Problems of knowledge in German classical philosophy. The main problems of German classical philosophy. Criticism of transcendental philosophy
german classical philosophy developed in that spiritual and intellectual atmosphere that began in the 80s of the 18th century and lasted for almost a century. The main representatives of German classical philosophy: Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Fichte, Schelling. An important role in the formation of German classical philosophy was played by the achievements of natural science and the social sciences. Main Features of German Classical Philosophy express the specifics of one of the directions philosophical thought modern times and can be defined as: a similar understanding of the role of philosophy as the basis for scientific understanding of the picture of nature, society, man; bringing to the fore the idea of development as a theory and method of cognition of reality / development of a dialectical concept of development /; creation of conceptual foundations, set out in abstract-logical forms; development of philosophy as a broad special system of disciplines, ideas and concepts; formulation of general principles and approaches to the problem historical development; vision in philosophy of the "critical conscience of the era"; consideration of anthropological issues from the standpoint of universal values; upholding the principle of freedom and other humanistic principles. Kant believed that before exploring the problems of philosophy, being, morality, it is necessary to study the possibilities of human cognition and establish its boundaries, noted that the conditions for cognition are embedded in the mind and form the basis of knowledge. Thereby Kant carried out a kind of revolution in philosophy, considering knowledge as an activity that proceeds according to its own laws. Kant distinguished between the phenomena of things perceived by man and things as they exist in themselves. He said that we cognize the world not as it really is, but only as it appears to us. Only the phenomena of things /phenomena/ are available to our knowledge. As a result of the impact of "things in themselves" on the senses, a chaos of sensations arises. And only the forces of the mind bring this chaos into unity and order. laws nature, in fact, there is a connection that the mind brings to the world of phenomena, that is, our mind prescribes laws to nature. According to Kant, the world of phenomena corresponds to an independent of human consciousness essence of things- "things themselves." Their absolute knowledge is impossible. Rejecting the claim of science to the knowledge of "things in themselves", he pointed out to the human mind its limits. Kant, he said, limited knowledge in order to make room for FAITH. Belief in the immortality of the soul, freedom and God is the basis of the fact that Man is called to be a moral being. Thus, for Kant, the sphere of moral action was separated from scientific knowledge and placed above it. The basic law of morality proclaimed the "categorical imperative". An act is moral only when done out of respect for moral laws. His doctrine of duty - deontology - centers around the concept of personality as the highest value. Every individual is an end in itself and cannot be a means. Considering that moral requirements are irreducible to pleasure, benefit, benefit. He argued that duty contains the dimension of independence.
Hegel is the author of the concept of "absolute idealism", the basis of everything that exists is the "world spirit", and all natural and social forms considered as its manifestation. Embodied in successive images, the objective spirit in the form of art, science, morality, religion, carries out the process of self-knowledge. The development of the individual as a whole produces the same pattern. In other words, man in Hegel's philosophy is the reality of the world spirit. A completely opposite interpretation of man is presented in the philosophical system Feuerbach. Man, according to Feuerbach, is the unity of soul and body, understood as a psychophysical unity. Based on this understanding of man, Feuerbach rejects the Hegelian idealistic interpretation, in which a person is considered primarily as a spiritual being. Human nature, according to Feuerbach, is a biologically separate individual, a link in the development of the human race. Feuerbach, in defining man, loses sight of the role of practice, as in historical life man, and in the process of cognition.
No. 26. VOLUNTARISM OF SCHOPENHAUER.
One of the most prominent representatives of the philosophy of irrationalism is Schopenhauer, who tried to give in his philosophical concept true view of the world. He argued that the world around us is only a world phenomenon, our idea of it, therefore it exists only for the intellect, for a being with mental functions. If the ability of consciousness is destroyed, then the whole world represented by it will disappear. Will is the basic concept of f-ii - voluntarism. The essence of the world is will, it is unconditional, absolute, free and does not depend on time and space, it is a blind, unconscious striving that excludes all goals. every movement, every satisfaction. Being a source of struggle and disagreement, the all-devouring will moves the world from within and attracts it. Man, like all living things, is an objectification / implementation, implementation / of his will. The will, as the inner essence of a person, manifests itself in him as the will to live, as a constant universal desire for life, a desire to live, at all costs, without any relation to the purpose and value of life. The will is the source of all aspirations and desires of a person: he does and wants only what the will wants, the objectification of which he is. The will is primary in relation to the intellect. The intellect is "a lantern that illuminates the way for the will, but does not pave it itself." Man, according to Schopenhauer, is the pinnacle of the objectification of the will, through his self-consciousness, the will is aware of itself. A person is able to understand all the tragedy and meaninglessness of the visible world, to realize that death is the death of the intellect, but for each individual there always remains a finite life in the guise of will. In general, Schopenhauer notes, people's lives are hopeless fading and grief. The meaning of life lies in understanding that the world is sorrow. Schopenhauer refers to the provisions of ancient Indian philosophy, calling a person to deny the meaningless world, to strive for peace, for "nirvana". Schopenhauer's history is meaningless, because there is no rational justification in it. Science constantly comes to a standstill when it tries to justify the world from the laws of reason. Because of the development of science and technology, the world has not become a better place.” Time is hostile to man, it is ruthless and insatiable. Thus, Schopenhauer comes to "pessimism", to the characterization of man as a being who does not live according to the laws of society and moral progress. to the denial of the possibility of knowing the world / since the will. spilled into the world, there are no laws / and also create a fair and reasonable society. In conclusion, it should be noted that in his concept Schopenhauer criticized traditional rationalism and "reason" as it was understood by classical philosophy, as a result of which voluntarism was opposed to rationalism.
CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY
German classical philosophy covers a period of time from the middle of the XVIII century. until the 70s of the nineteenth century. It represents a significant stage in the development of philosophical thought and culture of mankind. German classical philosophy is represented by philosophical creativity Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 - 1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775 - 1854), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel(1770 - 1831), Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach(1804 - 1872).
Each of these philosophers created his own philosophical system, characterized by a wealth of ideas and concepts. At the same time, German classical philosophy is a single spiritual formation, which is characterized by the following common features:
1. A peculiar understanding of the role of philosophy in the history of mankind, in the development of world culture. Classical German philosophers believed that philosophy was called upon to be the critical conscience of culture, the “confronting consciousness”, “grinning at reality”, the “soul” of culture.
2. Not only human history was investigated, but also human essence. Kant sees man as a moral being. Fichte emphasizes the activity, effectiveness of human consciousness and self-consciousness, considers the device human life according to the dictates of reason. Schelling sets the task of showing the relationship between the objective and the subjective. Hegel expands the boundaries of the activity of self-consciousness and individual consciousness: the self-consciousness of the individual in him correlates not only with external objects, but also with other self-consciousness, from which various social forms arise. He deeply explores various forms of social consciousness.
3. All representatives of German classical philosophy treated philosophy as a special system of philosophical disciplines, categories, ideas. I. Kant, for example, singles out as philosophical disciplines, first of all, epistemology and ethics. Schelling - natural philosophy, ontology. Fichte, considering philosophy a "scientific study", saw in it such sections as ontological, epistemological, socio-political. Hegel created a broad system of philosophical knowledge, which included the philosophy of nature, logic, the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of morality, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of the state, the philosophy of the development of individual consciousness, etc. Feuerbach considered ontological, epistemological and ethical problems, and also philosophical problems of history and religion.
4. German classical philosophy develops a holistic concept of dialectics.
Kantian dialectics is the dialectics of the limits and possibilities of human knowledge: feelings, reason and human mind.
Fichte's dialectic is reduced to the study of the creative activity of the Self, to the interaction of the Self and the non-Self as opposites, on the basis of the struggle of which the development of human self-consciousness takes place. Schelling transfers the principles of dialectical development developed by Fichte to nature. His nature is a developing, developing spirit.
The great dialectician is Hegel, who presented a detailed, comprehensive theory of idealist dialectics. For the first time he presented the entire natural, historical and spiritual world as a process, i.e. studied it in continuous movement, change, transformation and development, contradictions, quantitative-qualitative and qualitative-quantitative changes, interruptions in gradualness, the struggle of the new with the old, directed movement. In logic, in the philosophy of nature, in the history of philosophy, in aesthetics, and so on. - in each of these areas, Hegel sought to find a thread of development.
All German classical philosophy breathes dialectics. Special mention must be made of Feuerbach. Although Feuerbach criticizes the Hegelian system of objective idealism (with its idealistic dialectics), he himself, in his philosophical studies avoids dialectics. He considers connections phenomena, their interactions and changes the unity of opposites in the development of phenomena (spirit and body, human consciousness and material nature). He made an attempt to find the relationship between the individual and the social. Another thing is that anthropological materialism did not let it out of its framework, although the dialectical approach in considering phenomena was not completely alien to it.
German classical philosophy is a national philosophy. It reflects the features of the existence and development of Germany in the second half of the 18th century. and the first half of the 19th century: its economic backwardness in comparison with the states developed at that time (Holland, England) and political fragmentation.
German philosophers are patriots of their fatherland. In the midst of the war with France, when Napoleon's troops were stationed in Berlin (1808), Fichte, realizing the danger that threatened him, delivered his "Speeches to the German Nation", in which he sought to awaken the self-consciousness of the German people against the invaders. During the war of liberation against Napoleon, Fichte, together with his wife, devoted himself to caring for the wounded. Hegel, seeing all the ugliness of German reality, nevertheless declares that the Prussian state is built on reasonable principles. Justifying the Prussian monarchy, Hegel writes that the state in and for itself is a moral whole, the realization of freedom.
Classical German philosophy is contradictory, just as German reality itself is contradictory. Kant maneuvers between materialism and idealism; Fichte moves from the position of the subjective to the position of objective idealism; Hegel, justifying German reality, writes with admiration of the French Revolution as of the rising of the sun.
MAIN PROBLEMS AND DIRECTIONS OF GERMAN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY
Main Problems of German Classical Philosophy
German classical philosophy arose and developed in the general mainstream of the Western European philosophy of modern times. She discussed the same problems that were raised in the philosophical theories of F. Bacon, R. Descartes, D. Locke, J. Berkeley, D. Hume and others.
In the XVIII for Europe - "Renaissance". Centers of philosophical discoveries - France and England.
New era characterized by its new problems, however, the 17th century had an initial influence on German classical philosophy. Questions remained open about the method of cognition, about the place of man in the world around him, about the goals of his activity.
The role of the individual is growing. Orientation to historicism, humanism. Classical German philosophy emphasized the role of philosophy in developing the problems of humanism and made attempts to comprehend human life. This comprehension took place in different forms and in different ways, but the problem was posed by all representatives of this trend of philosophical thought. The most significant studies include: Kant's study of the entire life of a person as a subject of moral consciousness, his civil freedom, the ideal state of society and real society with incessant antagonism between people, etc.; Fichte's ideas about the primacy of the people over the state, consideration of the role of moral consciousness in human life, the social world as a world of private property, which is protected by the state; Hegelian doctrine of civil society, the rule of law, private property; Schelling's reliance on reason as a means of realizing a moral goal; Feuerbach's desire to create a religion of love and humanistic ethics. Such is the peculiar unity of the humanistic aspirations of the representatives of the classical German philosophy.
Under the influence of British empiricism (its main ideas are that feelings are supplied by the flesh, and thinking is based on sensory perception. Therefore, without feelings, thinking is not possible.), the ideas of Leibniz (that the mind is a step towards the Divine) and Locke (the system of educating the human mind through his feelings) formulate the problems of German classical philosophy of the 18th century: through the mind, movement towards the Divine is possible; thinking is brought up through feelings; feelings are necessary for the knowledge of God.
In the 19th century, the prerequisites for the emergence of new problems of German classical philosophy were outlined.
One of the features of the intellectual life of the 19th century is the gap between artistic and scientific pursuits.
If earlier thinkers were engaged in science and art from the standpoint of the general principle of harmony, then in the 19th century, under the influence of romanticism, a harsh reaction arose against the pressure of scientific progress on man. The scientific way of life, with its experiments, seemed to suppress the spirit of freedom and exploration that is required of artists. There is an opinion that the scientific approach will not allow discovering the secrets of nature.
At the same time, a divergence emerged between science and philosophy.
The enormous influence of science raises new social problems of an ethical nature.
The requirement remained effective - not to go beyond the limits of experience.
Searching for the causes of the phenomenon and striving to explain the transition to the noumenal world, where categories and explanations are not applied, turned out to be unrealizable. This approach to scientific theory is characteristic of a whole generation of scientists who were interested in philosophical content research activities.
In the second half of the 19th century, under the influence of the romantics with their subjectivism, interest in the problems of the irrational in general increased.
It was in the second half of the 19th century that the so-called "irrationalist" philosophy appeared. These are the teachings of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the intuitionist Bergson.
German classical philosophy has developed several general problems, which allows us to speak of it as a holistic phenomenon. She:
- turned the attention of philosophy from traditional problems (being, thinking, cognition, etc.) to research human essence;
- paid special attention to the problem of development;
- significantly enriched the logical and theoretical apparatus of philosophy.
At first, it was nature closely associated with the act of divine creation, as a result of which it often merged with God, such as God nature in Spinoza. Experimental science is looking for its own methodology in philosophy, a way to adequately cognize the truth; at the same time, philosophy, by its own admission, many philosophers such as Fichte, for example, develops as a “scientific science”, i.e. as the methodology and logic of science. exists as a reflection on scientific knowledge, always at the same time going beyond these limits, which can already be seen in the Critique of the Practical...
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Lecture 4
1. The problem of being in German classical philosophy I. Kant, G. F. Hegel).
2. The problem of being in postclassical philosophy. (K. Marx, irrationalism of A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche)
3. Existentialism (M. Heidegger).
A certain period in the development of German philosophical thought from the middle of the 18th to the middle of the 19th century, represented by the teachings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. At the same time, N.K.F. this is a special line, the highest, final link in the development of new European philosophical rationalism, and the so-called. philosophical classics (with its inherent claims to systematic integrity and completeness; conviction in the natural orderliness of the world order, the presence in it of harmony and orders accessible to rational comprehension). The problem of being, developed in German philosophy around the middle of the 18th century, existed in the form given by the German classics for almost 200 years and initiated the formulation of many other important, even fundamental, problems of philosophy; these include the question of the relation of thinking to being, the idea of the activity of thinking, the theme of contradictions in thinking and being, and so on. In the middle of the XVII beginning of the XVIII centuries. the concept of being has not yet formed; philosophical attention during this period was focused on the concept of nature. The need for its comprehension was set by the change at the turn of the XVIXVII centuries. cultural and philosophical paradigms that have changed the old attitudes. At first it was nature, closely connected with the act of divine creation, as a result of which it often merged with God, as, for example, God-nature in Spinoza. However, the assumption of such an indivisible unity has already made it possible to introduce self-movement into nature, to recognize its development according to immanent laws.
From the middle of the XVIII century. the concept of nature is transformed into the concept of being. Experimental science is looking for its own methodology in philosophy a way to adequately cognize the truth; at the same time, philosophy, by the own admission of many philosophers (such as, for example, Fichte), takes shape as “scientific teaching”, i.e. as the methodology and logic of science. But even in the case when this fact is not realized, the philosophy of the XVIIIXX centuries. exists as a reflection on scientific knowledge (always at the same time going beyond this framework, which is already evident in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment).
Being is not that existence (Existenz) in which all possible differences are removed and extinguished, i.e. where absolutely everything is included, including thinking (as it was with the enlighteners). It is the being (Sein) to which thinking opposes and in relation to which it can reveal its activity, demiurgical and at the same time cognitive power. Without the transformation of nature into being, thinking could not be understood as a theoretical, knowing mind, and philosophy could not be formed as the logic of science.
One of the first who in modern times understood the full significance of the principle of autonomy of being was Immanuel Kant. Being well aware of the achievements of Newtonian natural science, he tried to conduct a kind of experiment of the mind (by analogy with experiments in natural science) in order to find out what the mind can know and what it cannot know. The problem that confronted Kant in connection with the explanation of the tasks of scientific knowledge was identified primarily as the problem of the adequacy of knowledge. Related to it were questions about the beginnings (sources) of knowledge, about the forms of scientific objectivity, about the universal and necessary nature of scientific knowledge etc. The most important question was content knowledge. Unlike formal logic, which studies only the forms of correct thinking, Kant is aware of the tasks of the new logic as a requirement to substantiate its truth, i.e. to prove the correspondence of knowledge to its content. The content of knowledge must defend itself from the cognizing mind, even oppose it, just so that the object of knowledge, to what thinking cognizes, (as content) can be treat , in this case to know it. The content side of thinking, which differs from its formal side, must therefore have a certain independence, independence from thinking, i.e. to exist, as it were, outside of thought. In other words, thinking must have its objective content outside of itself; then it is formed as thinking. The whole problematic of German classical philosophy begins with this opposition of thinking and being.
The problems of the theory of knowledge are at the center of the philosophical system of Kant and his
numerous followers.
The process of cognition includes three stages, three steps. The first step is
sensory knowledge. All our knowledge begins with experience, with the work of organs
feelings, they are affected by objects of the external world outside the person,
or, as Kant calls them, things in themselves. The philosopher does not give an unambiguous
definitions of this concept. In many places in the Critique of Pure Reason, he
declares unequivocally that things in themselves exist objectively, i.e.
independent of human consciousness, although they remain unknowable. Such
understanding of the thing in itself as the basis of all phenomena, as the actual cause
human sensations, as an objective reality, is in Kahn
dominant, which allows us to qualify it as materialistic. But
it meets other interpretations incompatible with the first. So under the thing in
to himself, he understands a borderline, limiting concept that closes the circle of possible
human ideas and limiting people's claims to knowledge
peace. By the thing-in-itself, Kant also understands God, the immortality of the soul, and freedom.
will. Obviously, the last interpretations of the thing-in-itself contradict the first and
are idealistic.
The main feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism,
a compromise between the one and the other, a combination in one philosophical system
opposite worldviews. When Kant allows. What
our ideas correspond to something that exists outside of us, then it
acts as a materialist when he declares this thing unknowable,
transcendent, otherworldly, he acts as an idealist. defining
value in Kant's philosophy are still not materialistic, but
idealistic elements, by virtue of which he is a representative
philosophical idealism and agnosticism.
Sensations caused by the action of things in themselves on sensibility, according to Kant
nothing like the originals. They belong only to the subjective
properties of sensibility, are its modifications and do not give knowledge about
object. Although sensations are caused by the action of "things in themselves" on
human sensibility, they have nothing to do with these things.
Feelings are not images, but symbols of things.
Our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow at all that it is entirely
comes from experience. Knowledge, according to Kant, has a complex composition and consists of
two parts. The philosopher calls the first part the "matter" of knowledge. This is the flow
sensations, or empirical knowledge given a posteriori, i.e. through experience.
The second part form - is given before the experience, and p riori and must be completely finished
to be in the soul, in the subject.
Thus, along with agnosticism feature theory of knowledge
Kant is an apriorism. The question arises as to where the a priori, i.e.
pre-experimental forms of sensibility and all the new a priori forms of which
Kant. The philosopher was forced to admit that he was not in the position to answer this question.
forces: “this issue cannot be resolved, since in order to destroy it, as well as
for all thinking, we already need these properties”
If the "matter" of knowledge is. According to Kant, the experienced, a posteriori character, then
the form of sensory cognition outside experience, a priori. Before the perception of objects
experiential knowledge in us must exist "pure", i.e. free from everything
empirical, visual representations, which are the form, the condition
any experience. Such "pure", i.e. a priori visual representations
space and time appear. According to the philosopher, space and time
these are forms of sensibility, and not of reason; these are representations, and not
concepts.
Space is not at all a property of any things in themselves,
time also does not belong to things in themselves either as their property or as their
substance. Kant thus deprives space and time of everything
claim to absolute reality, he turns them into special properties
subject.
The first stage of knowledge - the field of sensibility - is characterized by the ability
ordering the chaos of sensations with the help of subjective forms of contemplation -
space and time. In this way, according to Kant, an object is formed
sensibility, or the world of phenomena. The next step is the realm of reason. Neither
one of these abilities cannot be preferred over the other. Without sensibility
one object would not be given to us, and without reason, not one would be a thought. Thoughts
perceptions obtained on the basis of sensibility have only a subjective
Meaning is a simple connection of perception. The judgment of perception must acquire
"objective" meaning, in Kant's words, i.e. get character
universality and necessity, and thereby become an "experienced" judgment. This
occurs, according to Kant, by subsuming the judgment of perception under the a priori
Causality is one of the categories that are a priori principles
thinking. They serve as tools for processing sensory material. In "Criteria
pure reason" Kant builds a special table of these categories. There are only 12 of them
corresponds to the number of types of judgments according to the traditional classification of judgments in
reality, negation, limitation, belonging, causality, communication,
possibility, existence, necessity. Kant cannot justify
no further grounds can be given, just as one cannot justify
why do we have such-and-such and not other functions of judgment, or why time and
space are the only forms of what is possible for us visual
representation".
By turning causality into a subjective category of reason, Kant created for himself
numerous difficulties. First of all, the "thing in itself", inasmuch as it
exists outside the subject cannot be regarded as the cause which,
acting on the sensibility of the subject, it generates the "matter" of knowledge. Are put
of all his cosmogonic theories, since they, like all natural science,
based on the recognition of the objective nature of the laws of nature, including
number of causal relationships.
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, argues that the principles of "pure reason"
reason", realizing the application of categories to experience, make possible the very nature
and the science about it "pure" natural science. The supreme law of nature
found in the human mind. Though strange, it is nevertheless true if
I will say: Reason does not draw its laws from nature, but prescribes them
to her"
The last and highest stage of knowledge is the sphere of the mind, which is "
the highest authority for processing visualization material and for
bringing it under the highest unity of thought. Explaining these points, Kant
indicates that reason, unlike reason, generates "transcendental
ideas" that go beyond experience. There are three such ideas:
psychological (the doctrine of the soul),
cosmological (the doctrine of the world),
theological (the doctrine of God).
These ideas express the desire of the mind to comprehend things in themselves. Mind greedily
seeks to comprehend these things, tries to go beyond the limits of experience, but all in vain:
things "flee from him" and remain unknown. As a result, the mind creates only
paralogisms, antinomies,"ideals without reality"
entangled in irresolvable contradictions. Kant pays great attention
antinomies, i.e. Contradictory, incompatible with each other provisions, each
of which, according to Kant, can be proven logically flawless. Such
Kant has four antinomies:
Thesis “The world has a beginning in time and
also limited in space.
Antithesis “The world has no beginning in time and no boundaries in
space. It is infinite both in time and space.
Thesis - "Every complex substance in the world
consists of simple parts and in general there is only simple and what is folded
from simple"
Antithesis “No complex thing in the world is
consists of simple things, and in general there is nothing simple in the world.
Thesis - "Causality according to the laws of nature
is not the only causality from which all phenomena in
the world. In order to explain phenomena, it is also necessary to admit free causality.
Antithesis “There is no freedom, but
everything happens in the world only according to the laws of nature.
Thesis “Belongs to the world, or as part of it,
or as its cause, an unconditionally necessary being.
Antithesis - There is absolutely no
necessary being neither in the world nor outside the world as its cause. In other words,
There is no god.
So, antinomies are contradictions that testify to the impotence of reason,
about his inability to comprehend "things in themselves", to go beyond the boundaries of experience. Metaphysics is not a science and is impossible as a science. However, Kant believes that it can become a science through transformation. First, it must be constructed as a doctrine of a priori forms of knowledge, which establishes the action of the understanding in all its aspects. 2-x it is possible as the desire of the human mind to penetrate into everything unknown and inaccessible. In 3, it should be a criticism of all previous claims to the knowledge of the other world (supersensible) world. But in our thinking there is a need to go beyond the limits of the sensory world and comprehend something different from it, that is, some stronger need that dominates theoretical life. This need can be based only on the moral conviction that our destiny goes beyond the limits of the world of our knowledge. Our knowledge is all the time conditioned by an ethical striving for the supersensible world, which life itself cannot satisfy.
Philosophical system of Hegel.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was born in Stuttgart - the capital
Principality of Württemberg. His father, secretary of the treasury, was a member of
top officials. In the gymnasium, Hegel, who was an exemplary student,
showed interest in ancient literature. The family prepared Hegel for a career
pastor, for which he took a course at the Tübingen Theological
Institute (1788-1793). During the first two years of study there was taught
Leibniz - Wolffian philosophy; defending an essay written in her spirit about
boundaries of moral duties, Hegel received a master's degree
philosophy. For the next three years, he took a course in theology,
the successful development of which Hegel was awarded the degree of candidate of theology.
The French Revolution made a strong impression on Hegel.
The philosophical system is divided by Hegel into three parts:
logic
· philosophy of nature
Philosophy of spirit
Logic, from his point of view, is a system of "pure reason", coinciding with
divine mind.
“Thoughts of God” turn out to be the most general laws of the development of nature, society and
thinking.
The starting point of Hegel's philosophy is the identitythinking (consciousness)
and being. Things and thoughts about them coincide, therefore thinking in its own
immanent definitions and the true nature of things are one and the same.
2.2.1. Logics
The identity of being and thinking, from Hegel's point of view, is
substantive unity of the world. But the identity is not abstract, but concrete,
those. one that implies a difference. Identity and difference unity
opposites. Abstract identity, as in Schelling, excludes itself
development opportunity. Thinking and being are subject to the same laws,
This is the rational meaning of the Hegelian proposition about concrete identity.
Objective absolute thinking, Hegel believes, is not only the beginning, but also
the driving force behind the development of all things. Manifested in all the variety of phenomena,
it acts asabsolute idea.
The absolute idea does not stand still. It is constantly evolving from
one step to another, more specific and meaningful. Climbing from
absolute to concrete general principle of development.
The highest stage of development"absolute spirit". At this stage
the absolute idea manifests itself in the sphere of human history and makes the subject
thinking itself.
The philosophical system of Hegelian objective idealism has some
peculiarities. Firstly, pantheism. Divine thought hovers
somewhere in the sky, it permeates the whole world, constituting the essence of each, even
the smallest thing. Secondly, panlogism. Objective divine
thinking is strictly logical. And thirdly, dialectics.
Hegel's innovation is that his logic breaks through the narrow horizon of formal
logic. Recognizing its pedagogical significance, the philosopher speaks of it in a very
dismissively. He had well-known reasons for this. Logic forms
were usually considered as frozen, unchanged, cut off from the content.
“They are dead forms and do not have the spirit that composes them
living concrete unity” (1.5.25).
Logical forms are not only meaningful, but are also interconnected and
development. Hegel proclaimsunity, identity of dialectics, logic and
theory of knowledge.Logic is not a canon, or a set of frozen rules, but
organon, or instrument of attaining truth.
Hegel is characterized by epistemological optimism, the conviction that the world is knowable.
Subjective spirit, human consciousness, comprehending things, discovers in them
manifestation of the absolute spirit, divine thinking. From this follows an important
Hegel's conclusion: everything real is reasonable, everything reasonable is real.
Revived forms of life will certainly give way to a new one, such is the true meaning of the form
Hegel.
So, logic is a regular movement of concepts (categories),
expressing the content of the absolute idea, the stages of its self-development.
Where does this idea start from? After a long discussion of this difficult
problem Hegel comes to the conclusion that the beginning is the category clean
being. Being, in his opinion, does not have an eternal existence and
should arise. But from what? It is obvious that from non-existence, from nothing.
“So far there is nothing, and something must arise. The beginning is not pure nothing, but
such a nothing out of which something must come; existence, therefore, already
is also included at the beginning. The beginning, therefore, contains both
the other, being and nothing; it is the unity of being and nothing, or, to put it another way, it
there is non-being, which is at the same time non-being” (1.5.57-58).
those. some particular being. Becoming can be considered the unity of non-being
and being. "Becoming isunstable worry,which settles
goes into somecalm result". This is the proposed scheme
Hegel.
If the dialectical process of the emergence of Hegel seeks to express with the help of
and its main feature: the identity of opposites. Nothing in the world dies
without a trace, but serves as a material, an initial step for the emergence of a new one. This
regularity is reflected by the category withdrawal, as well as the category
negation, which Hegel makes extensive use of in his philosophical system.
The new denies the old, but it denies it dialectically: it does not simply discard it into
side and destroys, but saves in a recycled form using
viable elements of the old for the creation of the new. Such a denial Hegel
calls specific.
Denial for Hegel is not a one-time, but essentially an endless process. And in
In this process, he finds a bunch of three elements everywhere: thesis
antithesis synthesis.As a result of the denial of any position,
taken as a thesis, an opposition (antithesis) arises. Last
is necessarily negated. There is a double negative, or
negation of negation, which leads to the emergence of the third link, synthesis. He she
a higher level reproduces some features of the first, original link.
All this construction is called triad.
In Hegel's philosophy, the triad performs not only a methodological function, but also
self-creating function. It is not only a substantive principle or law
dialectics, but also a way of constructing a scheme. All architectonics, structure
Hegelian philosophy is subject to a triple rhythm, takes place in accordance
with the requirements of the triad. In general, Hegel's philosophy is divided into three parts: logic,
philosophy of nature and philosophy of mind. These are not adjacent parts, which
can be swapped. This is a triad, where each part expresses regular
stage of dialectical development. At least that's what Hegel himself thinks. Logic
he also divides into three parts: the doctrine of being, for example, includes: 1)
certainty (quality), 2) magnitude (quantity), 3) measure. Quality consists
of three parts: 1) being, 2) being present, 3) being for-itself. Being is
triad: pure being nothingness becoming. Here the division limit is reached,
or a triad consisting of categories, each of which cannot be decomposed
into triads.
Let's take a look at some of the most important points systems of large and small triads.
The result of becoming is existence. In contrast to pure being, this
being defined, endowed quality . Quality is first
immediate determinateness of being. Every thing is different from others thanks to
its inherent quality. By virtue of the qualitative definiteness of things, not only
different from each other, but related to each other.
This order in volume corresponds to the history of human knowledge. Savages
(like children) distinguish things by their qualitative definiteness, although they do not know how to
The synthesis of qualitative and quantitative certainty is measure.
Every thing, insofar as it is qualitatively determined, is a measure. Violation of measure
changes quality and turns one thing into another. There's a break
gradualness, or a qualitative leap.
Hegel resolutely opposes flat evolutionism, which recognizes only
gradual transition from one quality state to another. Hegel
convincingly justifies what later became known as the law of transition
quantitative changes into qualitative ones and vice versa through jumps.
Hegel's position on nodal
measure ratio lines.Having reached a certain stage, quantitative
changes cause spasmodic and mostly sudden qualitative
changes. Those points at which a qualitative leap occurs, i.e. transition to
new measure, Hegel calls knots. All things are interconnected by nodal lines,
or a chain of transition from one measure to another. Development of science and public
practice confirmed the correctness of the dialectical law discovered by Hegel.
The dialectic of the transition from quantity to quality answers the question of form
development of all natural and spiritual things. But the more important question remains
driving force , the impetus for this development. And here Hegel is looking for an answer not in
other world, but in reality. He formulates this answer
in the doctrine of essence. "Mere wandering from one quality to another
and only one transition from qualitative to quantitative and vice versa, the matter is not yet
finished, but there is something abiding in things, this abiding is before
the whole essence."
Quality, quantity, measure are categories of being. These are the forms in which we
we perceive reality, and we perceive it imperially, empirically. But
empirically it is impossible to comprehend the essence of things. Essence is internal
the basis of being, and being is the external form of essence. There are no pure entities, they
expressed, manifested in the forms of being. Essence is also being, but most
high step. Essence, as the inner cause of being, is not identical with
last, she is different from him. In other words, the essence is known from
the opposite of immediate existence. So knowledge must go to
depth, to reveal their essence in phenomena.
What, according to Hegel, is this hidden essence of being? In his
internal inconsistency. Everything that exists contains
contradiction, unity of opposite moments.
Identity, unity of opposites- the key concept of logic
Hegel. "Controversy that's what really drives the world and it's ridiculous to say
that it is impossible to think contradictoryly. “Contradiction is the root of every movement and
vitality, only insofar as it has a contradiction in itself, it moves,
possesses impulse and activity” (1.1.206).
Contradiction leads forward; it is the principle of all self-movement. Even
the simplest form of movement - the movement of a body in space - represents
a constantly arising and immediately resolved contradiction. Something
moves not only because it is now here, and at another moment there, but also
because at the same moment it is both here and not here, i.e. and located and
is not located at this point of the trajectory.
The doctrine of the concept is the third and final part of Hegel's logic. Here he is the most
sharply expresses the point of view of absolute idealism. From this perspective, the philosopher
criticizes formal logic, which sees in the concept "empty and abstract
form." “In fact, the opposite is true:concept is the beginning of all
life , it is entirely specific. This is the conclusion of all
logical thinking done up to now and therefore does not require here
proof".
Philosophy of nature.
Hegel considers nature to be the second stage in the development of the absolute idea. nature is
the product of an absolute idea, its otherness. Born of the spirit, nature has no
existence independent of it. This is how Hegel solves the main question
philosophy, although he does not use the expression itself. At the same time, Hegel
attempts to disassociate itself from the traditional religious notion of
creation of the world. The absolute idea at the level of logic exists, according to him,
outside of time and space. It is no coincidence that these categories are absent in his
logic. As Hegel says, it is wrong to talk about what was before and what
Then. The expressions "before" and "then" are not suitable for this case. They
express "purely logical" primary and secondary. And although Hegel's God
not quite traditional, but an abstract idea of the world mind, it still does not
rejects the Christian dogma of the creation of the world.
Philosophy of spirit
This is the third stage of the Hegelian system, which is a synthesis of two
previous ones. Here the absolute idea, as it were, awakens, frees itself from
natural bonds and finds its expression in absolute spirit. Human
part of nature. However, the human spirit is not a product of nature, but of the absolute
spirit. Yes, and nature itself is generated by the spirit. For us the spirit has his
background nature, he is her truth, and thus
absolutely firstregarding her. In this truth, nature has disappeared, and the spirit
revealed itself in it as an idea that has attained being for itself” (1.3.32).
The self-development of the spirit proceeds along three steps. First"subject spirit"
individual human consciousness, divided into three types:
anthropology, phenomenology, psychology. Second step"objective spirit"
human society and its three main forms: law, morality,
state. Last step"absolute spirit" includes
art, religion and philosophy.
"Philosophy of Spirit" a work devoted mainly to the individual and
public consciousness, as well as the dialectics of historical development.
Spirit is something unified and whole, but in the process of development, transition
from lowest to highest. Hegel considers the driving force behind the development of the spirit
dialectical contradiction of subject and object, thought and object. "Substance
spirit is freedom, i.e. independence from others, relation to oneself
(1.3.41). real freedom does not consist in the denial of necessity, but in its
awareness, in the disclosure of its content, which has an ideal character.
The history of mankind is a progress in the consciousness of freedom, but again freedom
spirit, thought. Hegel's understanding of freedom was progressive in nature, because
was directed against feudal vestiges.
In Hegel's philosophy it is necessary to distinguish research method and
system, in accordance with which not only sets out but also
material is structured.
Hegel's method is dialectical in nature, being the most general
expression of the contradictory development of the world. The system is the chosen philosopher
the order of presentation of the material, the connection of logical categories, the general construction
some philosophical building. In contrast to the method, which is determined by the main
image of the objective content of the world, the system largely bears the features
triad. It has a rational meaning (an expression of the dialectical law
negation of negation). However, Hegel formalizes this principle, uses both
a pattern that a particular material is forced to obey. Therefore, many
Marx (briefly) (More on matter and motion in a separate topic).
The philosophy of Marxism arises in the 40s of the 19th century in the course of a critical rethinking of the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach. K. Marx and his co-author F. Engels were originally followers of Hegel and then moved to the positions of materialism.
Materialist dialectic
Marx and Engels used Hegel's achievements in developing the dialectical method in order to show the essence and dynamics of human practical activity. Marxist philosophy is often called dialectical and historical materialism, emphasizing that its core is the method materialist dialectic.
The term "dialectic" is used in the works of the classics of Marxism. The development of materialist dialectics as a theory and method was carried out by Marx and Engels in the following works: "German Ideology", "Holy Family", "Capital", "Theses on Feuerbach", " Dialectics of Nature", "Anti-Dühring".
Marxist dialectics includes:
* The idea of the world as an integral system.
* The doctrine of the connections and relationships between parts of the world as a whole.
* The problem of the development of the world as a whole and its parts.
* A special cognitive apparatus with the help of which the knowledge of the world takes place. It consists of categories and principles, which together form the dialectical method of cognition.
The main thing in dialectics is the understanding of the world as an organic system. This means that it consists of many diverse, but necessary, interconnected elements. And, most importantly, it contains the cause of its development in itself. Dialectics takes place where the development of the world is carried out at the expense of internal contradiction. Thus, dialectics acts as a doctrine of the world as an integral system, the main law of which is the law of the contradictory, necessary connection of its elements.
Under "connection" in dialectics is understood such a relationship between things or processes, when a change in properties or states in one automatically entails a change in properties or state in others.
The concept of development is central in dialectics. It is seen as self-development. Following Hegel, Marx and Engels subject the process of development to the action of three laws:
* The law of unity and struggle of opposites.
* The law of mutual transition of quantitative and qualitative changes.
* Law of negation of negation.
Each of these laws expresses a certain aspect of the integral process of development: the law of the unity and struggle of opposites characterizes the source of development; the law of mutual transition of quantitative and qualitative changes is the mechanism of development, and the law of negation of negation is the goal of development.
Marx and Engels considered the dialectical method to be the universal method of cognition.
The dialectical method is a system of methods and principles that make it possible to reproduce in thought the objective logic of an object or phenomenon.
Basic Methodological Principles of Marxist Dialectics
* The principle of consistency.
* The principle of ascent from the abstract to the concrete.
* The principle of unity of historical and logical.
Marx and Engels almost completely borrowed the categorical apparatus of their philosophy from Hegel. Categories are built into a systematic unity, according to the logic of the movement of thought from the most general and abstract to the concrete. At the beginning stands the category of the individual, at the end - the category of reality. The transition from one category to another is carried out according to the laws of dialectics.
Thus, dialectics, as a method, is a system of interrelated and interdependent laws, principles and categories that prescribes a strictly defined order of cognition and transformation of reality.
They depart from Hegel in solving the fundamental question of philosophy. Matter alone existing reality and apart from and outside of it, nothing exists. Matter is in constant motion. Movement is the mode of existence of matter. 5 forms of movement: mechanical, physical, chemical, biological and social. Between these forms there is a dialectical connection. Matter moves in space and time. At the last stage, matter gives rise to consciousness. Matter is known. But this is a complex process 2 levels sensory-empirical and mental-theoretical. They also interact with each other.
2. Non-classical idealistic philosophyset itself the goal of criticizing German classical philosophy, especially Hegel, using not new approaches (as materialists and positivists did), but old ones. Representatives of non-classical philosophy tried to explain the world, like the "classics", from the standpoint of idealism, but the idealism of the old, pre-Hegelian and pre-classical (for example, Platonic, etc.) and to find new, original approaches within the old pre-classical idealism.
The two main directions of non-classical idealistic philosophy XIX V. were irrationalism and "philosophy of life"and were mainly represented by the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey.
Irrationalism rejected logical connections V nature, the perception of the surrounding world as an integral and regular system, criticized Hegel's dialectics and the very idea of development.
The main idea of irrationalism is that the surrounding world is a disparate chaos, has no integrity, internal laws, laws of development, is not controlled by the mind and is subject to other driving forces, such as affects, will.
A prominent representative of irrationalism wasArthur Schopenhauer(1788 1860). In his work, he opposed the dialectic and historicism of Hegel, called for a return to Kantianism and Platonism, and proclaimed the universal principle of his philosophy voluntarism, according to which the main driving force that determines everything in the world around us is will.
In his book The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer distinguishes between two worlds. The first where the law of causality prevails (ie, the one in which we live), and the second where neither specific forms of things nor appearances are important, but only general transcendental essences. This is a world where we do not exist (the idea of doubling is taken from Plato). In everyday life, the will is subject to limitation, has an empirical character. Outside the empirical world, the will is independent of the law of causality. Here it is abstracted from the concrete form of things and is conceived outside of all time as the essence of the world and man. In the spirit of I. Kant's reasoning about a priori forms of sensibility - time and space, about the categories of reason, Schopenhauer reduces them to a single law of sufficient reason, this law has an a priori character. According to this law, true philosophy must proceed not from the object (like the materialists), but also not from the subject (like the subjective idealists), but onlyfrom the view,which is a fact of consciousness.
In turn, representations (rather than objective reality and non-cognizing subject) are divided into object and subject. It is precisely at the basis of the object of representations that the law of sufficient reason lies, which breaks down into fourindependent law:
law of being for space and time;
the law of causalityfor the material world;
law of reason for knowledge;
law of motivation for human actions.
Thus, the surrounding world (representation of an object) is reduced to being, causality, logical basis and motivation.
The representation of the subject does not have such a complex structure.Human consciousnesscarries out the cognitive process through the representation of the subject by:
direct knowledge;
Abstract (reflective) cognition;
intuition.
Will, according to Schopenhauer, is the absolute beginning, the root of everything that exists, the ideal force that can determine and influence everything that exists. Will is also the highest cosmic principle that underlies the universe.
Will:
Underlies consciousness;
It is the universal essence of things.
When explaining the will as the universal essence of things, Schopenhauer relies on Kantianism, namely on Kant's theory, by virtue of which only images of things of the surrounding world are reflected (affected) in consciousness, and their inner essence is an unresolved riddle ("thing in itself").
Schopenhauer uses this theory With positions of voluntarism:
The world there is only a world of representations in the mind of man;
The essence of the world, its things, phenomena is not a "thing in itself", but will;
The world of appearances and the world of essence are, respectively, the world of representations and the world of will;
Just as the will of a person determines his actions, so the universal will acting throughout the world, the will of objects and phenomena, causes external events in the world, the movement of objects, the emergence of phenomena;
Will is inherent not only in living organisms, but also inanimate nature in the form of "unconscious", "dormant" will;
The surrounding world in its essence is the realization of the will.
The philosophy of Schopenhauer (his doctrine of the four-fold law of sufficient reason, voluntarism, pessimism, etc.) was not understood and not accepted by many of his contemporaries and did not have much popularity, but it played a big role in the development of non-classical idealistic philosophy (irrationalism, symbolism, " philosophy of life") and positivism.
4. The successor of the philosophical traditions of Schopenhauer was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 - 1900). Nietzsche is considered the founder of a kind of irrationalism"philosophy of life".
The core concept of this philosophy is the concept life, which is understood asthe world in the aspect of its given to the cognizing subject, the only reality that exists for a particular person.
The goal of philosophy, according to Nietzsche, is to help a person to realize himself as much as possible in life, to adapt to the world around him.
At the heart of both life and the surrounding world lies will. Nietzsche highlights several types of human will:
"will to live";
Will inside the person himself ("inner core");
Uncontrolled, unconscious will - passions, inclinations, affects;
"will to power".
The philosopher pays special attention to the last variety of will "will to power" . According to Nietzsche, the "will to power" is more or less lesser degree inherent in every person. By its nature, the "will to power" is close to the instinct of self-preservation, it is an external expression of the desire for security hidden inside a person and the driving force behind many of a person's actions. Also, according to Nietzsche, every person (like the state) consciously or unconsciously seeks to expand his "I" in the outside world, the expansion of "I".
Nietzsche's philosophy (especially its main ideas - the highest value for a person of life, "the will to live", "the will to power") was the forerunner of a number of modern Western philosophical concepts, which are based on the problems of man and his life - pragmatism, phenomenology, existentialism and others
5. Wilhelm Dilthey(1833 - 1911) also belonged to the representatives of the direction"philosophy of life".
Dilthey criticized Hegel's philosophy, in which all the diversity of the surrounding world and the uniqueness of human life were reduced to thinking (idea). Instead of thinking (ideas), Dilthey proposed that philosophy be based on the concept"life".
Life is a way of human being in the world.Life has features such as:
Integrity;
Diverse spirituality;
Inseparable unity with the higher world.
According to Dilthey, philosophy should stop "scholastic" discussions about matter, consciousness, dialectics, etc. and focus all attention on the study of life as a special phenomenon in all its manifestations.
both individual and entire nations. It is impossible to influence the course of history.
Consider the understanding of being by the German philosopher M. Heidegger in his philosophical concept, called "fundamental ontology".
The program work of the philosopher "Being and Time" (1927) is devoted to this problem. Here the meaning of being, as in general in existentialism, is seen in the being of the individual. Speaking of being, the author does not talk about the multitude of existing things, but about being of being . The being of existence is a kind of deep foundation of things. Heidegger's concept of being is the darkest. It is indefinable and no logical analysis of it is possible (including due to its extreme breadth). Thus, science is unable to comprehend being. It is necessary to look for extra-scientific forms of comprehension of being. Being, according to Heidegger, is that which is, is present, exists. “Being,” he writes, “is always the being of beings.” He divides existence into two varieties. First, this exemplary . This is our own being. The author calls it "Dasein" ("here-being", "being-consciousness", "existent being"). This is an exemplary being, since we are capable of expression, search, and understanding. This kind of being is familiar to us, because it is our own existence. Man, from the point of view of the author, is fundamentally different from all living things he is aware of his existence and can say: “I am! I exist!". He may reason thus: I do not know what being is, but I know that I exist, for I experience my own existence more distinctly than anything else. From this Heidegger draws the conclusion: man is a self-conscious being. This existence cannot be an object, since we are unable to go beyond our being. It cannot be the subject of scientific knowledge. It can only be experienced and described.
Secondly, this so-called authornon-exemplary existence. It is simply there. These are things that surround a person. They do not have an existence independent of man and do not have a nature of their own. (To refer to things, Heidegger does not even use the concept of "being" to refer to things).
"Here-being" is always concrete. It operates and unfolds in the world of objects. "Here-being" gives meaning to "inner-worldly" objects. And the author calls such being immersed in the world “being-in-the-world”. "Being-in-the-world" is always "handy" in the sense that things are always "at hand". Things seem to exist in the field of the so-called "care" by the author. It is the care, concern of a person that determines and builds objects according to their meaning for a person. "Care" becomes one of the existentials of man: he is eternally preoccupied. He is doing something, taking care of something, using something. In other words, man does not exist apart from the world. He also does not exist separately from other people. Heidegger's "here-being" is always open to others. We are born already placed in a world inhabited by other people. Thus, in the structure of "here-being" the author distinguishes "co-being" and "co-here-being". These modes of being tell us nothing about the being of the Other. But this world is joint for I and the Other.
But the world of people, according to Heidegger, is impersonal. This is everyday life, which the author calls "Das Man". People do not mean just one person, but everyone. Man in such being is impersonal. A person is thrown into this world in which there is no responsibility. In such a world, everyone is responsible for everything, everyone acts and thinks. But in reality, it turns out that no one is responsible for anything, since “everyone is like everyone else” (“like everyone else”). The author considers such a being of a person to be inauthentic.
Along with the abandonment and preoccupation of man, which speak of his past and present, Heidegger introduces another characteristic: the project, the future of man. The author believes that the true existence of a person begins with anxiety (not from the fear of anything specific, but from the horror that is born out of itself). Nothing terrifies in this anxiety. And then the whole world loses its meaning, is perceived as alien and unsafe. But it is precisely at this moment that "here-being" awakens to true existence, to responsibility for one's own actions. In this situation, Heidegger sees a turn of man towards himself. "Here-being" opens in its uniqueness and incompleteness as freely projecting itself.
What is going on? As already mentioned, in anxiety, a person is frightened by Nothing, and not by specific objects or people. For a person, the whole world loses its meaning. Man finds himself in all alone. In the face of Nothing, death, for example, human existence turns out to be “empty”, which for Heidegger means “liberated”. The freedom of man becomes evident: the power of publicity and anonymity disappears.
But here a person is overtaken by the thought of his own finiteness. Therefore, true existence is defined by Heidegger as "being-toward-death." In the face of death, a person must choose himself, accept his own guilt, come to the determination to act.
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Introduction…………………………………………………………………..3
Gnoseology………….……..………………………………………….…4
The origin of epistemological problems
in ancient philosophy………………………….………….……………...6
New time: empiricism or rationalism?…….……….……………11
Problems of cognition in German classical philosophy……..….13
Gnoseological problems in Russian philosophy………….....17
7. Dialectical-materialistic epistemology…………………....…..20
8. Epistemological problems in Western
philosophy: modern approaches………………………………….…...21
9. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...26
10. Literature………………………………………………………..……27
1. Introduction.
Man has always sought to make clear to himself the world in which he lives. This is necessary in order to feel safe and comfortable in one's own environment, to be able to anticipate the occurrence of various events in order to use the favorable ones and avoid the unfavorable ones (or minimize the negative consequences).
The problems of the manifold integrity of the entire universe in its existence, or the problem of being, as well as the problem of knowing this being, is anything but a philosophical invention. After all, every person, every generation of people in each of the actions and processes of thought - regardless of whether they create, transform the world of objects, processes visible to the eye, or deal with people's relationships, with objects of scientific thought or with images of art created by the imagination - First of all, they must know or find out whether and how exactly there already exists, are present, are given those “objects” to which their actions and thoughts are directed or will be directed.
Throughout the centuries, from ancient Greek thinkers to modern philosophers, questions have been raised: “Do the objects around us exist? If so, how is the process of cognition carried out, that is, how are the objects of cognition transformed into images, and what is objective and what is subjective in them? If not, where do they (images) come from and what is their essence? These questions are solved by the theory of knowledge (epistemology, from the Greek gnosis - knowledge), the main provisions of which are discussed in Section 2.
Consideration of the problems of the theory of knowledge, as well as any philosophical questions, can be carried out in several ways. In this way, one can separately restore philosophical concepts, pose and solve certain questions within the framework of these concepts. However, a consistent consideration of philosophical problems makes it possible to correctly restore the process of the emergence of these concepts themselves and, at the same time, to trace the change and connections between the positions of various philosophers. In this work, the “historical” way of presentation is used.
2. Epistemology.
Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge and its possibilities, the process of transforming objects that act on us into images, the relationship of knowledge to reality, and reveals the conditions for the reliability and truth of knowledge. The term "epistemology" comes from the Greek words "gnosis" - knowledge and "logos" - concept, teaching and means "the concept of knowledge", "the doctrine of knowledge". This doctrine explores the nature of human knowledge, the forms and patterns of transition from a superficial idea of things (opinion) to comprehension of their essence (true knowledge) and therefore considers the question of the ways of the movement of truth, its criteria. The most burning question for all epistemology is the question of what practical meaning of life has reliable knowledge about the world, about man himself and human society. And, although the term “theory of knowledge” itself was introduced into philosophy relatively recently (in 1854) by the Scottish philosopher J. Ferrer, the doctrine of knowledge has been developed since the time of Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle.
Consciousness is always a conscious being, an expression of a person's attitude to his being. Knowledge is an objective reality given in the mind of a person who, in his activity, reflects and ideally reproduces the objective regular connections of the real world. Knowledge is conditioned, first of all, by socio-historical practice, while the process of acquiring and developing knowledge is constantly deepening, expanding and improving.
The question of whether objective reality can be given in the mind of a person, and if so, in what way, has long been of interest to people. The vast majority of philosophers and scientists in the affirmative decide the question of whether we call the World. However, there is such a doctrine as agnosticism (from the Greek agnostos - unknowable), whose representatives deny (in whole or in part) the fundamental possibility of knowing the objective world, identifying its patterns and comprehending objective truth. In the history of philosophy, the most famous agnostics were the English philosopher Hume and the German philosopher Kant, according to which objects, although they exist objectively, are unknowable “things-in-themselves”.
When characterizing agnosticism, the following should be kept in mind. First, it cannot be presented as a concept that denies the very fact of the existence of knowledge, which (fact) agnosticism does not refute. This is not about knowledge, but about clarifying its capabilities and what it is in relation to reality. Secondly, elements of agnosticism can be found in a wide variety of philosophical systems. Therefore, in particular, it is wrong to identify any idealism with agnosticism. Thus, the German philosopher Hegel, being an objective idealist, criticized agnosticism, recognized the knowability of the world, developed a dialectical theory of knowledge, pointing to the activity of the subject in this process. However, he interpreted knowledge as development, self-knowledge of the world spirit, the absolute idea.
Thirdly, the persistence of agnosticism is due to the fact that it was able to capture some of the real difficulties and complex problems of the process of cognition, which to this day have not received a final solution. This, in particular, is inexhaustibility, the limits of knowledge, the impossibility of fully comprehending the ever-changing being, its subjective refraction in the senses and thinking of a person - limited in their capabilities, etc. Meanwhile, the most resolute refutation of agnosticism is contained in the sensory-objective activity of people. If they, cognizing certain phenomena, deliberately reproduce them, then there is no room left for the “unknowable thing-in-itself”.
Unlike agnostics, supporters of skepticism do not deny the cognizability of the world, but either doubt the possibility of its cognition, or, without doubting this, stop at a negative result (skepticism as “truth paralysis”). Namely, they understand the process of cognition as a “futile negation”, and not as a dialectical one (with the retention of the positive). Such an approach invariably leads to subjectivism, although skepticism (especially “thinking”) in a certain sense helps to overcome errors in reaching the truth.
At the end of the section, we will give definitions of the subject and object of cognition, without which the process of cognition itself is impossible.
The subject of cognition is the one who implements it, i.e. creative personality, forming new knowledge. The subjects of cognition in their totality form the scientific community. It, in turn, historically develops and organizes itself into various social and professional forms (academies, universities, research institutes, laboratories, etc.).
From the epistemological point of view, it can be noted that the subject of knowledge is a socio-historical being that realizes social goals and carries out cognitive activity on the basis of historically developing methods of scientific research.
The object of knowledge is a fragment of reality that has become the focus of the researcher's attention. Simply put, the object of knowledge is what the scientist investigates: an electron, a cell, a family. It can be both phenomena and processes of the objective world, and the subjective world of a person: way of thinking, mental state, public opinion. Also, the object of scientific analysis can be, as it were, “secondary products” of the intellectual activity itself: the artistic features of a literary work, the patterns of development of mythology, religion, etc. The object is objective in contrast to the researcher's own ideas about it.
3. The emergence of epistemological problems
in ancient philosophy.
Cognition and its study is not something immutable, given once and for all, but is “something dialectical” that develops according to certain laws. They have a long history, the origins of which go back to ancient philosophy. At each stage of its development, knowledge is a summary of the history of cognition, the quintessence of all forms of human activity, including, and above all, sensory-objective (practice).
In ancient, especially in ancient Greek philosophy (6th century BC - 2nd century AD), deep ideas were formulated about the relationship between knowledge and opinion, truth and error, about the coincidence of knowledge and the subject, about dialectics as a method knowledge, etc. So, Heraclitus expressed the idea that everything flows, everything changes and everything turns into its opposite. But everything flows not at random, but obeying the laws of the “single wise one”, which are inherent in both being and cognition.
In order to comprehend the nature of each individual object, one must be able to apply a general law. Therefore, there is a lot of learning, which “does not teach the mind”, Heraclitus prefers “a single knowledge of everything”. Based on the fact that thinking is inherent in everything, that it is given to all people to know themselves and reflect, he believes that the human, subjective logos (i.e., knowledge) has every opportunity to be in agreement with the objective logos.
Zeno Eleisky tried to express real movement in the logic of concepts, in connection with which he subjected to a rigorous analysis of the contradictions (aporias) that arise when trying to think of movement. The famous aporias of Zeno (“Dichotomy”, “Achilles”, “Arrow” and “Stages”) have not lost their significance for modern science, the development of which is associated with the resolution of various contradictions that arise when the objective process of movement is displayed in cognition.
Notable figures in the history of epistemological and dialectical thought were the ancient sophists - Protagoras, Gorshi, etc. They set in motion human thought with its eternal contradictions, the tireless search for truth in an atmosphere of sharp and uncompromising disputes and the desire to find subtle ways of thought. Antique sophistry, for all its ambiguity, subjectivity and “play on words,” had a number of rational moments. These include: the conscious exploration of thinking itself; understanding its strength, contradictions and typical mistakes; the desire to develop flexibility, mobility of thinking, to give it a dialectical character; an attempt, with the help of such thinking, to “corrode like alkali” everything stable, to shake the finite; emphasizing the active role of the subject in cognition; analysis of the possibilities of the word, language in the cognitive process, etc.
Socrates brought to the fore the dialectical nature of knowledge as a joint acquisition of truth in the process of comparing various ideas, concepts, comparing them, dismembering, defining, etc. At the same time, he emphasized the close connection between knowledge and ethics, method and morality.
The rational content of Plato's philosophy is his dialectic, presented in a dialogic form, that is, dialectics as the art of polemic. He believed that being, which contains contradictions, is one and many, eternal and transient, unchangeable and changeable, rests and moves. Contradiction is a necessary condition for the awakening of the soul to reflection, the most important principle of knowledge. Since, according to Plato, any object, any thing in the world “is movement”, and, knowing the World, we should, out of necessity, and not out of whim and subjective arbitrariness, depict all phenomena as processes, i.e. in becoming and variability.
Following the Eleatics and Sophists, Plato distinguished opinion (unreliable, often subjective ideas) from reliable knowledge. He divided opinion into conjecture and trust, and attributed it to sensible things, in contrast to knowledge, which has spiritual entities as its subject. These spiritual essences are perceived in the process of intuitive thinking, when the mind instantly grasps the eidos of a thing as the semantic basis of its being. At this moment, the mind thinks only one and only being. Thus, if the mind were deprived of some properties specific to human thinking (the presence of the discursive along with intuitive thinking, there is a change of various interconnected thoughts in time, and the mind must somehow distinguish them from each other, introducing an element of non-existence into being ), then thinking and being have always been one thing. Indeed, in the intuitive act of thinking, thought and being coincide.
Plato's epistemology contains the idea of two qualitatively different levels of mental activity - reason and reason, "aimed" respectively at the finite and the infinite.
Aristotle in the logic he created saw the most important "organon" (tool, tool) of knowledge. His logic is dual in nature: it laid the foundation for a formal approach to the analysis of knowledge, but at the same time Aristotle sought to determine the ways to achieve new knowledge that coincides with the object. He tried to bring his logic beyond the framework of only formal, raised the question of meaningful logic, of dialectics. Thus, the logic and epistemology of Aristotle is closely connected with the doctrine of being, with the concept of truth, since he saw the forms and laws of being in the logical forms and principles of knowledge.
In his theory of knowledge, Aristotle distinguished between thinking and sensibility.
First, the very objects of perception of thinking and sensibility are different. Each feeling perceives only a certain sensual quality, and thinking, apparently, the form that determines the being of this thing as this thing. Secondly, each sense is inextricably linked with a certain bodily organ and is tuned to perceive only a certain sensory quality. Moreover, this organ itself also has a sensual quality of the type that is available to its perception. He, according to Aristotle, has a certain "average" quality in order to perceive in contrast the difference in his quality of other objects. Thus, the flesh, through which we perceive heat and cold, itself has a certain average warmth, and everything that deviates from this average warmth in one direction or another is perceived by us as warm or cold. The mind, unlike sensuality, cannot be associated with any bodily organ. Indeed, in this case, he would have some bodily quality and would not be able to think this quality. But the mind can equally perceive and think all qualities, and therefore cannot have any bodily organ. Both abilities, mind and sensibility, perceive images (eidos) without matter. But at the same time, the sense organs are still subject to material influence.
In a sense, it can be said that sensibility perceives flesh as a material thing. But the meaning, the idea of flesh, that flesh is flesh, is not perceived in this case. The perception of this is a matter of thinking. The mind discovers in different, sensually perceived qualities a thing as a whole, existing and united. The basis of this integrity is eidos. The mind, according to Aristotle, is in fact something from the very beginning as a pure possibility; it needs sensation, which for it will consist in becoming an intelligible eidos.
Now we can give a more or less final characterization of the relationship between thinking and sensory perception in the philosophy of Aristotle. The form of a thing that is perceived by thinking cannot be reduced to the summation of the material elements of a thing or its sensible qualities. Perceiving the form of a thing, the mind does not see that the thing is white or red. He knows what a thing is. So the actions of thinking and sensibility are always different.
Aristotle assigned an important role in the process of cognition to categories - “higher kinds”, to which all other kinds of truly existing are reduced. At the same time, he presented the categories not as motionless, but as fluid, gave a systematic analysis of these essential forms of dialectical thinking, considering them to be meaningful forms of being itself.
Demonstrating faith in the power of reason and emphasizing the objective truth of knowledge. Aristotle formulated a number of methodological requirements for the latter: the need to consider phenomena in their change, “bifurcation of the single” - presented by him not only as the law of the objective world, but also as the law of knowledge, the principle of causality, etc. Aristotle’s merit is also that he gave the first a detailed classification of sophistical techniques - subjectivist, pseudo-dialectical trains of thought, testifying only to imaginary wisdom, leading knowledge to the path of delusion.
Assessing in general ancient (more precisely, ancient Greek) philosophy and epistemology, it should be pointed out that they were characterized by the integrity of their view of the world, the absence of a purely analytical, abstract metaphysical division of nature. The latter was considered in the universal moments of the unity of all its aspects, in the universal connection and development of phenomena. However, this developing integrity was the result of direct contemplation, and not of developed theoretical thinking.
4. Modern times: empiricism or rationalism?
A major step in the development of the theory of knowledge was made by European philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, in which epistemological problems occupied a central place. F. Bacon, the founder of materialism and experimental science of that time, believed that the sciences that study knowledge, thinking are the key to everything else, because they contain “mental tools” that give instructions to the mind or warn it against delusions (“idols”) . Calling to strengthen the strength of the mind with dialectics, he believed that the logic common in his time - the Aristotelian formal logic distorted by the scholastics - was useless for the discovery of knowledge - Raising the question of a new method, of a “different logic”, F. Bacon emphasized that the new logic - in contrast from a purely formal one - should proceed not only from the nature of the mind, but also from the nature of things, not “invent and invent”, but discover and express what nature does, that is, be meaningful, objective.
Bacon distinguished three main ways of cognition: 1) “the way of the spider” - the derivation of truths from pure consciousness. This path was the main one in scholasticism, which he sharply criticized, noting that the sluggishness of nature is many times greater than the sluggishness of reasoning: 2) “the path of the ant” is narrow empiricism, the collection of disparate facts without their conceptual generalization; 3) “the path of the bee” - a combination of the first two paths, a combination of the abilities of experience and reason, that is, sensual and rational. Advocating for this combination, Bacon, however, gives priority to empirical knowledge.
Bacon developed his own empirical method of cognition, which is his induction - a true tool for studying the laws (“forms”) of natural phenomena, which, in his opinion, make it possible to make the mind adequate to natural things. And this is the main goal of scientific knowledge, and not "entangling the enemy with argumentation." An important merit of Bacon is the identification and study of global delusions of knowledge (“idols”, “ghosts” of the mind). An important means of overcoming them is a reliable method, the principles of which must be the laws of being. The method is an organon (tool, tool) of knowledge and it must be constantly adapted to the subject of science, but not vice versa.
The whole philosophy and epistemology of R. Descartes is permeated by the belief in the infinity of the human mind, in the enormous power of cognition, thinking and conceptual discernment of the essence of things. To build the building of a new, rational culture, a clean “building site” is needed. And this means that it is first necessary to “clear the ground” from traditional culture. Doubt performs such work in Descartes: everything is doubtful, but the very fact of doubt is undoubted. For Descartes, doubt is not fruitless skepticism, but something constructive, general and universal.
After the doubt has “cleared the ground” for a new rational culture, the “architect”, that is, the method, is included in the matter. With its help, all generally accepted truths are submitted to the court of pure reason, their “credentials” are carefully and mercilessly checked, the validity of their claims to represent the true truth.
According to Descartes, the mind, armed with such means of thinking as intuition and deduction, can achieve complete certainty in all areas of knowledge, if only it is guided by the true method. The latter is a set of precise and simple rules, the strict observance of which always prevents the false from being accepted as true.
The rules of Descartes' rationalistic method represent an extension to all reliable knowledge of those rational methods and methods of research that are effectively used in mathematics (in particular, in geometry). This means that you need to think clearly and distinctly, to divide each problem into its constituent elements, to move methodically from the known and proven to the unknown and unsaid, not to allow gaps in the logical links of the study, etc. Descartes opposed his rationalistic method both to Bacon's inductive methodology, which he treated with approval, and to traditional, scholasticized formal logic, which he sharply criticized. He considered it necessary to cleanse it of harmful and unnecessary scholastic accretions and supplement it with what would lead to the discovery of reliable and new truths. This means is, first of all, intuition.
The productive method of Cartesian philosophy and epistemology is: the formation of the idea of development and the desire to apply this idea as a principle of cognition of nature, the introduction of dialectics into mathematics by means of a variable, an indication of the flexibility of the rules of their method of cognition and their connection with moral norms, and a number of others.
5. Problems of knowledge in German classical philosophy.
The founder of German classical philosophy, Kant, for the first time tried to connect the problems of epistemology with the study of the historical forms of human activity: the object as such exists only in the forms of the subject's activity. Kant formulates the main question for his epistemology - about the sources and limits of knowledge - as the question of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments (i.e., giving new knowledge) in each of the three main types of knowledge - mathematics, theoretical natural science and metaphysics (speculative knowledge of the truly existing ). The solution of these three questions Kant gives in the course of the study of the three basic abilities of knowledge - sensibility, reason and reason.
Despite apriorism and elements of dogmatism. Kant believed that the natural, factual and obvious state of thought is just dialectics, because the existing logic, according to Kant, can in no way satisfy the pressing needs in the field of solving natural and social problems. In this regard, he divides logic into general (formal) - the logic of reason and transcendental - the logic of reason, which was the beginning of dialectical logic.
Transcendental logic deals not only with the forms of the concept of an object, but also with the object itself. It is not distracted from any subject content, but, proceeding from it, studies the origin and development, volume and objective significance of knowledge. If in general logic the main method is analysis, then in transcendental logic it is synthesis, to which Kant attached the role and significance of the fundamental operation of thinking, because it is with its help that new scientific concepts about the subject are formed.
Kant knits the main logical forms of thinking in categories that form a certain system (table) in his teaching. Although Kant's categories are a priori forms of reason, they are such forms that are the general schemes of the subject's activity, the conditions of experience that order it, the universal regulators of cognition.
An important role in the development of epistemology and methodology was played by Kant's doctrine of antinomies. He believed that the attempt of the mind to go beyond the limits of sensory experience in the cognition of the “thing in itself” leads it to contradictions, to antinomies of pure reason. It becomes possible for two contradictory, but equally justified judgments to appear in the course of reasoning, of which Kant has four pairs (for example, "The world is finite - the world is infinite"). The attempt to introduce the dialectical principle of contradiction into scientific-theoretical knowledge and the sphere of practical reason was a great achievement for Kant's philosophy.
Hegel's philosophy became a major stage in the development of the problems of the theory of knowledge. He gave an analysis of the most important laws, categories and principles of dialectics, substantiated the position on the unity of dialectics. Logic in the theory of knowledge, created the first developed system of dialectical logic in the history of thought. Hegel revealed in its entirety (as far as it was possible from the position of idealism) the role and significance of the dialectical method in cognition, criticized the metaphysical method of thinking, substantiated the procedural nature of truth.
If Kant, in the form of transcendental logic, presented only a “vague outline” of dialectical logic, then Hegel quite clearly and definitely outlined the content of the latter as an integral system of knowledge (the logic of reason). At the same time, he did not at all belittle the role and significance of formal (rational) logic in cognition, and even more so did not “treat” it. At the same time, Hegel noted the limitations (but not a vice!) of formal logic, due to the fact that it considers the forms of thinking in their immobility and difference, outside of their interconnection and subordination.
Hegel emphasized that it is impossible to understand the subject without understanding the entire previous path of development. The source of development is contradiction, which is not only “the root of all movement and vitality”, but also the fundamental principle of all cognition. Developing a subordinated system of categories of dialectics and deriving them from each other along the steps of the logical ascent of knowledge from the abstract to the concrete, Hegel guessed brilliantly that logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but a reflection of the objective world in its integrity and development.
According to Hegel, dialectics as Logic, the theory of knowledge and the universal method should not contain empty, dead forms of thought and principles; the whole life of a person (both individual and generic) should enter into it. He sought to consider logic as a necessary component of the practical activity of a person as a social being, which changes external reality, makes it objectively true. And this means that the study of the general patterns of human life, i.e., his practical activity (“good”, “waves”) in all its forms is the key to unraveling the mystery of logical categories, laws and principles, the mechanism of their feedback on practice.
Hegel was the first to include practice (although he understood it as an abstract - spiritual work) in the consideration of epistemological problems, made it the key category of his logic. The latter, summarized in the dialectical method, is the means that is in the arsenal of the subject, stands on his side not only as a thinking, knowing, but also acting, transforming reality. And this means that dialectics, like Logic and the theory of knowledge, belongs not only to a theoretical, but also to a practical idea, serves (and should serve) not only as a means of developing knowledge, but also as an instrument of "good", "will", "life" - practically -transformative activity.
L. Feuerbach, highlighting experience as the primary source of knowledge, emphasized the mutual connection of sensory consciousness and thinking in the process of cognition, made guesses about the social nature of the latter, and characterized the object of cognition in connection with the activity of the subject. Noting that Hegel's dialectical method lacks the vitality of the original, and his logic is human thinking, forced out beyond the limits of man, Feuerbach believes that real dialectics is not a dialogue of speculation with itself, but speculation with experience. Only in this case, it is possible to distinguish meaningful logical forms from only abstract elements of language forms, because speaking does not mean thinking, otherwise, the philosopher ironically, "a great talker would be a great thinker."
Thus, according to Feuerbach, logical forms and regularities are nothing but conscious universal forms and regularities of being, the world sensually given to man. And dialectics as a logic and method of cognition cannot run counter to the natural origin and development of phenomena in their general characteristics. The unity of thought and being, cognition and experience, according to Feuerbach, truly makes sense only when the basis, the subject of such unity is taken as a person as a “product of culture and history”, “a social, civil, political being”. He is convinced that all the principles of private sciences are only various forms and types of the unity of man with man, the result of people's communication. And this means that the key to understanding nature, matter in general, is in the understanding of man, and not vice versa (as is often believed, to this day). Man is the original "cognitive principle" of philosophical epistemology. That is why “every speculation is in vain” that wants to go beyond the limits of nature and man.
At the same time, for Feuerbach, as, indeed, for other materialists of the 17th-19th centuries. (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Holbach, Spinoza, Chernyshevsky, etc.) the following limited ideas in the understanding of cognition were characteristic: 1) contemplation - consideration of cognition as a passive act of perception by an isolated individual ("epistemological Robinson") of the surrounding world; 2) metaphysicality - inability to cognize the World as a process, incomprehension of the dialectical nature of cognition in the active role of the subject as a social being in this process; 3) mechanism - the desire to explain all phenomena only on the basis of the laws of mechanics (ignoring or underestimating other sciences), which at that time was the most developed science. But such an attempt also contained a rational grain - the desire to understand the world from itself, without referring to otherworldly forces.
6. Gnoseological problems in Russian philosophy.
Russian philosophical thought of the XIX-XX centuries. represented a wide range of very different directions, trends, schools, etc., where the questions of knowledge occupied a certain place. We find many interesting thoughts connected with the development of the theory of knowledge among the Russian revolutionary democrats. So, N. G. Chernyshevsky saw the source of knowledge in the objective world, influencing the human senses. He attached great importance to practice, which he called the touchstone of any theory. For N. G. Chernyshevsky, the laws of thought and knowledge have not only a subjective meaning. They reflect the forms of the actual existence of objects, as a result of which they “completely resemble”, and do not “distinguish” from these forms. The Russian thinker considered the dialectical method to be an effective safeguard against the subjectivism of one-sidedness in solving both cognitive and practical issues. Without recognizing the necessity and value of scientific and philosophical thinking, without relentless mastery of it, any spider? either slide into meager empiricism, or start preaching "illusionism."
Chernyshevsky drew attention to the need for a correct “general philosophical outlook” for solving special problems in a particular science, showed that only by eliminating all “philosophical oversights” can one achieve the truth, “destroy prejudices” on particular issues. Knowledge of general concepts, philosophical categories and their logical development, he considered one of
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Topic 13. KNOWLEDGE, ITS POSSIBILITIES AND MEANS
13.1. Statement of the problem of knowledge in classical German philosophy.
1.Aboutdifference between pure and empirical knowledge
Undoubtedly, all our cognition begins with experience; indeed, how would the cognitive faculty be awakened to activity, if not by objects that act on our senses and partly produce representations themselves, partly induce our understanding to compare them, connect or separate them, and in this way how to process the rough material of sensory impressions into the knowledge of objects, called experience? Therefore, no knowledge precedes experience in time; it always begins with experience.
But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not at all follow that it comes entirely from experience. It is quite possible that even our experiential knowledge is made up of what we perceive by means of impressions, and of what our own cognitive faculty (only prompted by sensory impressions) gives from itself, and we distinguish this addition from the basic sensory material only when when prolonged exercise draws our attention to it and enables us to isolate it.
Therefore, at least a question arises that requires more careful investigation and cannot be solved immediately: is there such a knowledge, independent of experience and even of all sensory impressions? Such knowledge is called priornym, they are distinguished from empirical knowledge that has an a posteriori source, namely in experience.
However, the term a priori is not yet sufficiently defined to adequately indicate the whole meaning of the question posed. Indeed, it is customary to say of some knowledge derived from empirical sources that we are capable of or (268) participate in it a priori because we derive it not directly from experience, but from general rule, which, however, is itself borrowed from experience. So they say about a man who undermined the foundation of his house: he could know a priori that the house would collapse, in other dictionaries, he had no need to wait for experience, that is, when the house really collapsed. However, he still could not know about this completely a priori. The fact that bodies are heavy and therefore fall when they are deprived of support, he must have learned earlier from experience.
Therefore, in the following study, we will call a priori knowledge, undoubtedly independent of all experience, and not independent of this or that experience. They are opposed to empirical knowledge, or knowledge that is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. In turn, from a priori knowledge clean those knowledge are called, to which nothing empirical is mixed at all. So, for example, the position any change to themfuck your reason there is a proposition a priori, but not pure, since the concept of change can only be obtained from experience.
2. We have some a priori knowledge, and even common sense can never do without them
This is a sign by which we can confidently distinguish pure knowledge from empirical. Although we learn from experience that an object has certain properties, we do not learn at the same time that it cannot be otherwise. That's why, Firstly, if there is a proposition which is conceived along with its necessity, then it is an a priori judgment; if, moreover, this proposition is derived exclusively from those which are themselves necessary, then it is unconditionally an a priori proposition. Secondly, experience never gives its judgments a true or strict universality, it gives them only a conditional and comparative universality (by means of induction), so that this must properly mean the following; as far as we know so far, there are no exceptions to either rule. Consequently, if any judgment is conceived as strictly universal, i.e., in such a way that the possibility of exception is not admitted, then it is not derived from experience, but is an unconditionally a priori judgment. Therefore, empirical generality is only an arbitrary increase in the validity of a judgment from the degree in which it is valid for most cases to the degree in which it is valid for most cases, as, for example, in the proposition all bodies have gravity. On the other hand, where strict generality belongs to judgment in essence, it points to a special cognitive source of judgment, namely, to the capacity for a priori knowledge. Thus, necessity and strict universality are the true signs of a priori knowledge and are inextricably linked with each other. However, using these signs, it is sometimes easier to detect (269) the contingency of a judgment than its empirical limitation, and sometimes, on the contrary, the unlimited universality that we attribute to a judgment is clearer than its necessity; therefore it is useful to apply separately from each other these criteria, each of which is infallible in itself.
It is not difficult to prove that human knowledge actually contains such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, therefore, pure a priori judgments. If you want to find an example from the field of science, then you just need to point out all the provisions of mathematics; if you want to find an example from the application of the most common understanding, then this can be the assertion that every change must have a cause; in the last proposition, the very concept of cause contains so clearly the concept of the necessity of connection with the action and the strict universality of the rule that it would be completely nullified if we thought, as Hume does, to deduce from his frequent connection of what happens to that that precedes it, and from the resulting habit (hence purely subjective necessity) of linking representations. Even without citing such examples to prove the reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition, we can prove their necessity for the possibility of experience itself, i.e., prove a priori. Indeed, from where could experience itself derive its certainty, if all the rules that it follows were in turn also empirical, and therefore accidental, so that they could hardly be considered first principles. However, here we can be content with pointing out as a fact the pure use of our cognitive faculty, together with its features. However, not only in judgments, but even in concepts, the a priori origin of some of them is revealed. Gradually discard from your empirical concept of the body everything that is empirical in it: color, hardness or softness, weight, impenetrability; then it will remain space, which the body (now completely vanished) occupied and which you cannot drop. In the same way, if you discard from your empirical concept of any corporeal or non-corporeal object all the properties known to you from experience, then you still cannot take away from it that property due to which you think of it as substance or as something attached to a substance (although this concept is more definite than the concept of an object in general). Therefore, under the pressure of necessity with which this concept is forced upon you, you must admit that it resides a priori in our cognitive faculty. (270)
Kant I. Criticism of pure reason // Works: in 6 volumes. T.Z. - M., 1964. - S. 105-111.
F. SHELLING
Transcendental philosophy must explain how knowledge is possible at all, provided that the subjective is accepted in it as dominant or primary.
Consequently, it makes its object not a separate part of knowledge or its special object, but knowledge itself, knowledge in general.
Meanwhile, all knowledge is reduced to known primordial convictions, or primordial prejudices; their transcendental philosophy must reduce them to one original conviction; it is the belief from which all others are derived, expressed in the first principle of this philosophy, and the task of finding it means nothing else than finding the absolutely certain, by which all other certainty is mediated.
The division of transcendental philosophy itself is determined by those original convictions, from the significance of which it proceeds. These beliefs must first be discovered in ordinary consciousness. If we return to the point of view of everyday consciousness, it turns out that the following beliefs are deeply rooted in the minds of people.
That not only does the world of things exist independently of us, but, moreover, our ideas coincide with these things so much that there is no nothing more than what exists in our ideas about them. The coercive character of our objective representations is explained by the fact that things have an invariable certainty, and our representations are indirectly determined by this certainty of things. This first original conviction defines the first task of philosophy: to explain how representations can absolutely coincide with things that exist completely independently of them. For on the assumption that things are exactly as we imagine them to be, and that we actually know things as they are on their own the possibility of any experience is substantiated (because what would happen to experience and what would be, for example, the fate of physics without the premise of the absolute identity of being and appearance), then the solution of this problem belongs to the field theoretical philosophy, which is to explore the possibilities of experience.
Schelling F. The system of transcendental idealism // Works. T.1. – S. 238, 239.
Being (matter), considered as productivity, is knowledge; knowledge, considered as a product, is being. If knowledge is productive at all, it must be so entirely and not in part; nothing can enter into knowledge from the outside, for everything that exists is identical with knowledge, and outside knowledge there is nothing. If one factor of representation is in the ego, then the other must also be in it, since they are not separated in the object. Suppose (271), for example, that only materiality belongs to things, then this materiality, until the moment when it reaches the I, or in any case at the stage of transition from thing to representation, must be formless, which, of course, is unthinkable.
But if limitation is initially posited by the ego itself, then how does it feel it, i.e., sees in it something opposite to itself? The whole reality of cognition is connected with sensation; therefore, a philosophy that is unable to explain sensation is thus already untenable. For the truth of all knowledge is no doubt based on the sense of compulsion that accompanies it. Being (objectivity) always expresses only the limitation of the contemplative or producing activity. The statement “in this part of space there is a cube” means only that in that part of space the action of my contemplation can manifest itself in the form of a cube. Consequently, the basis of the whole reality of cognition is the basis of limitation independent of contemplation. A system that eliminates this foundation would be dogmatic transcendental idealism.
Schelling F. The system of transcendental idealism // Works. T. 1. - S. 291.
We accept as a hypothesis that our knowledge is generally characterized by reality, and ask the question: what are the conditions of this reality? Whether reality is really inherent in our knowledge will be established depending on whether those conditions are actually revealed in the future, which at first are only deduced.
If all knowledge is based on the correspondence of the objective and the subjective, then all our knowledge consists of propositions that are not immediately true and borrow their reality from something else.
A simple comparison of the subjective with the objective does not yet determine true knowledge. Conversely, true knowledge presupposes a union of opposites, which can only be mediated.
Therefore, in our knowledge, as the onlyits basis must be something universal mediating.
2. We accept as a hypothesis that there is a system in our knowledge, that is, that it is a self-contained and internally consistent whole. The skeptic will reject this premise as well as the first; and to prove that both can be done only through the action itself. For what would it lead to if even our knowledge, moreover, our whole nature, turned out to be internally contradictory? Hence, if allowed, that our knowledge is a primordial totality, the question of its conditions arises again. (272)
Since every true system (for example, the system of the universe) must have a basis for its existence in theyourself then the principle of a system of knowledge, if such a system really exists, must to be within knowledge itself.
This principle can only be one. For every truth is absolutely identical with itself. In probability there may be degrees, in truth there are no degrees; what is true is equally true. However, the truth of all positions of knowledge cannot be absolutely the same if they borrow their truth from different principles (mediating links); therefore, at the basis of all knowledge there must be a single (mediating) principle.
4. Indirectly or indirectly, this principle is the principle of every science, but directly and directly - only the principle sciences of knowledge in general, or transcendental philosophy.
Consequently, the task of creating a science of knowledge, i.e., a science for which the subjective is primary and highest, leads us directly to the highest principle of knowledge in general.
All expressions against such absolutely the highest principle of knowledge are cut short by the very concept of transcendental philosophy. These objections arise only because they do not take into account the limitations of the first task of this science, which from the very beginning completely abstracts from everything objective and proceeds only from the subjective.
This is not an absolute principle at all. being- otherwise, all the objections raised would be valid - but about the absolute principle knowledge.
Meanwhile, if there were no absolute limit of knowledge - something like that which, even without being consciously by us, absolutely fetters and binds us in knowledge and in knowledge does not even become an object for us - precisely because it is principle any knowledge, it would be impossible to acquire any kind of knowledge, even on the most private matters.
The transcendental philosopher does not ask what is the last basis of our knowledge outside of him? He asks what is the last in our very knowledge, beyond which we cannot go? He seeks the principle of knowledge inside knowledge ( hence the principle itself is something that can be known).
The statement “whether there is a higher principle of knowledge” is, in contrast to the statement “there is an absolute principle of being”, not positive, and negative, limiternym assertion, which contains only the following: there is something final, from which all knowledge begins and beyond which there is no knowledge. (273)
Since the transcendental philosopher always makes only the subjective his object, his assertion is reduced only to the fact that there is some initial knowledge subjectively, that is, for us; whether there is anything at all abstracted from us beyond this original knowledge, he does not at first care at all, this must be decided afterwards.
Such primordial knowledge is for us, no doubt, the knowledge of ourselves, or self-consciousness. If the idealist transforms this knowledge into a principle of philosophy, then this is quite consistent with the limitation of his whole task, the only object of which is the subjective side of knowledge. That self-consciousness is the anchor point to which everything is connected for us needs no proof. But that this self-consciousness can only be a modification of some higher being (perhaps a higher consciousness, or even a higher one, and so on ad infinitum), in a word, that self-consciousness can be something that can be explained at all, can be explained something about which we cannot know anything, precisely because the whole synthesis of our knowledge is created by self-consciousness - it does not concern us as transcendental philosophers; for for us self-consciousness is not a kind of being, but a kind of knowledge, and the highest and most complete of all that are given to us.
Schelling F. The system of transcendental idealism //Works. T.1. - S. 243, 244.
Irritability is like a center around which all organic forces are concentrated; discovering its causes meant revealing the secret of life and stripping nature of its veil.
If nature contrasted the animal process with irritability, then irritability, she, in turn, contrapostavila sensitivity. Sensitivity is not absolute property of living nature, it can be imagined only as the opposite of irritability. Therefore, just as irritability cannot be without sensitivity, sensitivity cannot be without irritability.
In general, we conclude about the presence of sensitivity only from the peculiar and arbitrary movements that external irritation causes in a living being. The external environment acts differently on a living being than on a dead one; light is only light for the eye; but this peculiarity of the effect which an external stimulus has on a living thing can only be inferred from the peculiarity of the movements that follow it. So for an animal scope of possible movements the scope of possible sensations is also defined. How many voluntary movements an animal is capable of performing, the same amount it is capable of perceiving sensory impressions, and vice versa. Consequently, the sphere of his (274) irritability to the animal determines the sphere of his sensitivity, and, conversely, the sphere of his sensitivity is the sphere of his irritability.
The living differs from the dead, defining briefly, precisely by what one is capable of experiencing. any impact, to another a sphere predetermined by its own nature available impressions.
In the animal there is a striving for movement, but the direction of this striving is initially indefinitely. Only insofar as the animal has an inherent drive to move is it capable of sensitivity, for sensibility is only the negative of this movement.
Therefore, together with the disappearance of the desire for movement, sensitivity (in sleep) also fades away, and, conversely, along with the return of sensitivity, the desire for movement also awakens.
Dreams are harbingers awakening. The dreams of healthy beings are morning dreams. Therefore, sensitivity exists in the animal as long as there is a desire for movement in it. However, initially this desire (like any other) is aimed at something indefinite. certain its direction becomes only through external stimulation. Consequently, irritability, the initially negative animal process, is positive sensitivity.
And finally, if we combine irritability and sensitivity in one concept, then the concept arises instinct(for the urge to move, determined by sensibility, is instinct). Thus, gradually separating and recombining opposite properties in the animal, we have reached a higher synthesis in which the voluntary and the involuntary, the accidental and the necessary in animal functions are completely united.
Schelling F. About the soul of the world. The hypothesis of higher physics to explain the universal organism or the development of the first principles of natural philosophy based on the principles of gravity and light // Works: in 2 vols. Vol. 1. - P. 175.
M. HEIDEGGER
The new European form of ontology is a transcendental philosophy that turns into a theory of knowledge.
Why does this appear in modern European metaphysics? Because the being of beings begins to be thought of as its presence for the establishing representation. Being is now objective opposition. The question of objective opposition, of the possibility of such an opposition (namely, to establishing, calculating representation) is the question of knowability. (275)
But this question is meant, in fact, as a question not about the physical and mental mechanism of the cognitive process, but about the possibility of the presence of an object in cognition and for it.
In what sense does Kant, by his transcendental posing of the question, provide the metaphysics of modern times with this metaphysical quality? Since truth becomes certainty and the own essence of beings turns into standing before the perception and consideration of the representing consciousness, i.e. knowledge, so far knowledge and cognition come to the fore.
The "theory of knowledge" and what is considered as such, is basically metaphysics and ontology, standing on truth as on the certainty of a establishing-providing representation.
On the contrary, the interpretation of the “theory of knowledge” as an explanation of “cognition” and “theory” is confusing, although all these establishing-certifying efforts, in turn, are only a consequence of the reinterpretation of being into objectivity and representation.
Under the heading "theory of knowledge" lies the growing fundamental inability of modern European metaphysics to see its own essence and its foundation. Talk about the "metaphysics of knowledge" gets bogged down in the same misunderstanding. Essentially, it is a question of the metaphysics of the object, i.e., of the existent as an object, an object for a certain subject. In the offensive of logistics, it is simply the reverse side of the theory of knowledge that makes itself felt, its empiricist-positivist reinterpretation.
Heidegger M. Being and time. - M., 1993. - S. 179.
WITH On the other hand, philosophy requires - as it seems at first - to apply one's knowledge, as it were, in practice, translating them into actual life. But it always turns out that these moral efforts remain outside of philosophizing. It seems that both creative thought and worldview - moral efforts must be fused together in order to create a philosophy.
Heidegger M. Being and time. - S. 335.
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