. O. propagandists, popularizers of their philosophy, completely insufficiently developing and deepening its main provisions. Lenin's "Philosophical Notebooks" show that he strove to continue the work of the founders of Marxism in the materialist reworking of Hegelian dialectics.
In the USSR and in a number of other countries, Marxist philosophy was the subject of not only propaganda and popularization, but also development, especially in such sections as the theory of knowledge, the philosophical generalization of the achievements of natural science, the history of philosophy, etc. However, the transformation of the teachings of Marx and Engels, as well as Lenin's views into a system of indisputable dogmatic propositions made it difficult and largely distorted research work philosophers. It suffices to point out the fact that for a decade and a half Soviet philosophers were mainly occupied with commenting on the work of I.V. Stalin “On Dialectical and Historical Materialism”, which is an extremely simplified and largely distorted exposition of Marxist philosophy. Due to these and a number of other circumstances, Marxist philosophy is not so much systematized as sketchy, not to mention the fact that some of its provisions turned out to be erroneous. See also Art. K. Marx , F.Engels , V.I.Lenin .
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Solution: From the point of view of dialectical materialism, the main forms of truth are absolute and relative. Absolute truth is understood as complete, exhaustive knowledge about an object, which is considered as the goal of knowledge. Specific achievements of science are evaluated as relative truths - incomplete knowledge of the subject.
8. “Truth is an agreement,” the representatives believed ...
9. The philosophical doctrine, according to which there is knowledge obtained by a person before experience and independently of it, is called ...
10. Complete exhaustive knowledge, which is identical to its subject and cannot be refuted with the further development of knowledge, is understood as _____________ truth.
11. From the point of view of pragmatism, the main criterion of truth is ...
Solution:“Truth is knowledge that contributes to the creative self-realization of the individual,” the representatives of existentialism believed. Existential reality includes the spiritual and vital values of people, such as the ideals of goodness, justice, beauty, feelings of love, friendship, as well as the spiritual world of man.
13. The main criterion of truth, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, is ...
Solution: The main criterion of truth, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, is practice. Practice is understood as a purposeful, subject-sensory activity of a person to transform material systems and himself.
14. Deliberate erection of deliberately incorrect ideas into the truth is called ...
15. The results of specific sciences, incomplete knowledge about the subject are understood as ____________ truth.
Solution: The results of specific sciences, incomplete knowledge about the subject are understood as relative truth. Relative truth is objective in content and excludes error and falsehood. Thus, classical mechanics, before the emergence of the theory of relativity, was considered true in some absolute sense. Later it turned out that it can no longer be considered true without restrictions.
|
H.-G. Gadamer |
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|
K. Popper |
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Solution: The author of the work "Truth and Method" is H.-G. Gadamer is a German philosopher, the founder of philosophical hermeneutics. According to Gadamer, human knowledge is "non-methodical", moreover, the scientific and theoretical development of reality is only one of the options for man's relationship to the world. In a sense, Gadamer's work continues the "rehabilitation" of the humanities (the "sciences of the spirit" dating back to German romanticism), begun at the end of the 19th century by W. Dilthey.
270. Conventionalism understands truth as...
The agreement of scientists to choose the most expedient and easy-to-use scientific theory
2) correspondence of knowledge to objective reality
3) non-contradiction, self-consistency knowledge
4) knowledge useful to a person
271. Adherents consider everything that is useful to be true
pragmatism
2) Marxism
3) neo-Thomism existentialism
4) pragmatism considers the truth ...
272. Obvious and reliable facts correspondence of knowledge about an object to the object itself
1) the general validity of collective representations
Knowledge leading to successful action
273. According to the classical position, truth is a theoretical construct that makes it possible to achieve success in a given situation.
1) what is recognized as such by the majority
Compliance of knowledge with objective reality
274. Ultimate knowledge of certain aspects of reality is
2) hypothesis
3) relative truth
absolute truth
275. The main criterion of truth for dialectical materialism is...
1) sensory experiences
2) logical constructions
Practice
4) self-evidence and reliability
276. An exaggeration of the significance of absolute truth is
1) Gnosticism
2) agnosticism
Dogmatism
4) skepticism
277. The modern dialectical materialist interpretation of truth assumes that
there is no absolute truth
Truth is a process
2) Truth is always subjective,
Truth is inextricably linked with object-sensory activity, practice
4) in knowledge one should strive for eternal and absolute truth.
278. Deliberate distortion by the subject of reality is interpreted as..
Lie.
2) explanation.
3) delusion.
4) fantasy.
279. Knowledge not currently confirmed by practice, or insufficiently substantiated logically, is called ...
1) delusion
2) Reliable
3) erroneous
Hypothetical
280. It does not apply to the forms of practice as a criterion of truth...
1) ideology
2) Public production
3) Socio-political activity
4) scientific and experimental activity
281. The opposite of truth is....
2) doubt
Delusion
282. Relative and absolute truths are...
1) only different levels, or forms, truths are identical concepts
2) forms of subjective truth
mutually exclusive moments of the process of cognition
283. Every relative truth...
Contains a fraction of the absolute
2) is an obstacle to absolute truth
3) identical to absolute truth
4) has nothing to do with the absolute
284. Both relative and absolute truth.
A complete, comprehensive understanding of the subject
2) are objective
3) may be revised over time
4) are subjective
285. The dependence of knowledge on conditions, place and time is expressed in the concept ...
1) absoluteness "Falsehood"
2) concreteness»abstractness»
286. Arguing that truth is the revelation of the essential forces of matter itself, its self-movement, the philosopher takes the position...
1) Objective idealism
2) materialism
3) Subjective idealism
4) pragmatism
287. The following judgments do not agree with the point of view of dialectical materialism in the definition of truth
Truth is knowledge confirmed by myths
2) truth is such knowledge, guided by which we create works of art
Truth is that which simply and economically describes the flow of human experience.
4) truth is such knowledge, guided by which we achieve the goal.
288. From a dialectical point of view
1) truth is the unity of the objective and the subjective
2) There are universal absolute truths
3) truth is always relative
Truth is unity
5) relative and absolute
6) truth is absolute and error is relative
289. The objective reasons for the emergence of errors in science include
1) inability to reach the truth
2) Mistakes of individual scientists
3) the multidimensionality of the object of knowledge
The process of searching for truth associated with the nomination
Assumptions and hypotheses
6) imperfection of methods of cognition
Features of scientific knowledge
290. Does not apply to the functions of science
1) aesthetic
2) Explanatory
3) cognitive
4) Predictive
291. The information disseminated by anthropology, parapsychology, ufology refers to the so-called knowledge.
1) scientific
2) quasi-scientific
3) parascientific
4) pre-scientific
Pseudo-scientific knowledge is called in philosophy
1) proto-knowledge, which in the future will become a science, knowledge that speculates on the totality of popular theories
Knowledge obtained as a result of a departure from the accepted norms of the cognitive process
3) knowledge that does not meet the criteria of scientific character, but has found the support of the authorities
292. Art in any kind of production was called in antiquity
1) thinking
technique
3) Religion Experience
293. To the essence scientific revolution not applicable..
1) creation of new research programs
2) building new theoretical concepts
Study of the history of the subject
294. As the highest cultural value considers scientific knowledge...
1) voluntarism
scientism
3) nihilism
4) antiscientism
295. Scientific and technological progress contributes to the growth of ethical nihilism, he believes. .
1) dogmatism
2) liberalism
antiscietism
4) scientism
296. Science acts as
1) forms of culture that can explain anything
Spiritual and practical activity aimed at understanding the essence of the laws of the objective world
3) a set of views on the world and a person's place in the world
The body of knowledge accumulated by man
297. Distinctive features of scientific knowledge are: systematization, evidence, and also ..,
Verifiability
2) eternity
3) truth
4) personal character
298. Formal distinction scientific activity from unscientific is the presence of the following components:
1) the seriousness of the intention of the scientist
2) research institute
3) accurate recording of facts
