Mikhail Bakhtin on the Dialogue of Cultures. Modern problems of science and education. Background and influences

In fact, Bakhtin does not dialogue at all, but discussion, dialogue another is not required, and the discussion, as you know, excludes the eternal continuation, so the discrepancy turns out. AND postmodernism not engaged in dialogue at all, but interest in text as an independent structure had, and where there is no need for friend. Etkind is good as a writer and researcher asexual, but Bakhtin can no longer be attributed to postmodernism. Communism and postmodernism are antipodes external And inner, and no one managed to avoid the influence of the communist trend in the USSR, and so far. And why postmodernism in Russia even now is still labeled almost as a demonic obsession (Dugin and others), which is not accidental.

Probably, communication with his brother had that questioning, provoking and objecting character, which became for Mikhail Bakhtin a model of genuine dialogue.
The dialogue is not completed by definition. But the brothers were separated by history. The problem that occupied Bakhtin throughout his entire creative life was the problem of the relationship between the self and the other. For Russian or, perhaps, in this case, to be more accurate to say, Eastern European thought, this problem was not new. For example, M. Buber and A. A. Ukhtomsky offered their own versions of its solution, Jewish and Orthodox. This problem will become a key one for the Western humanities of the last third of the century; it will form one of the main themes of that direction known as postmodernism. Bakhtin was able to formulate some ideas common to postmodernism earlier and more accurately than his Western colleagues. The main word in Bakhtin's texts is dialogue. Bakhtin gave dialogue and dialogism the meaning of a general humanitarian idea that simultaneously describes human reality and prescribes a certain approach to this reality. His discourse develops entirely in opposition to the monologism of traditional science.
“It is one thing to be active in relation to a dead thing, a mute material that can be sculpted and shaped as you like, and another thing is to be active in relation to someone else’s living and full-fledged consciousness.” many consciousnesses, - not many people in the light of one consciousness, namely, many equal and full-fledged consciousnesses. “Not what happens inside, but what happens on the border of one’s own and someone else’s consciousness, on the threshold.” Consciousness alone can exist."
Any statement about a person made by another is, in principle, insufficient and defective. Any analysis, interpretation and evaluation are only an “external definition in absentia.” The free act of self-consciousness, expressed in the word, is for Bakhtin the most reliable, and probably even the only acceptable form of expression. and deadening lies."
Perhaps no one before Bakhtin formulated this position with such persistence. It is in direct opposition to the much more widespread in our century analytic position, so clearly expressed by Freud: the truth about a person is inaccessible to him, because he, regardless of his desire, becomes a victim of self-deception. Only another person can find out this truth, subject to a number of strict conditions.
The truth about a person, as psychoanalysis sees it, is an objective description of his unconscious, debunking the illusions of self-consciousness. The unconscious cannot be translated into consciousness within the individual; this circuit necessarily includes the other person. Only he, depending on his goals and abilities, can bring consciousness closer to the unconscious, which is what the psychoanalyst strives for, or maybe even move it away, which bad parents do. There is a long tradition in the history of psychoanalysis of evidence that introspection is impossible. And when Freud himself analyzed his dreams, the only excuse for this was the absence of a colleague who could consult the first analyst. In relation to his followers, Freud was the Other who noticed the mistakes of their self-consciousness and had the right to correct them.
For Bakhtin, on the contrary, the inner point of view has fundamental advantages over the outer one: "in a person there is always something that only he himself can discover in a free act of self-consciousness and speech." A person with his self-consciousness is by no means alone: inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or through the eyes of another. But in Bakhtin's world, a person is only a subject, he actively and harshly denies any attempts to consider a person as an object. “The true life of a person is accessible only to dialogical penetration into it, to which it itself responds and freely reveals itself.” In such a dialogue, a person “never coincides with himself. The formula of identity cannot be applied to him:“ A is A ”.
Carried to its end, this position denies the usefulness, validity, and ethical permissibility of any constructions that explain a person from the outside. And, perhaps, any logic in which always A=A. If only the data of self-consciousness are valid, then what about the unconscious, which, by definition, is not given to self-consciousness? Dostoevsky, Bakhtin's favorite hero, has been attributed by many since Freud to a special interest in the unconscious. Bakhtin, on the contrary, is not inclined to attach any significance to the unconscious. For him, any description of the unconscious is a monologue "someone else's word", and a person "always strives to break the final and, as it were, deadening frame of other people's words about him."
The psychoanalyst here naturally comes up with the idea of resistance.

The author of "Freudianism" defines consciousness as "the comment that every adult person attaches to his every act." These people, former witnesses of the final victory of Marxism, found their main source of analogy in the mechanisms of the social reality that hypnotized them. The psyche is an ideology; psychic mechanisms are ideological instruments implanted inside a person. Ideology can be official and unofficial, or worldly; any Soviet person knows the difference between them. The Freudian unconscious is easier to understand if we call it “unofficial consciousness”; inside a person it occupies approximately the same position of an existing, but not recognized reality that unofficial poets, philosophers, artists (remember “Goat Song”!) occupied inside the Stalinist state. The analogy is interesting and understandable, interpreting the key Soviet problem of doublethink in a new way. But either without thinking it through, or, on the contrary, having thought over its possible consequences too well, the author chooses an extremely rigid and one-sided way of developing it. "Thinking outside the orientation to a possible expression ... does not exist." "Experiencing ... exists only in familiar material." "The familiar material of the psyche is essentially the word - inner speech." “Everything that is verbal in a person's behavior ... belongs not to him, but to his social environment,” writes the author of “Marxism in the Philosophy of Language.” In "Freudianism" the main problem of analysis - the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious - was nevertheless interpreted more complexly, as "conflicts between inner and outer speech and between different layers of inner speech."
And at the same time, this attempt to overcome psychoanalysis, which was later undertaken in other works, probably belonging to Bakhtin, contains a prediction of one of the main directions of development that psychoanalysis will receive in the second half of the 20th century. In a number of provisions of his criticism, Bakhtin turned out to be paradoxically close to the concept of Jacques Lacan, his semantic interpretation of psychoanalysis. In contrast to Bakhtin, Lacan is confident both in the existence of the unconscious and in the right of the other to interpret its content. But like Bakhtin, Lacan seeks to represent the unconscious by analogy with a reality that is more understandable to man. For Lacan, this reality is language. The unconscious is structured like a language; it formulates its main axiom. Psychoanalysis has only one tool: the word. And every word is meant for an answer, even if the answer is silence.
Bakhtin and Voloshinov wrote about the same thing. In general, “the word is, as it were, a “scenario” of that immediate communication in which it was born”, and in particular, “all verbal statements of the patient ... are such scenarios, first of all, of that closest small social event in which they were born - a psychoanalytic session ". Freud's "unconscious", they argue, is opposed not to the consciousness of the patient, but to the consciousness of the doctor, as "resistance". The professional approach of Bakhtin and his circle to the word, which took shape (in this, one can also see an analogy with the path of Lacan) through the assimilation and overcoming of early Russian structuralism (the so-called "formal school"), consisted in understanding the integral, addressed from the "I" to the other, verbal utterance as a minimal communicative unit. Having come quite close to Lacan's semantic formulations here, Bakhtin and Voloshinov go in the opposite direction from them: their own social situation, the "scenario" of which their word was also supposed to be, was, however, completely different.
Both psychoanalysis and formalism, recognizing the lawfulness of man's feelings and deeds, which is unconscious of man, both imposed restrictions on the very possibility of man's transformation. These restrictions should be removed. I needed new theory consciousness, if one can call a theory something that does not recognize any laws, Bakhtin then gave one of its variants, the theory of ideology. Later, A. N. Leontiev would find another variant that would be established in Soviet psychology for decades—the theory of activity.
To paraphrase Lacan, for Bakhtin and his circle, consciousness was structured as an ideology. The presentation of consciousness (and the unconscious) as an ideology placed them at the disposal of ideological control. Since “self-consciousness is always verbal, it always comes down to the search for a specific verbal complex” — to the extent that “any awareness of oneself ... is bringing oneself under some social norm, social assessment, is, so to speak, the socialization of oneself and one’s action.” Lacan's experience shows that a given consequence does not necessarily follow from a given premise; the semantic interpretation of "I" is compatible with individualism, it raises the problematics of the Other and the Big Other (society), but is not obliged to dissolve the individual ego in them.
Voloshinov gave the socialization of consciousness a more radical meaning than the correlation of self and other; “realizing myself, I try to look at myself through the eyes of another person, another representative of my social group The gradualness of this verbal transition (other-group-class) models an attempt to smoothly move from reasoning, quite acceptable for civilized European individualism, to reasoning in the spirit of radical Marxism. Bakhtin himself went in the course of decades in the opposite direction.
Philosopher at the mirror
A simple "ideological" solution to the problem of the relationship of the ego to the Greater Society - a problem to which post-Freudian thought, and Lacan in particular, will return endlessly - is hardly relevant today. But the analysis of the second classical problem- the relationship between "I" and the other.
According to Bakhtin, "the most important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by the attitude to another consciousness", but at the same time, the mechanisms of self-consciousness and consciousness of another are fundamentally different. Consciousness exists in two forms - "I" and "other", and the transition from one form to the other entails drastic changes in its content. Bakhtin attributes the discovery of the "other" to Dostoevsky (it was with him that "the role of the other was revealed, in the light of which alone any word about oneself can be built").
The main interest for Bakhtin himself was to show on the material of Dostoevsky the depth of transformations that the image of a person undergoes when moving from an external point of view to an internal one or vice versa - transformations not so much structural as content, psychological and even ideological. "Dostoevsky possessed an exceptionally keen eye and a sensitive ear to see and hear this tense struggle between the "I" and the "other" in every external manifestation of a person (in every face, gesture, word).
If for Lacan the prototype of the universal human relationship "I - the other" is the relationship between the analyst and the patient, then for Bakhtin the prototype, the dynamics of which is more understandable to him than any other human affairs, is the relationship between the author of a literary work and his heroes. The author (for example, Dostoevsky ) - I; the hero (for example, Raskolnikov) is different for the author. The author's world is inhabited by heroes, and through them, although not only through them, the author expresses everything he wants to say. On the other hand, literary heroes, at the will of the author, but at the same time and of their own free will enter into non-literary relations with each other: Raskolnikov and his old victim, Raskolnikov and the prostitute, Raskolnikov and the investigator. but in many cases he places the "I" inside his hero, and then one of them becomes the "I", and the other turns out to be the Other no longer for the author, but for the hero.
Bakhtin's fundamental argument here is the dialogism of the "I" and the other, the difference between the mechanisms of their being and the irreversibility of these positions within the framework of human life. ", or the theory of the "other". All psychology that claims to be scientific falls into this latter category. Bakhtin, of course, would not agree with Freud's well-known formulation from his work "I and It", according to which the part "I ", and both the deepest and the highest in the "I", may be unconscious. Any reasoning about the unconscious for Bakhtin is the embodiment of the point of view of the other, which from the outside and monologically describes the life of the "I". "I" for Bakhtin is everything in which a person finds and feels himself; everything for which he is responsible.
Differences in the positions of the “I” and the other begin with the perception of appearance, the “I” does not see its appearance, only the other is capable of this. Here Bakhtin refers to the image of the mirror, which he uses many times, like Lacan, but with a slightly different purpose: for Bakhtin, the mirror is a mechanical and illusory means of removing the opposition of "I" and the other. He categorically does not believe in this possibility. Unnatural facial expression of a person looking at himself in the mirror is for Bakhtin proof that it is impossible to find a middle between the opposites of "I" and the other. Indeed, for the philosopher, for whom “to be is to be for another and through him for oneself”, Narcissus is not a problem; he simply does not exist, does not exist. For Lacan, the mirror is a symbol of self-knowledge, and meeting him is crucial point In human life.
For both Lacan and Bakhtin, a mirror is a reality, from its actual side, understood in the same way as a mediator of the opposition of “I” and the other: looking into the mirror, a person recognizes himself outside, sees himself as another or as others see him. But Lacan relates and Bakhtin to the mirror in different ways: for Lacan, the “mirror stage”, when the child begins to recognize himself in his reflection and calls himself “I”, is the culminating moment and turning point in his development. For Bakhtin, the mirror artificially overcomes the opposite of “I” and another, but fails and only blurs their differences. For Bakhtin, the real mediator between the "I" and the other is only the living process of dialogue.
Nowhere distinguishing between thought and feeling, thought and action, Bakhtin operates with an integral category of experience. Experience is a "trace of meaning in being", it exists as such only on the threshold of the transition from "I" to another, which takes place within a person. The narcissist who all the time plays the role of the other in relation to himself is just as unnatural, just as disturbing the normal course of things, as is the psychologist who is trying to make an object out of the other. "Dostoevsky categorically denies that he is a psychologist... He saw in it (psychology) only the reification of his soul, degrading man," writes Bakhtin, as always, linking his own thoughts-feelings with Dostoevsky. But any experience (in that sense , in which a person says: “I feel ...”) includes a moment of self-observation and therefore, Bakhtin believes, includes the point of view of another: a person, as it were, looks into a mirror at his inner state, “I experience the object of my fear as terrible, the object of his love as a beloved; in order to experience fear or love as such, I must become different in relation to myself." Experience must be analyzed at the boundary of the "I" and the other, as the interaction of the "I" and the other, and the "other" here is not Lacan's Other and, therefore, no longer John G. Mead's generalized other, but a reflexive position determined by an external point of view in relation to the subject. Bakhtin's analysis all the time shows systematic differences in the phenomenological pictures of "I" and "other". “The Other is always opposed to me as an object, his external image is in space, his inner life is in time.” And the acting “I” exists, according to Bakhtin, outside of space-time; its unity is supported by the categories of meaning and responsibility.
At the end of his life, Bakhtin persistently applied these early ideas to the analysis of death. Death is related to the Other. The statement of death is always “the privilege of another.” “Death cannot be a fact of consciousness itself... Man has a beginning and an end, birth and death, life, destiny, but not consciousness... Beginning and end lie in the objective... world for others, and not for consciousness itself... Death from within, that is, conscious death, does not exist for anyone."
So, "other people's minds cannot be contemplated, analyzed, defined as objects, as things - one can only communicate with them dialogically." Dialogue is equivalent to life, it is potentially infinite, it is a perpetual motion machine, it is valuable and self-sufficient. goal. One voice ends nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum of life, the minimum of being." And “when the dialogue ends, everything ends.” The real Bakhtin lived in a truly Nietzschean world, oversaturated with social practice. The idea was realized in this world directly, without any difficulties and paradoxes, and resistance was overcome by force. reaction to this world, resistance to it or, more precisely, opposition. He saw precisely: "the unity of consciousness, which replaces the unity of being, inevitably turns into the unity of one consciousness."
But we should not forget the case of Nikolai Bakhtin, who never created in the comfortable and clear atmosphere of Cambridge anything equivalent to what his brother managed to do in Soviet poverty and fear. In accordance with the Bakhtinian logic of dialogue, we never get a definitive answer to any of the questions that confront us here.

Philosopher Alexei Kozyrev on the concept of the Other, the polyphony of Dostoevsky's novels and the theory of carnival

How did Bakhtin develop as a philosopher? What, according to Bakhtin, is the value of the Other for a person? What role does carnival play in dialogue with a different worldview? Alexey Kozyrev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, answers these and other questions.

Mikhail Bakhtin is not a philosopher, but a philologist, candidate of philological sciences. In Soviet times, he did not rise to a higher degree of scientific aggregation, which was the reason for the caustic statements of Soviet philosophers who said: “Well, who is Bakhtin? Just a candidate of philological sciences.” But it so happened that this candidate of philological sciences today represents Russian philosophy in the world philosophical space, because Bakhtin studies, Bakhtin studies have become an entire industry: scientific conferences are held in France, in Germany, Bakhtin's collected works were published in Japanese earlier than in Russian.

Bakhtin's thought turned out to be extremely in demand in the 20th century, when the problem of communication between people became especially serious and when many controversial issues began to be resolved through world wars, with the help of guns and bombardments. The problem of the philosophy of dialogue, the philosophy of the Other, the philosophy of communication has become, perhaps, one of the key problems of modern civilization.

Bakhtin, who studied in Odessa, at Novorossiysk University - that was the name of Odessa University - and then finished his studies at Petrograd University, already during the First World War, was very interested in philosophy. And despite the fact that he studied at the Faculty of History and Philology, philosophy was the subject of his independent studies, he read the books of the neo-Kantians, the collections New Ideas in Philosophy. After he graduated from the university, left to work as a school teacher, lecturer and began to write, his first work, his first articles and books were more philosophy than literary criticism. These are the work "Toward a Philosophy of Action" and the large unfinished work "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity", written by 1924.

Years after the revolution, Bakhtin spends first in Nevel, then in Vitebsk, and then with this manuscript in his briefcase he returns to Petrograd, which became Leningrad, and participates in the religious and philosophical circle "Sunday", for participation in which he will subsequently fall under arrest and will go to link.

"On the Philosophy of Action". Bakhtin argues that each of us is an "acting" being. And by this we cannot say that we are absent in being, we cannot have an alibi in being (Bakhtin's term is "non-alibi in being"). That is, we cannot say that when it was necessary to make a choice, when it was necessary to perform an act, we were not there, we were late somewhere, were at work, or were just sleeping. Because not doing an act, avoiding an act is also an act. And man is an ethical being, a being who realizes certain values and meanings in his activity.

When we look at another person, we evaluate him not only ethically, we also evaluate him aesthetically: like / dislike. I like a person - I will communicate; I don’t like it, something repels me in him - perhaps I’ll pass by and try not to spend my time crossing with this person.

A Russian proverb says: “Not good for good, but good for good.” And according to this saying, Bakhtin builds his philosophy of the Other.

It is very interesting that the theme of the Other, which will be revealed by Sartre, by Levinas, by Ricoeur in French philosophy, may appear earlier in Russian philosophy of the 1920s by Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin.

Bakhtin says: “All cemeteries are filled only with Others, all monuments are erected only with Others, only our grateful memory preserves and reproduces the Other.” In fact, I cannot write an obituary about myself, I cannot erect a monument to myself. I can do it in a slightly strange, comical, playful way, we are a little jarred when we see monuments to living people. A monument is a memory that remains after a person in the world, if he has done something, and a monument is erected to Others.

This is the function of the Other, which is a contemplator and finalizer in relation to another person - he sees him from the outside, he observes him from his one and only place in the world, and he is able to aesthetically comprehend the life, fate and body of another person. Bakhtin speaks of the spatial, temporal and semantic unity of the hero. In this sense, the author is a pseudonym for the I, and the hero is a pseudonym for the Other. We can only lay our hands on the Other, like a priest during confession, we can only hug the Other, we can only kiss the Other.

In this regard, it is the Other who is a kind of value for us, into whose eyes we can look, we can see ourselves in the Other, as in a living mirror. Because when we look at ourselves in an ordinary mirror, we do not have an excess of vision. Bakhtin says that a person experiences lies and falsehood in front of a mirror, because, being in front of a mirror, he wants to look at himself through the eyes of the Other, but he sees nothing in the mirror except the doubling of his own face. He does not see the emotional-volitional reaction to himself from the other person, he sees only his own eyes, which are reflected in this mirror. Because if we look into the eyes of the Other, we see that these eyes are friendly, affectionate, affable or, on the contrary, suspicious, hate us, look at us with poorly concealed contempt. Naturally, we cannot see any such reaction in the mirror, and we get the situation of a double.

The other is not a double. In this regard, one can compare Bakhtin with Ukhtomsky, a remarkable Russian thinker and biologist who graduated from seminary and then became a biologist. He had a theory of a well-deserved companion. It is the well-deserved interlocutor who is the Other we are looking for, the person who can believe in us, who can understand us. We can reproach ourselves that we are weak, we are imperfect; Another will come and say, "No, you are beautiful." That is, he will give us his credit of trust, he will see in us with his loving eyes what we ourselves will not see in ourselves. He will see us as a lover sees his beloved, when he deifies in some sense the object of his love, refuses to see shortcomings in him, but sees in him a certain limit of perfection, a certain ideal image of this person.

Bakhtin's work "The Author and the Hero in Aesthetic Activity" was not read at all in its time, it is a kind of premise to the end of the 20th century, when these works will be published. What Bakhtin will do next is he will work as a literary critic, as a person who will philologically interpret certain literary sources.

Dostoevsky first. And he comes up with the theory of the polyphonic novel, that Dostoevsky's novel is a novel where consciousnesses look at each other, where there is no outward voice of the author, where the hero has the last word about himself. But the hero seems to be mirrored in the replicas, in the words of other heroes - why Dostoevsky's novels turn out to be so vital. He even interprets them as some kind of ancient text, but not tragedies, like Vyacheslav Ivanov, but menippeas, menippean satires.

Dostoevsky's novels are life itself, because there is no predetermined result.

Here is Alyosha Karamazov - who will he become outside of Dostoevsky's novel? Perhaps he will become a revolutionary, or perhaps he will become a monk, go to a monastery—Dostoevsky himself does not know the fate of his hero. Bakhtin borrows the term "polyphony" from music and calls Dostoyevsky's novels polyphonic novels.

"The work of François Rabelais and folk culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance". This is also a question of a certain dialogue, but a dialogue with other worldviews: how the other is present in me, how my alter ego lives in me and pops up, like an open window during a medieval carnival, which turns out to be for Bakhtin a kind of model of culture, where culture tests, recognizes its other . For a certain period, it is necessary that the chthonic forces that live in our soul crawl out, break out and express themselves. Bakhtin calls it a carnival - something that is an analogue of our Maslenitsa, farewell to meat. When a person meets his otherness in this carnival. In order, perhaps, to strengthen what he has, to strengthen those values, the worldview that he professes.

The model of carnival, carnival laughter culture with pleasure is extended by culturologists to different eras, to different cultural phenomena on the history of Stalinism. It is very interesting that the very idea of carnival, like other ideas of Bakhtin, is not indisputable - they are debatable. I remember the dispute between Sergei Sergeevich Averintsev and Bakhtin, where Averintsev asked whether everything could be ridiculed, whether everything could become the subject of a carnival. Will the values we ridicule perish? Perhaps due to the duality of Bakhtin, his rootedness in the culture of the Silver Age, because his philosophy of dialogue is a continuation of Vyacheslav Ivanov with his humanism, with his “you are”, written on the temple of Apollo in Delphi.

On the other hand, Bakhtin is in a certain sense a relativist, some things are thrown towards postmodern culture, which will renounce absolute values, which will make culture a fact of our interpretations. Bakhtin is, as it were, between these two arrays, and this, perhaps, he remains alive and relevant in our contemporary culture, forcing us to publish journals, republish his texts, hold conferences on the thoughts of Mikhail Bakhtin. And without giving us the opportunity to define him unambiguously as a philosopher, as a philologist, as a culturologist, presenting him as a synthetic figure that covers various humanitarian disciplines.

Russian literary critic and culturologist.

One of the areas of his work is the problems of dialogue and polylogue. The scientist interpreted the statement as "a link in a very complexly organized chain of other statements."

"To me Bakhtin talked about the circumstances in which he began to write a book about Rabelais. As a result of the activities of his circle, which was illegal, and several religious and philosophical circles in which he participated (memoirs are now printed about them, in particular Likhachev, who was arrested at the same time), as a result of the activities of these circles, in particular the circle of Meyer, our famous philosopher who died in the camp, Bakhtin was arrested and sentenced to five years in Solovki.

He was already at that time very seriously ill: he had a disease of the bone marrow - osteomyelitis, and he, of course, was in danger of death if he ended up in the Solovetsky camp.

He was saved - literally - from this difficult death by Ekaterina Pavlovna Peshkova, wife Gorky, which at that time headed, and for a long time headed until the moment when it was closed, the Political Red Cross and helped many people. In particular, she convinced that Bakhtin, for medical reasons, should replace his stay in the camp with exile.

He was sent to Kazakhstan, where his illness progressed; he lost a leg, then limped, walked on crutches, then the other leg also failed, and by the end of his life he was already motionless. Bakhtin has served his exile; he told me that at that time such a difficult problem arose before him: where can he teach in order to earn a living for himself and his wife? He had a so-called minus in his passport: this means he could not live in Moscow and Leningrad and in a number of other cities. And he looked at the list of higher educational institutions and checked: they were all in those places where the "minus" did not allow him to live.

One then the city was in the entire geography of Russia, which was in the center of the camps. This is the center of Dubrovlag, one of the main outgrowths of the Gulag - Saransk.

Since Saransk was located in the thicket of camps, it was possible for Bakhtin to live in it. And there he began to lecture and read almost all his life: he moved to Moscow - near Moscow, then to Moscow - at the very end of his life; his life, despite everything, was very long.

In the first years of teaching at Mordovian University Bakhtin Not could live in Moscow, but could come there on a business trip to give lectures. He came to read a report at the Institute of World Literature: he was invited, he was then engaged in a novel. Bakhtin read the first of the proposed lectures - they are now published - he came to a friend's house, where another friend was waiting for him, who had come from Saransk with the message that they had come for him at night to arrest him again.

Bakhtin realized that he could not return. He had a friend, a specialist in natural sciences, who invited him to settle with his wife at his dacha outside Moscow. The problem will be only with books, because if you take books from the academic library, you will understand that a biologist is engaged in a work Rabelais can not; I had to come up with something.

And they came up with the idea that the biologist sent requests to the Leningrad libraries, and what books the biologists from Leningrad subscribed to - the KGB had not thought of that before. And Bakhtin lived for two years in the country, hiding from all people, and wrote this wonderful book about Rabelais. The book, as you will see if you re-read it, is full of a healthy passion for life and humorous culture, and it is simply impossible to guess that this is written by a person who has already lost his leg in exile and is waiting for a probable arrest.

MM. Bakhtin wrote: “The first task is to understand the work as the author himself understood it, without going beyond his understanding. The solution of this problem is very difficult and usually requires the involvement of a huge amount of material. The second task is to use one's temporary cultural outsideness. Inclusion in our (alien for the author) context”.

Bakhtin M.M., Aesthetics of verbal creativity, M., "Art", 1979, p. 349.

I note that in the 20s of the 20th century two books on dialogue were published: in 1923 by Martin Buber: “I and You” and in 1928 by M.M. Bakhtin: "Problems of Dostoevsky's Creativity"...

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Introduction

Bakhtin's own words can serve as an epigraph to Bakhtin's scientific work: "My word will remain in the ongoing dialogue, where it will be answered, heard and rethought." Bakhtin's scientific heritage is great. He sought to "turn" philosophy to the eternal problems of human existence. Through all of Bakhtin's research, ideas about responsibility for one's only being in the world and the culture of the individual pass. He believed that philosophy should explore life as an activity (not so much physical as spiritual), as a continuous "act". The most important task of Bakhtin's philosophy was the problem of uniting two worlds - the world of culture and the world of life, the destruction of "the abyss between the motive of an act and its product." He sought to answer the questions: how to make the universally significant moment of individual "being-event"? How to link together the world of culture and the world of man? How to make a person responsible? According to Bakhtin's interpretation, the duty of each person is to recognize his "uniqueness" and to put into practice a responsible act, which should become the life of each individual person. The basic concept of his philosophy - an act - Bakhtin interprets as the result of a responsibly perceived, and not imposed from the outside, obligation. From the standpoint of the “philosophy of the act”, Bakhtin also solves the problem of value: there is no value given once and for all, “a generally significant value becomes really significant only in an individual context.”

An important place in Bakhtin's work is occupied by the philosophy of language. His works in this area can be characterized as an attempt to "transfer" the question of the interaction of culture and man to a new - semiotic - plane. "Language", according to Bakhtin, is a set of meanings and meanings accepted in a given culture and expressed in sign material. "Word" is an act of individual creativity. “Social outlook” is the area of meanings that is assigned to individual consciousness by a given era and a given cultural situation. Reflecting on the problem of interaction between tradition and individual creativity, Bakhtin sees in it, first of all, a dialogue with tradition.

Bakhtin's aesthetic ideas are inextricably linked with his general philosophical attitude and organically fit into the "philosophy of the act." In his works, the problems of dialogue and verbal communication are posed and solved in an original way, which are key for a number of areas in modern philosophical (and, more broadly, humanitarian) thought, including such areas as the study of argumentation and rhetoric. Of particular importance in this regard is Bakhtin's interpretation of objectively neutral styles as "still involving a certain concept of their addressee", "assuming, as it were, the identity of the addressee with the speaker", as well as his understanding of any statement as "a link in a very complexly organized chain of other statements. ”, entering into certain relations with them, when “every speaker himself is in a greater or less lesser degree responsible."

The purpose of the course work is to study the main philosophical ideas of M.M. Bakhtin. The objectives of the course work are to study the philosophical heritage of M.M. Bakhtin, the concept of dialogism and the problems of the methodology of humanitarian knowledge.

1. Mikhail Mikhailovich BakhtAndn

1.1 short biography MM. Bakhtin

Bakhtin Mikhail Mikhailovich is a specialist in the field of the theory of knowledge, aesthetics, cultural studies, philology, literary criticism. Born in Orel in 1895. He graduated from a gymnasium in Odessa and entered the Faculty of History and Philology of Novorossiysk University, then moved to Petrograd University, graduating in 1918. He spoke five languages (Greek, Latin, German, English, French). After graduating from the university, he taught in Nevel at a unified labor school. Among the Nevelsk friends of Bakhtin is the original thinker and literary critic M.I. Kogan, philosopher, poet and musicologist V.N. Voloshinov, philosopher and philologist L.V. Pumpyansky and others. In 1920 he moved to Vitebsk, where for four years he taught general literature at the Higher Institute of Public Education and the philosophy of music at the conservatory. He gave public lectures, was actively engaged in scientific activity. In 1924 Bakhtin moved to Petrograd. Despite the fact that he cannot find a permanent job here and lives on odd jobs and on a meager disability pension, these years were the most important period of his creative activity. On the night of December 24, 1929, Bakhtin was arrested on false charges of involvement in the activities of an "illegal organization of the right-wing intelligentsia" (Leningrad) called "Resurrection" and sentenced to 5 years in the Solovetsky Special Purpose Camp. On a personal petition in connection with a serious illness - multiple osteomyelitis - the sentence was changed to 5 years of exile in Kustanai. After the end of his exile in 1936, due to the ban on living in large cities, he got a job at the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute in Saransk, but he was forced to leave there in 1937 and until 1945 he lived at the Savelovo station (on the border between the Moscow and the Kalinin region) and in the city of Kimry, where he worked as a school teacher. In 1938, he underwent an amputation of his leg. In 1945, Bakhtin returned to Saransk, where he worked at the Department of General Literature of the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute (since 1957 - the university). In the second half of the 60s. Bakhtin's health deteriorated significantly, although he continues to engage in science. In 1969, Bakhtin left Saransk, was treated in a Moscow clinic, then settled with his wife in one of the nursing homes near Moscow. After the death of his wife in 1971, Bakhtin moved to Moscow, where friends and students, students of the philological faculty of Moscow University, helped him overcome his illness and loneliness. Bakhtin died in 1975, half a year before his 80th birthday.

All his life striving for active creative activity and seeing his destiny only in it, the scientist was practically excluded from scientific life of his time, was forced to write "on the table." For over 30 years, Bakhtin did not publish any of his major works. There is a widespread version according to which the authorship of a number of works published under the names of V.N. Voloshinov and P.N. Medvedev, belongs to Bakhtin or these works were written in collaboration with him. In November 1946, the Institute of World Literature defended Bakhtin's Ph.D. thesis - "Rabelais in the History of Realism". However, this work, later evaluated as an outstanding scientific achievement, did not give Bakhtin the opportunity to receive a scientific degree: it was awarded to him only 6 years later.

1.2 Ideas and works of M.M. Bakhtin

In Bakhtin's early work On the Philosophy of Action, moral philosophy is called the "first philosophy"; it is focused on understanding the nature of man, spiritual being, his experiences, empathy in others, actions in word, deed. The term “first philosophy” emphasized the importance of moral principles in the life of society, moral behavior, which involves not only the accomplishment of actions, but a conscious, motivated attitude towards them, and not just the achievement of certain results prescribed from above, on behalf of the universal.

Understanding the specifics of Bakhtin's moral philosophy is possible only in the context of the spiritual quest of both Western European and Russian thinkers. At the same time, the scope of theoretical paradigms of one or another philosophical school. Bakhtin's philosophical heritage, including ethical, cannot be limited to the philosophy of life, neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, as researchers often do. His moral philosophy absorbs many ideas and questions, while not giving a final answer to any of them, rather we are invited to further reflection, development of them. Bakhtin's ethical theory was based on the ideas of dialogue. And therefore it appears as the antipode of rationalistic philosophical systems, in which attention to the ultimate foundations of individual human existence is ignored due to the absolutization of the role of reason, knowledge, logic, closed on themselves. Such “self-closing thinking” is defined by Bakhtin as “fatal theorism”, “monologism”, when it is impossible to see the world outside of oneself by “alien consciousness”. The "First Philosophy" could not be focused on the semantic, content side. It involves the recognition of the fact of "an event in being" and the only valid act - an act. This refers to the exit from the world of traditional moral standards into the sphere of meaning, spirit. Only in this case a sense of responsibility is born, since I am the only witness of the “event - being”. My knowledge is an ontology of knowledge. It is defined by "my non-alibi in being."

The morality of philosophy is read as the ethics of arts, creativity, the ethics of a professional, religious ethics. It implements other criteria of truth and, accordingly, it has its own cognitive methods. Here Bakhtin is closest to anthropological philosophy and he creatively comprehends such fundamental concepts as "soul", "spirit", "spirituality", "mental", "body". His philosophical anthropology is characterized by the principle of trinity, when the body, soul and spirit are considered in their mutual connection. The development of the problem of “I-for-myself”, “I-for-other”, “other-for-me” is also innovative, where the phenomenological aspect of “involved outsideness in someone else’s consciousness”, “participatory attention to the other” occupies a significant place. Here lies the ethical and aesthetic issues that determined the forms, the essence of the relationship between the world of culture, art and human life.

Bakhtin's moral philosophy is permeated with the idea that every phenomenon of human life must be perceived as a phenomenon of culture, read in its context. And the idea of culture was understood as a synthesis of the spiritual meanings of being - logical, aesthetic, religious, moral, emotional. And therefore Bakhtin gives his understanding of culture. Every culture is based on creativity and means creativity. But if the world of culture, as the world of the living spirit, is replaced by the world of rational categories, the mechanical way of thinking, social. necessity, then all vital connection is killed, then there is no need for knowledge about the spiritual world. This is one of the roots of the crisis of creativity, the crisis of culture and the crisis of actions. If causal and mathematical necessity reigns everywhere, then a person can only understand everything and forgive everything, since good and evil are absolutely equivalent in the face of necessity. Any responsibility is removed from the person. Through culture, a person is capable of self-determination and is able to be responsible for his actions. Here we are talking not only about a person who owns culture, but also about how life itself is filled, permeated with culture.

2. The concept of dialogismin filosophic creativity of M.M. Bakhtin

Bakhtin's book on Dostoevsky, containing the concept of dialogue, was most likely written in the middle or in the second half of the 1920s. By that time, dialogism already existed as an independent trend in Western philosophy. In 1921 Franz Rosenzweig's book "The Star of Salvation" was published, in which the main, from the position of this Jewish thinker, aspects of being are presented from the point of view of "dialogical thinking". And in 1923, M. Buber published his treatise "I and You", containing a different version of dialogical philosophy. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Patmos philosophical circle operated in Berlin, uniting adherents of the idea of dialogism (including Buber and Rosenzweig, as well as F. Ebner and others); it is noteworthy that N. Berdyaev was involved in it, who in 1922 found himself in emigration against his will. In general, the beginning of the 1920s was marked by the assertion in certain European philosophical circles of dialogical intuition; successively dialogism goes back to the social ethics of H. Cohen and further to the ideas of L. Feuerbach.

The conductor of dialogism (and not only Cohen's philosophy) to Russia was apparently Bakhtin's friend M. Kagan. At the moment, the question of Kagan's acquaintance with members of the Patmos circle has not been finally clarified; however, it is known that Buber's book "I and You" was well known in Bakhtin's circle. According to N.K. Bonetskaya, the formation of Bakhtin's dialogism took place, at least at the beginning, completely independently; perhaps "I and You" contributed to the appearance in Bakhtin of the very term "dialogue", which was absent in early treatises. In any case, the prerequisites for dialogism existed - in the form of the "problem of an alien self" - in the Russian Kantian tradition from which Bakhtin emerged. And Bakhtin's dialogism of the 1920s is original, if only because, being ethics and ontology (like Western dialogism), at the same time it acts as a very witty aesthetic and literary theory.

According to Bakhtin's treatises of the early 1920s, an aesthetic event is an event of a certain relationship between the form and content of a work, carried out in one or another art material. In the case of verbal art, almost the only subject of Bakhtin's interests (as they are presented in Bakhtin's works), the aesthetic event is the "communication" of the author and the hero. This communication consists in the formalizing "completion" of the hero - in his bodily-psychic-spiritual nature - on the part of the author. This aesthetic event contains a vital-ethical element. The hero, who, according to Bakhtin, belongs to reality itself, can resist the author's activity that "finishes" him, which joins him to eternity, but at the same time paralyzes, mortifies his own, active principle in him. In other words, the hero can manifest his personal freedom in an aesthetic event, and the author can, to some extent, recognize this right for him. And if the author allows the hero's freedom to unfold in all its ethical postulate of Kant, according to which a person can under no circumstances be a means, but only an end - then it will be the world of Dostoevsky's novel, Dostoevsky's poetics.

The author in Dostoevsky's novel gives the hero the opportunity to fully realize himself, to express what seems to the hero to be the ultimate truth about the world, without making any judgment about the good quality of this truth. The author, invisibly accompanying the hero on his life path, provokes the hero to manifest himself; this is how the “dialogue” between the author and the hero unfolds, since the author simultaneously conducts several such “dialogues” with the protagonist characters, then Dostoevsky’s novel turns out to be a tangle of life “ideas” of the characters, in other words, their “voices”; Bakhtin likens such "poetics" to Bach's fugue, to a polyphonic construction. There is a certain "theology" behind these things. The author, the creator of the novel world, has as his prototype in Bakhtin the God-Creator, who obviously does not interfere in human life and in this sense endowing a person with freedom. As for Christ, according to Bakhtin, in the world of Dostoevsky He is a man among people, a voice among voices. Theologically, Christ for Bakhtin turns out to be a man who in no way overcomes the limits of created nature; whether it is deism, whether it is Judaism (complemented with a certain piety towards Jesus), whether it is an original religious and philosophical construction in the spirit of ancient Arianism - we leave it to the reader to judge.

The "dialogue" in Dostoevsky's world, according to Bakhtin, takes place not only between the author and the characters: it is also conducted by the characters among themselves. The ideological, "ideological" dialogue appears in the form of the characters' conversations about the "last" problems of being. The hero of Dostoevsky is an "idea", a "word"; the speaking ethical cosmos of the book about Dostoevsky is nothing but the aggregate "being-event" of the early treatises, the desired social "realm of spirits". Dostoevsky's novel for Bakhtin is a model of being, and even more than that, it is being itself. Here - a certain mysterious moment of Bakhtin's constructions, Bakhtin's specific "mysticism without mysticism". Other dialogists also wrote about being as a dialogue - Buber, Ebner, Rosenzweig. However, the existential dialogical structure of each of these thinkers has its own; Bakhtin also imagines it in his own way. Dialogue, according to Bakhtin, is "the opposition of man to man as the opposition of the 'I' and the 'other'." It is ontologically characteristic here that in such a dialogue there is no third existential position: in Western constructions, this belongs to God. But it seems that the main features of Bakhtin's dialogue - in its, so to speak, non-objectivity and infinity. It cannot be said that in Bakhtin's dialogue the interlocutors meet in the space of a certain theme that is objectively taken out of the dialogue and therefore has an independent existence: Bakhtin fundamentally refuses to conceptualize in his philosophy an object, a "thing". dialogue is confrontation as such, confrontation for the sake of confrontation, a dynamic-spiritual event, which therefore does not lead to any stable, concrete result.Bakhtin was addicted to this image of an endlessly lasting and leading to nothing dialogue, perhaps reflecting endless talk about the most important things in his youthful circle are conversations traditionally familiar to Russian thinking youth ... Indeed, life, being in Russia is always mostly conversations and communication. However, Bakhtin's concept has already received quite a few fair reproaches that this relativistic world of equal "ideas", a world in which there is no value hierarchy and the last author's "verdict", has, in general, little in common with the world of Dostoevsky, who wrote his novels by no means Forget about your innermost beliefs. And here arises Bakhtin's special problem as a literary critic, to which we will return later in connection with his book on Rabelais: it is not really about Rabelais either... So, if at the "pre-dialogical" stage, in the early treatises, " idea" of Bakhtin appeared in the form of "philosophy of action", then in the book about Dostoevsky Bakhtin's "first philosophy" passes to its second stage: we have here not so much a literary analysis as an ontological construction of a Russian dialogist.

3. "MethodologyHumanities” M.M. Bakhtin

bakhtin philosophy dialogue ethical

In the 1980s, the American academic world began to increasingly become aware that each critic, immanent in his own private sphere of activity, is involved in and responsible for all the real consequences of modern theoretical thought, the paradigmatic principles of which he shares in one way or another. This self-awareness completely rebuilt the very structure of the objects of research and the traditional boundaries between scientific fields: a sense of belonging and responsibility turned out to be integrated into theoretical practice. And that is why the field of Bakhtin studies (the Bakhtin studies), united by the idea of dialogism, the idea of a responsible, that is, ethical, form of humanitarian knowledge in general, has now found itself at the very center of critical, theoretical, ideological debates and the very practice of the humanities.

The legacy of the last period of Bakhtin's work (60-70s) is numerous, fragmentary recordings that have not yet been fully published. Basically, they are of a speculative-philosophical nature - Bakhtin's thought seems to be returning to the 1920s, closing the circle traversed in half a century. Later recordings contain the result of Bakhtin's creative path. What he has done is seen by Bakhtin as laying the foundations of humanitarian knowledge. Obviously, Bakhtin's "methodology of the humanities" belongs to the mainstream of European philosophy, which has its source in the idea of "spiritual sciences" by V. Dilthey, incorporates the achievements of "speech thinking" of dialogists and Heidegger's existentialism. This line in philosophy was summed up and comprehended by H.-G. Gadamer, designating it with the name of hermeneutics. Bakhtin, the author of fragments from the 1960s and 1970s, could be called a Russian hermeneuticist. Interest in the knowledge of the actual human principle - the eternal and "incomplete" human spirit - is inherent in Bakhtin as a continuer of the line of Russian Kantianism, focused mainly on the "problem of another's Self." The European "humanitarian" problematics on Russian philosophical soil originated in the "school" of A. Vvedensky and was realized in the theory of dialogue, "metalinguistics" of Bakhtin. The late Bakhtin, on the other hand, plunges into the hermeneutic realm in a narrow sense: thinking over the motley content of Bakhtin's notes of the 1960s and 1970s, one comes to the conclusion that the problem of interpretation comes to the fore in them. Bakhtin solves it in the spirit of his dialogism; Let us note that his hermeneutic concept is not distinguished by the sophistication of Western hermeneutic constructions - it is very simple.

Dialogicality as a property of humanitarian knowledge was first identified by F. Schleiermacher, and M.M. was introduced into the methodology of the humanities. Bakhtin. In his sketches “Toward a Methodology of the Humanities,” Bakhtin writes: “The exact sciences are a monological form of knowledge: the intellect contemplates a thing and speaks about it. There is only one subject here - the one who knows (contemplates) and the one who speaks (expresses). It is opposed only by the silent thing. Any object of knowledge (including a person) can be perceived as a thing. But the subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become mute, hence its cognition can only be dialogic. The possibility of humanitarian cognition lies in the fact that a person (his actions, inner world, his creations), being the object of research, appears before the cognizing person, firstly, as a set of texts that make up the objective side of cognition. M.M. Bakhtin wrote about this: “The text is the primary given (reality) and the starting point of any humanitarian discipline. A conglomerate of heterogeneous knowledge and methods called philology, linguistics, literary criticism, science of science, etc.” . And secondly, the subjective side of cognition, from which it is impossible to abstract, determines the dialogical nature of humanitarian cognition. “Research becomes questioning and conversation, that is, a dialogue. We do not ask nature, and she does not answer us. We pose questions to ourselves and organize an observation or experiment in a certain way in order to get an answer. Studying a person, we look everywhere and find signs and try to understand their meaning.

The dialogical nature of humanitarian knowledge, dialogue as a principle that reveals the inner essence of understanding, the dialogical nature of the interpretation of texts are the most urgent problems of the methodology of the humanities, which are currently underdeveloped. “We are approaching here the cutting edge of the philosophy of language and of humanitarian thought in general, the virgin land.” A characteristic feature of humanitarian knowledge is also that in the humanities the problems of the adequacy of knowledge and its truth are separated, the criteria for the adequacy and truth of knowledge do not coincide. In natural science knowledge, knowledge, which is an adequate reflection of reality, is considered true knowledge. The properties "to be an adequate reflection" and "to be true" coincide with each other in meaning. In humanitarian knowledge, objectively true knowledge constitutes, as it were, the core, is the main core. In order to become adequate, he still needs to "gain" knowledge about many accompanying moments that are not essential for natural science. The latter is consciously abstracted from them, since its goal is to achieve objective truth. These moments include the cultural and historical context, linguistic characteristics, psychological, worldview, life attitudes of the author of the text and his researcher, and other conditions, the choice of which is predetermined by the objectives of a particular study.

The task of humanitarian knowledge of any particular text is to build its model. The greatest difficulty is the construction of models of such texts that are removed from us in time. The model is a theoretical reconstruction of the text in order to most accurately reproduce the meaning of the text put into it by the author (objectively true interpretation), and to give it an additional (new) meaning. The new meaning brought into the reconstruction of the text by the interpreter is a necessary moment of "co-creation" of the author and the interpreter. The preservation of the objectively true core of the text model is a necessary condition for an adequate interpretation. But it is still not sufficient. An adequate interpretation becomes when the interpreter "breathes life" into the model he created, when it is perceived by the interpreter's contemporaries as an original work. The role of the interpreter is to overcome the temporal distance between the original text and the present.

Understanding of texts is always based on certain models. The models of the text author, the author's contemporaries, the interpreter and the interpreter's contemporaries are different. Their difference is based on a fundamentally different perception of the same text. All four models have the right to be attributed to one text (they can be called its models), because they all have an objectively true core. The presence of this core removes possible accusations of instability, "fluidity" of humanitarian knowledge. This concept makes it possible to assert that there are equal adequate models of the same text. The plurality of models is a positive fact only on the condition that each of the models, which is recognized as adequate, relies in its development on a system of principles of interpretation. In each specific case, the system of principles for interpreting the text (building a model) may be different. To build a general methodology of humanitarian knowledge, one can formulate a system of general principles that are used in any particular system of principles designed to analyze a specific text. The selection of a system of such principles is a rather difficult task related to the problems of the methodology of science.

In Soviet philosophical literature, the methodology of humanitarian knowledge as a whole was turned relatively recently, but there is already a significant number of works, both critical and theoretical.

In 1979, M. M. Bakhtin's book "The Aesthetics of Verbal Creativity" was published, which included two sketches. They could be called philosophical reflections on the subject, subject and methodology of humanitarian knowledge. In the works of M.M. Bakhtin, The problem of text in linguistics, philology and other humanities. An Experience in Philosophical Analysis” and “Toward a Methodology of the Humanities” contain a presentation of a well-thought-out (but, unfortunately, sketchy) original concept.

Outlining an approach to the methodology of the humanities, M.M. Bakhtin singles out the object of study in humanitarian knowledge, which, in his opinion, is a social (social) person, and the subject of study is the text. The text is the one specific feature, which singles out a person as an object of humanitarian knowledge. Texts can be real and possible. For texts, it is essential that they are sign systems. Signs not related to human activity essence material objects. Being intended to convey information, they become signs in the proper sense of the word. Only man is able to endow signs with meaning. Signs are not necessarily linguistic, but any sign can in principle be expressed in linguistic form, represented as text. Understanding in the humanities is always aimed at comprehending the meaning (meaning) of signs.

The main task of the humanities is to comprehend the "deep meaning" of the text. Even in the simple situation of understanding a single utterance, certain difficulties arise. Every utterance is "given" and "created". The given in the statement is presented as a reflection of the external (in relation to language and thinking) state of affairs (thinking about reality) together with the expression of the same state of affairs by linguistic means (linguistic meaning). What is created in the utterance is, on the one hand, a relation to the subject (to the speaker). It is always colored with new shades, expressing the speaker's attitude to the state of affairs and to his thoughts about it. On the other hand, what is created in the statement is related to values (truth, goodness, beauty, justice, etc.).

The "deep meaning" of the statement is always somewhat veiled, hidden. Moreover, this provision will be fair in relation to the system of statements - to the text. Deep meaning cannot be reduced to purely logical or purely objective relations. Therefore, it is necessary to use a special method of research: “going beyond the limits of what is understood” (the principle of being outside).

The criterion for adequate understanding in the concept of M. M. Bakhtin is its "depth", the comprehension of deep meaning. The main method of such comprehension is "replenishing understanding", aimed at comprehending the unconscious motives of the author's creative process of the text (translating them into the plane of the interpreter's consciousness) and at mastering the "multiple meanings", at "revealing the diversity of meanings" of the text.

Accuracy in the Humanities M.M. Bakhtin connects with "overcoming the alienness of the alien without turning it into purely one's own." “Overcoming the strangeness of the alien” is possible through the use of the method of “getting used to”. Getting used to an alien culture, analyzing a work from the point of view of this alien culture is not enough to fully understand the meaning of the work. If we dwell only on such a method, then only duplication is possible, which has never been an interpretation, since it did not carry an element of novelty. "Vzhivanie" ("resettlement") in an alien culture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding. Creative understanding, according to M.M. Bakhtin, should not renounce modernity, from their own culture. This point of view radically distinguishes Bakhtin's concept from Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. Awareness of the researcher being in the present tense, in his contemporary culture, makes it possible to look at the subject of interpretation from the outside (another point of being outside). Accuracy in humanitarian knowledge is associated not only with penetration into the deep layers and comprehending them from the standpoint of an "alien" culture, but also with a significant limitation. The subjective factor cannot be eliminated in humanitarian knowledge. It is he who determines the dialogic nature of the humanities. But you can not turn the interpreted text into "purely your own". The absolutization of the subjective factor leads to relativism and, ultimately, to agnosticism, emasculates the concept of objective truth and makes it inapplicable in the humanities.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the ideas proposed by M. M. Bakhtin. They define an integral research program in the field of humanities and have a significant impact on work in this area.

Conclusion

Created by M.M. Bakhtin's philosophy of dialogism was entirely based on the interpretation of Dostoevsky's work. The essence of Bakhtin's teaching stemmed from the concept of incompleteness, free openness, "outsideness" of a person. Man never matches himself. There is something in him that does not lend itself to "external definition" and is revealed only "in an act of free self-knowledge and speech." He is always "at the point of exit", non-identity with himself; no finite attributes and imposed patterns are applicable to it. Man is free and nothing can be predicted or determined beyond his will. Bakhtin rejected the materialistic understanding of history. The individualization of the individual, in his opinion, takes place not in the sphere of sociality, but in the sphere of consciousness. The criterion of sociality proceeds from the principle of the unity of being. But the unity of being inevitably turns into the unity of consciousness, which, ultimately, transforms into the unity of one consciousness. And at the same time, it makes absolutely no difference what metaphysical form it takes: “consciousness in general” (“Bewusstsein uberhaupt”), “absolute self”, “absolute spirit”, “normative consciousness”. According to Bakhtin, the only important thing is that next to this single and inevitably one consciousness, “a multitude of empirical human consciousnesses” can no longer coexist; the latter turn out to be as if accidental and even completely unnecessary. Thus, it becomes obvious that on the basis of philosophical monism, the personality is completely closed for knowledge. Thus, in dialogism, Bakhtin found the key to revealing the essence of man, his individuality. Dialogism meant the pluralization of philosophical anthropology. For Bakhtin, it was not the self itself that was of paramount importance, but the presence outside of oneself of another equal consciousness, another equal self (you). A person really exists in the forms of I and the other, and the form of the other in the image of the person prevails. This will create a special field of tension in which the struggle between the self and the other takes place, the struggle "in everything by which a person expresses (reveals) himself outside (for others), - from the body to the word, including to the last, confessional word. Where there is no struggle, there is no living I and the other, there is no value difference between them, without which no valuable action is possible.

For him, there is no morally and aesthetically significant value of my body and my soul. In its individuality, I remain within the framework of a calm and equal positive given. In his world of values there is no me as a self-determined consciousness, as a consciousness capable of a value-based attitude to the world. Therefore, the true, creative self cannot close in on itself; it will seek a way out of itself, where it will immediately find another.

Bakhtin represented man in a new dimension - in his incompleteness and openness to the world. His man acted as a guarantor of the immeasurable future. For Bakhtin, the relation of the self to the other signified precisely the value demarcation and self-affirmation of the individual. Therefore, he generally considered the problem of the soul to be a problem of aesthetics, and not of ethics, which, undoubtedly, was discordant with the general structure of Russian thought.

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