The relationship between freedom and morality is arbitrariness. Moral values ​​and guidelines. What will we do with the received material?

Freedom is one of the traditional problems of ethics that arises in connection with the problem moral choice, determining the conditions that make such a choice possible (the presence of alternatives), understanding the reasons for the choice, the activity of the individual in the process of making it. The latter is connected with the responsibility of the individual for the results of his choice.

In an objective sense, choice always creates a new reality, a new circle public relations absent prior to its commission. These relationships may be positive or negative meaning for other people, may or may not be in the interests of some people and not in the interests of others.

Accordingly, moral responsibility arises in connection with the fact that the choice affects the interests of other people. This choice contributes to the stabilization of certain social relations, the reproduction of social interrelationships (including on an extended, progressive scale) if the right balance of a combination of different interests is found, or vice versa, leads to conflicts, to tensions that destroy social life.

On an individual level, choice also matters in terms of influencing the development of the motivational sphere of the individual. Its implementation, people's reactions to the objective result of the choice have an inverse effect on the nature of the motives that contribute to making this choice. And positive influence on the moral consciousness of the individual can even have a negative result in an objective sense. For example, the emergence of a conflict situation as a result of a certain choice can contribute to the fact that a person begins to more deeply analyze the motives of his moral behavior. If, as a result of this, he does not even give up the motives of behavior that caused the conflict, he can somehow correct them, find means to resolve the conflict situation, convince other people to change the motives of their behavior, etc. So a moral choice that is negative in one respect and in some time parameters may in some cases turn out to be positive in other time parameters. All this shows the incredible complexity of the problem of moral choice and the complexity of determining the degree of responsibility of the individual for making it. This circumstance causes a significant scatter of decisions regarding the definition of the measure of freedom and responsibility presented in ethical thought. Freedom can be declared simply an illusion (Stoic philosophy). Or the person may be imputed absolute responsibility in the global sense. That is, the individual choice of freedom is supposed to influence all processes developing in society, due to the fact that it becomes an example for other people who choose their way of life (existentialism).

The idea of ​​the absence of freedom creates difficulties for understanding the real responsibility of the individual for the results of his actions. However, this does not mean a denial of moral responsibility. Solving this problem, absolutist ethics follows the path of affirming the responsibility of the individual for the motives of his actions, not taking into account or to a lesser extent taking into account the responsibility for the results (I. Kant). In consequential ethics (eudemonism, ethics reasonable selfishness, utilitarianism), on the contrary, it is mainly the responsibility for the result of an act that is taken into account. The solution of this problem is also complicated by the fact that in many concepts the world, although it is considered as non-deterministic and compatible with free action, nevertheless, is presented as unknowable or so complexly organized that it is impossible to talk about real responsibility for the result. So, in existential philosophy, despite the thesis of global responsibility, the lack of grounds for choice (Sartre) makes a person practically irresponsible, both for the motive and for the result of his act. In deontological intuitionism, a person is assumed to be responsible only for the motive of an act, due to the assertion that it is impossible to predict the result.

All of the above shows that this problem can be resolved by evaluating an act in the unity of motive and result. Aristotle, Hegel, Marx argued in this regard. Hegel wrote in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: “What a person is externally, i.e., in his actions (and not in his external appearance, as it goes without saying), such is he internally, and if he is only internal, i.e. That is, if he remains only in the field of intentions, mindsets, if he is “virtuous”, “moral”, etc., and his external is not identical with his internal, then one is just as empty and empty as the other.

Moral freedom is a value that a person strives to achieve and the possession of which is good for him. At the same time, it is also a condition for the manifestation of his moral performance by him of moral deeds and actions.

The lack of moral principles in modern society requires the purposeful cultivation of personal existence, an important dimension of which is the unity of freedom and morality. Free will, consciousness, including not only reason, but also desires, knowledge of reality (necessity), self-awareness, value certainty in the socio-cultural context - in a word, everything related to the content of freedom, significantly affects the formation of responsibility. It, being the epicenter of morality, contributes to the rise of freedom itself to a higher and more mature level.

Solovyov sees in freedom ethical phenomenon. In his manuscript "Universal Christianity" the relationship between freedom and necessity is considered in the section on morality. Positive, or reasonable freedom (as opposed to negative - egoistic, or indifferent) can be considered, in his opinion, only that which is enlightened by moral consciousness, corresponds to moral necessity. It is "freedom conditioned by sincere obedience to that which is holy and lawful." Its internal self-restraint does not mean impoverishment, but enrichment, spiritualization. Man is basically a spiritualized self. Immoral freedom is as much nonsense as unfree morality.

37. Freedom as an ethical and legal issue.

Freedom is the implementation of public and personal actions, both moral and moral, but having legal significance. In this concept, we also include, for the purposes of this work, the ability of the self or the psyche of an individual to give a moral assessment of his thoughts and actions, as well as morality in general as an ideological category.

38. Freedom and responsibility: moral content and political and legal dimension.

Law serves as an official measure of the freedom in force, its norm, an indicator of the boundaries of what is due and what is possible. At the same time, it is a guarantee of the exercise of this freedom, a means of its protection and protection. Acting as a legitimate (lawful) scale of freedom, law objectively reflects the achieved level of development of social reality. In this sense, it is a measure of progress, and, consequently, a measure of freedom as a product of development. As well as a measure of social responsibility. -

Hegel considered law as the realm of realized freedom, its real being. “Freedom is there,” he wrote, “where the law prevails, and not arbitrariness.” Known are Kant's provisions on law as a sphere of freedom; in ensuring the external autonomy of the individual, he saw the main goal and purpose of law 2 . Perhaps only Leo Tolstoy, in spite of everything, considered law to be violence against the individual.

Legal norms are the norms of freedom, but freedom legally recognized, expressed (formalized) by the state in the form of laws and other legal acts.

The theory of the interaction of law, freedom and interest was deeply developed by the above-mentioned Rudol Iering. Russian lawyer N.M. Korkunov also saw the purpose of law in the division and reconciliation of interests. He did not reduce law to a "punishing sword", declaring: "Nonsense mo a right which would be wholly and exclusively based on coercion alone. In other words, law implies not only sanctions, but also permission, permission, the possibility (within the framework of the law) of personal discretion, choice.

The ultimate (deep) source of freedom and its essence are not in legal forms, which by themselves can neither explain nor exhaust freedom. ON THE. Berdyaev wrote that law is “only the minimum of human freedom” 1 . But without legal forms and means in a state-organized society, it is impossible to "legally recognize" freedom, its expression, consolidation and "distribution for individual use. After all, it is important not only to achieve a certain level of freedom, but also to properly dispose of it, legalize it, make it accessible to people, put it at the service of society.

39. Moral foundations of social (professional) interaction.

Morality and freedom. What is morality (morality)? This question is not only the original, the first in ethics; throughout the history of this science, covering about two and a half thousand years, it has remained the main focus of its research interests. Different schools and thinkers give different answers to it. There is no single, indisputable definition of morality, which is directly related to the originality of this phenomenon. Reflections on morality turn out to be different images of morality itself not by chance. Morality is more than a collection of facts to be generalized. It acts simultaneously as a task that requires, among other things, also theoretical reflection. Morality is not just what is.

She is what she should be. Therefore, an adequate relationship between ethics and morality is not limited to its reflection and explanation. Ethics is also obliged to offer its own model of morality: moral philosophers in this respect can be likened to architects, whose professional vocation is to design new tasks.

These definitions are largely consistent with commonly held views of morality. Morality appears in two interrelated, but nevertheless different differences: a) as a characteristic of a person, a set of moral qualities, virtues, for example, truthfulness, honesty, kindness; b) as a characteristic of relations between people, a set moral standards(requirements, commandments, rules), for example, “do not lie”, “do not steal”, “do not kill”.

Freedom is one of the traditional problems of ethics that arises in connection with the problem of moral choice, the definition of the conditions that make such a choice possible (the presence of alternatives), the understanding of the grounds for choice, the activity of the individual in the process of making it. The latter is connected with the responsibility of the individual for the results of his choice.

In an objective sense, choice always creates a new reality, a new circle of social relations that were absent before it was made. These relationships may be positive or negative for other people, may be in or partially in the interests of some people and not in the interests of others.

Accordingly, moral responsibility arises due to the fact that the choice affects the interests of other people, that it contributes to the stabilization of certain social relations, the reproduction of social interconnection (including on an expanded, progressive scale) in the event that the correct balance is found between the combination of different interests, or vice versa, it leads to conflicts, to tensions that have a destructive effect on social life.

On an individual level, choice also matters in terms of influencing the development of the motivational sphere of the individual. Its implementation, people's reactions to the objective result of the choice have an inverse effect on the nature of the motives that contribute to making this choice. Moreover, even a negative result in an objective sense can have a positive impact on the moral consciousness of a person. For example, the emergence of a conflict situation as a result of a certain choice can contribute to the fact that a person begins to more deeply analyze the motives of his moral behavior. If, as a result of this, he does not even give up the motives of behavior that caused the conflict, he can somehow correct them, find means to resolve the conflict situation, convince other people to change the motives of their behavior, etc. So a moral choice that is negative in one respect and in some time parameters may in some cases turn out to be positive in other time parameters. All this shows the incredible complexity of the problem of moral choice and the complexity of determining the degree of responsibility of the individual for making it. This circumstance causes a significant scatter of decisions regarding the definition of the measure of freedom and responsibility presented in ethical thought. From those in which freedom was declared simply an illusion (Stoic philosophy), to those in which the individual is imputed with absolute responsibility in the global sense, since her individual choice is supposed to influence all processes developing in society, due to the fact that it becomes an example for other people who choose their way of life (existentialism).

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This work is rather a sketch of the description of the mechanism of interaction of such antagonistic social phenomena which are freedom - the ability of a person (a group of people) to independently choose the opportunity to act in accordance with their needs, desires, beliefs, and morality - generally accepted norms that restrict the freedom of an individual or group in accordance with public ideas about good and evil.

Weighing on the scales of morality of individual or group freedom often leads to the fact that both negative and positive assessments can be equally fair.

On the one hand, freedom, understood as the ability and right of a person to act on the basis of the aspirations of his own will, can be perceived by society as evil, since these aspirations do not correspond to its moral standards.
On the other hand, following the requirements of moral norms under the pressure of social influence can hardly be considered a completely moral act, since the decision on correct (in the eyes of society) behavior was made under duress, i.e. not free.

Therefore, freedom, acting in the form of evil, is necessary for the affirmation of good. At the same time, the common obligation to serve the ideal of good, formulated once and for all, not only deprives people of the freedom of choice and makes them executors of someone else's will, but, in fact, kills the possibility of social development, becoming evil.

Morality, requiring every member of society to renounce freedom of choice, degenerates into a tyranny of moral duty, and society degenerates into a monastery or a concentration camp.
Freedom, rejecting the limitations of morality, together with them discards conscience and humanity, turning society into a menagerie, and freedom itself, no matter what sphere of human existence it belongs to, reducing it to a formality.

For many centuries, philosophers of different eras and countries have tried to resolve this contradiction, considering it as a problem of the freedom of the human will.

Over time, this problem, it would seem, moved into the background, giving way to the problems of human rights, the requirements of securing civil, political, economic and other rights and freedoms for the individual.

But it is not for nothing that the question of the interaction of morality and freedom is listed among the "eternal" ones, which each new generation of people has to solve anew. That is why it is necessary to recall the traditional ideas about human freedom.

The problem of free will as a source of the problem of freedom and morality: a historical essay.

The problem of free will is one of the most significant general philosophical problems. Its essence boils down to the question of the conditionality of the human will - whether or not the desires of a person are determined and, if so, what exactly determines them.
Let us note that philosophers understood by will not any human desire, but only reasonable, i.e. based on reason, as opposed to instinct, the source of which is the bodily nature of man.

Traditionally in philosophy there were two approaches to defining the content of the concept of freedom.
In the first case, freedom is interpreted as the independence of any object from external influences.
This effectively means that the object corresponds to its own intrinsic nature. In other words, the object is free from outside influence, and therefore has the ability to remain itself.
An example is the statement of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes: “Freedom is the absence of any obstacles to action, since they are not contained in the nature and in the internal qualities of the acting subject. Thus, we say that water flows freely, or has the freedom to flow, along the course of a river, for in this direction there are no obstacles to its flow; but it cannot flow freely across the course of the river, for the banks prevent it. And although water cannot rise, no one ever says that it has no freedom to rise; we can only say that it does not have the ability, or strength, to rise, because in this case the obstacle lies in the very nature of water and is of an internal nature. In the same way, we say that a bound person does not have the freedom to walk, because the obstacle lies not in himself, but in his bonds, but we do not say that about a sick person. Hobbes T. About freedom and necessity. - In the book. Hobbes T. Collected works in 2 volumes, v.2, M., 1965, p.555.

However, according to many thinkers, in particular, the Dutch philosopher Benedict Spinoza, such freedom is illusory, at least in the material world, since this world is thoroughly permeated with necessity:
“Every single thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and act in one way or another. Further, imagine, please, that the stone, continuing its movement, thinks and realizes that it strives with all its might not to stop this movement. This stone, since it is conscious only of its own desire, and since it is by no means indifferent, will think that it is supremely free and that it continues to move for no other reason than that it desires it. Such is that human freedom, the possession of which everyone boasts, and which consists only in the fact that people are conscious of their desire, but do not know the reason by which they are determined ... By these remarks, if I am not mistaken, I have sufficiently explained my opinion about free and forced necessity and about imaginary human freedom. Spinoza B. Letter to G.G. Shuler, Oct. 1674 - In the book. Spinoza B. Selected works in 2 volumes, v.2, M., 1957, pp. 592-593.

The second approach to the definition of freedom applies only to rational beings and means voluntary submission to necessity:
“We and our race are guided by necessity, but by no means blind, but completely clear and transparent to ourselves by the inner necessity of divine being; and only by submitting to this grace-filled guidance do we gain true freedom and penetrate to being… Free is not the one who does not subordinate himself to anything, but the one who submits himself to the highest.” Fichte I.-G. main features of the modern era. - St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 127-128.

Note that here necessity appears in the form of a causal relationship, the content of which, however, can change, both depending on the considered slice of being (the laws of the Cosmos, nature, human society or state), and on the worldview of a particular philosopher.
For idealist philosophers, the source of necessity is a certain higher, supernatural reality - the Higher Mind, God, Absolute Spirit, etc., for materialists - natural, i.e. the natural world, economic, industrial relations, etc.

In relation to free will, necessity is the cause of the emergence of desire - the source of motivation, and free will itself means the knowledge of necessity for the purpose of either voluntary subordination of the latter (in the doctrines of idealists) or its transformation (among materialist philosophers, and especially in Marxism).

Recall that the will in the philosophical understanding is, in opposition to instinct, just a reasonable, rational desire. Therefore, the denial of necessity by a person is a consequence of ignorance, and ignorance, in turn, is a consequence of the absence (or inactivity) of the mind.

But a man without intelligence is a biological being, an animal. As an animal - a part of the material world - a person is subject to its laws, and, therefore, initially not free.
His will is obviously not free, because all desires and needs are determined not by himself, but by the laws of nature, to which he belongs. “If we consider man as a product of nature, then he should be subject to the laws of nature, which do not allow for the slightest exception. Man is an object in a series of other objects, as a link in a causal chain, which is indeed a real chain. Fisher Kuno. About human freedom. - St. Petersburg, 1900, p.2.

In fact, this means that submission to the laws of higher necessity frees a person from his enslavement by the laws of natural, material existence.
Only realizing the need for such submission, uniting his will with the Highest, a person got the opportunity to be free - not to depend on the necessity of the material world: which can be adequately understood from his nature, although by them he is determined to act necessarily. For freedom does not destroy the necessity of action, but presupposes. Spinoza B. political treatise. - M., 1910, p.13.

As for morality, in relation to the problem of free will, it acts as one of the types of necessity.
Their interaction will be described later, but for now we note the following.
Of course, ideas about freedom and morality arose in human society long before the emergence of philosophy. It is obvious, however, that these ideas concerned phenomena that were essentially opposite.
Thus, at the dawn of human history, the concept of "freedom" meant a certain state of man, opposite to the state of slavery. To be free meant to have a dominant socio-political status.

Later, when in ancient civilizations the first legislative codes appeared, this state also acquired a legal meaning. Thus, initially the concept of "freedom" was a social and legal category.

In addition, as soon as humanity began to be divided into slaves and free, "de facto" there was an understanding of freedom as natural, i.e. natural, human needs, the foundation of which was a social feeling, a socio-psychological sensation.
It was just a feeling, and that it actually existed, we can judge not by laws or any social and legal acts, but only by slave uprisings.

People, like, in general, wild, untamed animals, sought to regain their lost freedom, become independent again and belong to no one.

Thus, already in the era of the slave-owning society, freedom, on the one hand, was recognized as a socio-legal category, and on the other hand, it was felt as an organic internal need inherent in every living being.

The Greek historian Thucydides talks about freedom primarily as the freedom of the people, seeing in it the basis of mutual tolerance and respect for the laws: “And since our city is ruled not by a handful of people, but by the majority of the people, then our political system called democracy. In private matters, everyone enjoys the same rights under the laws. As for public affairs, everyone is nominated to honorary public positions on their merit, since he has distinguished himself in some way, not because of belonging to a certain class, but because of personal prowess. Poverty and obscure origin or low social position do not prevent a person from taking an honorary position if he is able to render a service to the state. In our state we live freely and in Everyday life we avoid mutual suspicions: we do not harbor hostility towards a neighbor if he follows personal inclinations in his behavior, and we do not express to him, although harmless, but painfully perceived annoyance. Tolerant in our private relationships, in public life we ​​do not violate laws, mainly out of respect for them and obey the authorities and laws, especially those established in defense of the offended, as well as unwritten laws, the violation of which everyone considers shameful. Thucydides. Story. - L., 1981, p.80.

Thus, freedom was originally a factor of individual existence and meant primarily independence, giving the individual the opportunity to be himself, i.e. fulfill their own personal interests and needs.
Note that when it comes to the freedom of the people, as, for example, in a quotation from Thucydides, the people in this case also represents, as it were, one whole - a conditional individual.
Recall that the word "individual" (individuum) in Latin means the same as "atom" (;;;;;;) in Greek - indivisible, indivisible.

Unlike freedom, moral norms are conditioned not by the fact of individual, but of social life.
Everywhere and at all times, the will of a person living in a society of his own kind was bound by moral norms of the most varied content, having the form of customs, religious or state institutions.

A new look at the interaction of freedom and morality appeared in philosophy and was due to the fact that it arose from the attempts of ancient thinkers who tried to develop a system of worldview, to find that single root cause from which the diversity of the surrounding world arose.

Therefore, the distinction between freedom and necessity was interpreted by them as a distinction between the single and the individual, the universal and the individual, the general and the particular manifestations of being, and philosophers traditionally saw the true being in the one, universal and general, and treated the individual, individual and particular existence as ontologically inferior. And so that special understanding of their interaction arose, which was reflected in the concepts of free will.

The beginning of the study of this problem was laid by Socrates, dividing the nature of man into corporeal and rational, and giving the latter unconditional priority.
Having defined freedom as “self-control”, as the power of the mind over the body, Socrates actually legitimized the understanding of freedom as the subordination of the lower to the higher, the material to the ideal (in this case, rational). Reale J., Antiseri D. Western philosophy from origins to the present day. In 4 volumes, v.1. - St. Petersburg, 1997. - S. 67.

But at the same time, Socrates had in mind the mind of an individual person.

However, Aristotle already speaks of Nous - higher mind, whose laws govern the material world, including the individual. Therefore, to be moral means to be involved in a single universal mind, and what is morally proper consists in the fulfillment of the general law.
Nevertheless, Aristotle understood that one can speak about the morality of an individual person only when this submission is made by a person voluntarily. “We change our actions voluntarily, so that the original, i.e. intentions and will, change voluntarily. From this it is clear that it depends on us whether to be good or bad. Aristotle. Great ethics. - In the book. Aristotle. Sobr. op. in 4 volumes, v.4, M., 1983, p.310.

The Christian doctrine of morality, developed by medieval theologians also within the framework of the problem of free will, differs from ancient traditions mainly in the ideological features of the Christian doctrine itself.
At the same time, the actual opposition of the higher, spiritual and universal to the lower, bodily, individual is preserved, but takes the form of the opposition of righteousness and sin.

Disobeying God, tasting the Forbidden fruit, man became mortal, i.e. fell under the power of his own body, and thereby lost given by God freedom.
Blessed Augustine, considering free will as an opportunity to choose between sin and righteousness, considered the possibilities of a person limited, due to his sinful nature.
For him, man is only the material of moral perfection, the true source of which can only be recognized as God, and the necessary mediator is the church; grace received from above becomes the equivalent of virtue.
The essence of sin lies in the affirmation of one's "I", in self-will; therefore, moral purification is based on the consciousness of one's spiritual poverty and modesty. To make the right choice, a person needs divine help: “... one should not rely on the freedom of one's own will, but hope to call on the name of the Lord God. For free will, although by nature created good by the good God, is created changeable and unchangeable, because it was created out of nothing. Therefore, it can deviate from goodness in order to do evil, which depends on free will; likewise, to deviate from evil in order to do good, which is not done without divine help. Augustine. About the city of God. - In the book. Augustine. Creations in 4 volumes, v.4. SPb-Kyiv, 2000, p.94.

Genuine freedom will become possible only in the Kingdom of God, when the sinful, natural part of human nature will be maximally neutralized: “... they will also have free will, because sins will no longer be able to give pleasure. And this freedom will be higher, because it will be cleansed from the pleasure of sinning for the sake of the immutable pleasure of not sinning. First given to man, when he was created right, free will could not sin, but it could also sin; this same future freedom will be more powerful than that, because it will already be in a state of impossibility to sin. And so it will be by the gift of God, and not by the possibility, which lies in its very nature. For it is one thing to be God, and quite another to be partaker of God. God cannot sin by nature itself, but he who participates in God receives the impossibility of sinning from God. There must have been degrees in this divine gift, so that at first such free will was given in which a person could not sin, and in the future such a free will in which he could no longer sin; the former had to do with the state of the reward, and the latter with the state of receiving the reward. But since our nature has sinned, because it could have sinned, then, being cleansed through the mediation of the most abundant grace, it is brought into a state of that freedom in which it could not sin. As the first immortality that Adam lost through sin was that man could not die, and the future will consist in that we will not be able to die even then; in the same way, the first freedom consisted in the fact that we could not sin, and the future one will consist in the fact that we will then be placed in a state of impossibility to sin. For the will to piety and righteousness will not be lost, just as the will to blessedness is not now lost. It is true that because of sin we have not retained either piety or beatitude, but having lost beatitude, we have not lost the very will to beatitude. At least in God Himself, although He cannot sin, should free will be denied for this reason? So, in that city there will be one free will inherent in everyone, - cleansed of all evil and full of all good, endlessly enjoying the joys of eternal joys, forgetting about his guilt and punishments, but not forgetting about his liberation, not so much as not to be grateful to my Liberator." Augustine. About the city of God. - Creations in 4 volumes, v.4. - St. Petersburg, Kyiv, 2000, p.582-583.

In the philosophy of modern times, the problem of free will was studied by Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and others.
Despite all the differences in their concepts, they have in common the traditional view of free will as subordination to supernatural necessity.
Therefore, the source and guarantor of free will from the necessity of natural, material still remains the highest essence.
Therefore, for them, both freedom and morality are reduced to the voluntary recognition and adherence to the highest necessity: “A person is the more free, and the more true to himself, the more he loves God and honors Him with all his soul.” Spinoza B. Political treatise. - M., 1910, p.18.

But during the 19th century, approaches to freedom gradually changed in European philosophy. It is already considered as a factor in real - social, political, economic, legal and other - spheres of human life.

As for the problem of free will, it is preserved in the philosophy of Nietzsche, existentialists, and is also being developed in Russian religious philosophy.

However, in Europe it is largely no longer felt as a key philosophical problem.
In particular, he was skeptical of discussions about free will English philosopher John Stuart Mill, believing that, in contrast to the question of the civil freedom of the individual, this problem has lost its relevance: “The subject of my research is not the so-called free will, so unsuccessfully opposed to the doctrine, falsely called the doctrine of philosophical necessity, but civil or social freedom, - the properties and limits of that power that can rightly be recognized as belonging to society over the individual. Mill D.S. About freedom. - In the book. Mill D.S. Utilitarianism. About freedom. St. Petersburg, 1900, p.288.

Chapter 2. Free will and moral law.

Thus, the problem of freedom and morality in philosophy is, as noted above, one of the variants of the problem of the relationship between freedom and necessity.
But it is obvious that the legitimacy of identifying such opposing concepts is quite debatable. That is why, in particular, Mill in his famous essay "On Freedom" calls the very problem of free will false.

It is no coincidence that most philosophers, who considered freedom as a voluntary submission to the laws of higher necessity (in particular, moral norms), sought to mediate this submission with something more attractive to a person than just an obligation.
At different stages of the existence of philosophy, such a "carrot" was usually good, salvation, benefit, happiness - something that an ordinary individual would like to achieve.

Extremely simplifying complex reasoning, the general essence of such concepts can be expressed as follows: "If you want to be happy, act according to the laws of virtue" or "If you want to be saved, act in accordance with the will of God."

However, it is obvious that, although in this case necessity loses its status of an absolute and turns into just a condition - even a fundamental one, of something more important and significant, the "chasm" itself between freedom and necessity does not decrease.

That is why Immanuel Kant's approach to this problem is so interesting, he managed to substantiate the interdependence of freedom and necessity, without resorting to such mediations of the latter.

The moral doctrine of Kant is indeed liberated from eudemonism.
Kant rejects the point of view that morality (virtue) is either identified with the good (human happiness), or acts as the foundation of the latter. The moral law is absolute. It exists in the form of a categorical imperative - a rule of will, which, unlike the hypothetical imperative, is not conditioned by any other purpose than itself.
Nothing can serve as the basis for a moral law but itself: “The conviction that one must have in order to keep this law is to keep it from a sense of duty, and not from a voluntary disposition, and in any case not from an uncoerced, independent and willingly carried out desire to observe it. Kant I. Criticism of practical reason // In the book. Kant I. Op. in 6 vol. vol. 4., part 1. - M., 1966. - p.411.

To imaginary morality, based on pleasant and useful, on instinct, on external authority and on feeling, Kant has a negative attitude.
He considers such morality to be heteronomic (foreign), since all these motives, essentially private and random, cannot have an unconditional significance for the mind and internally determine the final way the will of a rational being, as such: “Even a feeling of compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes reflection on what duty is, and becomes a determining basis, painful even for well-meaning people; it confuses their deliberate maxims and arouses in them the desire to get rid of it and obey only the legislative reason. Kant I. Criticism of practical reason // In the book. Kant I. Op. in 6 vol. vol. 4., part 1. - M., 1966. - p.450.

At first glance, it seems that by refusing attractive motivation, which usually serves as a link between freedom and necessity, Kant thereby renounces the possibility of combining the free will of an individual and the moral law.
However, such a connection is carried out, but not externally - through additional justifications, but as if from within - in the will itself, and in the moral law itself.
According to Kant, free will does not consist in passively perceiving moral necessity and following it, but in participating in its formation. This approach is due to Kant's ontological and epistemological ideas, according to which everything that exists is simultaneously a noumenon - a "thing in itself", which is impossible to know, and a phenomenon - a "thing for us", such a manifestation of the noumenon that is accessible to our knowledge. The world of phenomena is the world of nature, conditioned by rigid cause-and-effect relationships.
From this follows the definition of will and freedom: “Will is a kind of causality of living beings, since they are rational, and freedom would be such a property of this causality when it can act independently of extraneous causes that determine it, just as natural necessity would be a property of the causality of all beings devoid of reason are determined to activity by the influence of extraneous causes. Kant I. Fundamentals of metaphysics of morality. // In the book. Kant I. Critique of Practical Reason. - St. Petersburg, 1995. - p. 104.

Having defined freedom as the absence of causes, Kant thereby excludes it from the empirical world, since it is to this world of appearances (phenomena) that the necessity, expressed in cause-and-effect relations, belongs.

It would seem that, proving the unconditional subordination of phenomena to the laws of nature, the strictest determinism, Kant thereby denies even the possibility of human free will: “Freedom is that which has no cause: Since this empirical character itself must be derived from phenomena as from actions and from rules them, found by experience, then all the actions of a person in a phenomenon are determined from its empirical character and other contributing causes according to the natural order; and if we could investigate to the end all the manifestations of the human will, we would not find a single human act, which could not be predicted with certainty and known as necessary on the basis of the conditions preceding it. Consequently, in relation to this empirical character there is no freedom, and it is only on the basis of this empirical character that we can consider a person if we are engaged exclusively in observation and want to investigate the driving causes of his actions physiologically, as is done in anthropology. Kant I. Criticism of Pure Reason. // In the book. Kant I. Op. in 6 volumes, v.3. - M., 1966. - p.489.

Therefore, if we understand by free will the cause of human actions at the empirical level, such freedom does not exist, and the belief in the opposite is only the result of ignorance of the true motives of human behavior: “It can be assumed that if we were able to penetrate so deeply into the mindset of a person how it manifests itself through internal and external actions, that we would know every, even the slightest impulse to them, as well as all external causes that affect it, then human behavior in the future could be predicted with the same accuracy as the moon or solar eclipse". Kant I. Critique of Practical Reason. // In the book. Kant I. Op. in 6 vols., vol. 4., part 1, M., 1966. - p. 428.

But, in fact, free will does exist.
One should simply look for it not on the empirical, but on a different, extra-natural, level, the level of noumena: “Let the will be free, but this can only be related to the intelligible reason for our desire. Indeed, as regards the phenomena of our manifestation of will, i.e. actions, then according to an inviolable basic maxim, without which we cannot use reason in empirical application, but must explain them in the same way as all other phenomena of nature, namely, on the basis of its immutable laws. Kant I. Criticism of Pure Reason. // In the book. Kant I. Op. in 6 volumes, v.3. - M., 1966. - p.657.

Such freedom is possible, since outside the world of phenomena there is a world of “things in themselves”, which is free from the causality of the natural world and therefore forms the realm of freedom - freedom from the inexorable laws of nature, since freedom is the first, pre-temporal link in the causal chain of events.
True, the existence of this primordial freedom is unprovable, it is unknowable, supersensible, transcendent.
But if we agree that there are not only phenomena, but also “things in themselves”, then the conclusion about the existence of such freedom becomes fully justified.
If, on the other hand, the being of "things in themselves" is rejected, then any possibility of freedom is thereby rejected, for natural determinism knows no exceptions.
In other words, the individual will of an individual, since it is reasonable, contains the features of the universal, turns into a noumenon.

On the other hand, the moral law in itself is a "thing in itself", universal, it lies outside the limits of empirical being, in the transcendent, intelligible world.
But the individual will cognizes it in the form of a categorical imperative - a requirement addressed to the individual to act only according to that rule, following which he can at the same time (without internal contradiction) want it to become a universal law. That is, the categorical imperative itself is, as it were, a kind of phenomenon, and, being realized in it, the moral law is individualized. In fact, this means that the universal moral law and the will of each individual interact both at the noumenal and at the phenomenal levels.

It is in this fact of co-presence that, in essence, free will lies. The “noumenal nature” of the individual will, which is rationality, makes it capable of perceiving the universal and thereby frees it from submission to the inexorable laws of the empirical world: “Since the concept of causality includes the concept of laws according to which, by virtue of something that we call cause , something else must be given, namely, a consequence, then although freedom is not a property of the will according to the laws of nature, nevertheless, it cannot be asserted on this basis that it is completely free from law; rather, it must be causality according to immutable laws, but only of a special kind; for otherwise free will would be nonsense. Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes, since each effect was possible only according to the law that something else determined the efficient cause to causality; and what else can free will be but autonomy, i.e. property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition that the will is in all actions a law unto itself means only the principle of acting only in accordance with a maxim that can also have itself as an object as a universal law. But this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality; therefore, free will and will subject to moral laws are one and the same. Kant I. Fundamentals of metaphysics of morality. // In the book. Kant I. Critique of Practical Reason. - St. Petersburg, 1995. - p. 104-105.

The very formulation of the categorical imperative, which requires the individual "to act only in accordance with such a maxim, which can also have itself as an object as a universal law", as it were, combines the individual and the universal. The requirement to "act" - i.e. to act, turns each person into a subject of moral action, which, acting in accordance with the requirement of the highest moral necessity, at the same time forms this necessity itself, thereby realizing the freedom of one's own will.

This means that the moral law ceases to be only an external necessity for the individual, but also becomes an internal necessity. And internal necessity, as we said in the first chapter, is in fact identical with freedom.

Note that in most philosophical doctrines devoted to free will, the latter consists in submissive (at best, conscious) following precisely external necessity.
But if the individual will of a person is an active carrier, a “doer”, and in fact a “co-author” of the universal, it becomes an independent value, and a person is no longer only a means in which the moral law is manifested, but also the goal for which he, in fact, and exists.

The attitude towards each person as a rational being, who in all the rules of his will must look at himself as giving a universal law, in order to evaluate himself and his actions from this point of view, forms a different nature of the connection between the individual will of a person and the universal law than in others. similar concepts - not vertical, but horizontal.
For example, according to Spinoza, a person, like any other object of the universe, exists in connection with other objects located both at higher and lower levels of being. And the higher the level, the greater the "power" of the object, by which Spinoza understood the size of the area where the laws operate, generated and distributed by this object.
Thus, the power of each object is directly proportional to its power and, therefore, only God has absolute freedom: “From here, i.e. from the fact that the power of natural things, by which they exist and act, is the very power of God, we can easily understand what the right of nature is. For since God has a right to everything, and the right of God is nothing but the very power of God, since it is regarded as absolutely free, it follows that each natural thing has by nature as much right as it has the power to exist and act; for the power of every natural thing by which it exists and acts is the very power of God, which is absolutely free.” Spinoza B. Political treatise. - M., 1910, p.7.

For Kant, however, the connections are horizontal: extending equally to all rational beings, defining their interaction as goals in themselves, the universal law turns into the result of the joint moral activity of mankind. Hence the requirement for a person to coordinate his goal with the goals of other people, since they also have reason.
Therefore, freedom, if we understand by it the property of the will to act according to the laws of morality, is not the exclusive property of any one will. On the contrary, it should apply equally to all rational beings: “We cannot be content with ascribing freedom to our will, no matter on what basis, if we do not have sufficient grounds to attribute freedom also to all rational beings. Indeed, since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it must also be significant for all rational beings; moreover, it is not enough to prove it by some imaginary data of experience about human nature, it must be shown in general to belong to the activity of rational and volitional beings. And so, I say: every being who cannot act otherwise than guided by the idea of ​​freedom, for this very reason, is really free in practical terms, i.e. for him all the laws that are inextricably linked with freedom are valid, just as if his will, significant in itself, and in theoretical philosophy were recognized as free. I say, therefore, that to every rational being that has a will we must necessarily ascribe also the idea of ​​freedom, and that it acts only from that idea. Indeed, in such a being we conceive for ourselves a practical reason, i.e. having causality in relation to its objects. We cannot conceive of a mind that, with its own consciousness, would be directed in relation to its judgments by something from outside, since in such a case the subject would ascribe the determination of the faculty of judgment not to his mind, but to some kind of inclination. Reason must regard itself as the creator of its principles, independent of extraneous influences; therefore, as a practical reason or as the will of a rational being, he himself must consider himself free, i.e. the will of a rational being can only be his own will if it is guided by the idea of ​​freedom, and therefore, from a practical point of view, we must attribute it to all rational beings. Kant I. Fundamentals of metaphysics of morality. // In the book. Kant I. Critique of Practical Reason. - St. Petersburg, 1995, p. 105-106.

Finally, we recall that Kant's concept did not become universally recognized, and criticism came from several sides.

But if we recall the traditional views on freedom, will, and necessity, briefly outlined at the beginning, it becomes clear that these objections related not so much to the doctrine of Kant, but to those views on freedom, will, and morality that were expressed long before him.

First, Kant's position was criticized that true freedom is possible only outside the natural world, that it is a property of the will only as a noumenon, since at the level of phenomena all human desires and actions are determined by the laws of empirical being.

On the one hand, the German philosopher Gottlob-Ernst Schulze argued with his teacher, arguing that freedom in general is a property not so much of the mind as of the body, and it should be defined as the physical sensation of a particular person: “I know only the freedom of the body. I perceive it by feeling my body, moving around, taking care of my life, continuing it. I comprehend freedom because of the fear of losing it. This freedom Kant cannot think. Jacobs W. The Origin of Evil and human freedom, transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. // Questions of Philosophy. - 1994, No. 1.

On the other hand, Hegel, also considering freedom as a property of the will, believed that it is inherent in the will initially, already at the level of empirical being.
Freedom and will are inseparable, because, on the one hand, will without freedom is not will, and on the other hand, freedom itself can be present only as will, as a subject: “Freedom of will is best explained by pointing to physical nature. For freedom is the same fundamental definition of the will as gravity is the basic definition of the body. When they say that matter is heavy, it can be assumed that this predicate is only accidental, but in fact it is not so, because there is nothing non-heavy in matter, or rather, it is gravity itself. It is the same with freedom and will, for free is will. Will without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is valid only as a will, as a subject... The spirit is thinking in general, and man differs from the animal in thinking. However, one should not imagine that a person, on the one hand, is a thinker, and on the other, a willer, that he has thinking in one pocket and will in the other, for this would be an empty idea. The difference between thinking and will is only a difference between a theoretical and practical relationship, but they do not represent two abilities - will is a special way of thinking: thinking as moving itself into the presence of being, as a desire to communicate to itself the presence of existence. Hegel V. Philosophy of Law. - M., 1990, p.68-69.

Secondly, Schopenhauer generally disputed the reality of the cosmic moral law, which gives the highest meaning to the empirical existence of nature and man: “Since ancient times, all peoples have recognized that the world, in addition to its physical meaning, also has a moral meaning. Philosophers, for their part, have at all times tried to achieve a clear understanding of the matter, and all their systems, with the exception of strictly materialistic ones, agree among themselves that the most important, even the only essential thing in all being, that on which everything is based, its true meaning, its central point and its point, all lie in the moral value of human behavior. And it turns out that it is easy to preach morality, it is difficult to justify morality. It is justly demanded of metaphysics that it serve as the support of ethics; and thus a difficult problem arises - to prove, contrary to everyday experience, the dependence of the physical world order on the moral one, to find a connection between the force that, acting according to the eternal laws of nature, imparts stability to the world, and the moral law that lives in the human chest. Schopenhauer A. About the will in nature. - M., 1903, p.140.

Conclusion

However, of the many philosophical doctrines devoted to the interaction of freedom and necessity, Kant's concept stands out primarily for its humanism.
He was perhaps the only philosopher who tried to find a solution to the problem without detracting from the dignity of man.
Man for Kant is not a faceless means of manifestation of the Moral Law, but the goal for which, in fact, this law exists - since only he, a man, being reasonable, is able to understand it, perceive it and be guided by it in his actions, thus, in fact, everyone once recreating it.

Hence the different approaches to freedom. In the doctrines of other philosophers devoted to freedom, it exists, as it were, in two “hypostases” - as the freedom of a higher reality, for the existence of which there are no other reasons than itself, and as the freedom of an individual, which consists in carrying on the shoulders of the imposed him the burden of supreme necessity.

For Kant, however, there is only one freedom, and the very participation of man as a rational being in the Moral Law means his equal participation in this freedom.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Kant's ideas even today. The requirement expressed in his categorical imperative to see in man an end, not a means, along with the thesis that freedom should equally apply to all rational beings, formed the basis of philosophical doctrines called liberal, because they are devoted to human rights and freedoms.

Criticizing the social inequality between people, modern liberals call themselves followers of Kant in his assertion that man is an end, not a means. The founder of the so-called social liberalism, the American philosopher John Rawls, notes that one of the fundamental concepts of his concept is the "veil of ignorance", "implicitly contained in Kant's ethics." Rolls D. Theory of justice. - Novosibirsk, 1995, p.130.

If we really treat a person as an end, in order for the social system to have a moral right to exist, the consent to this of all interested individuals is necessary.
Thus, Rawls and his followers use Kant's ideas to model their own idea of ​​the moral equality of individuals. “The idea of ​​moral equality presupposes that no one is naturally subject to the will of another person, no one comes into this world being the property or subject of another.” Kimlika U. Liberal equality. - In the book. modern liberalism. M., 1998, pp. 150-152.

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The question of freedom and morality, on the one hand, is relevant, since in society there is a shortage of both one and the other. On the other hand, the relevance of this topic has remained in the last century. Now in the center of attention in society are other topics. And conversations in any group of people about morality cause irritation, people are now worried about other issues. Now in the public consciousness in the first place is another value - benefit, profit. On the one hand, the condition for a moral act must be freedom, on the other hand, freedom is a condition for an immoral act. Freedom cannot be without boundaries, but on the other hand, different individuals have different understanding of the boundaries of their freedom, for example, a criminal and his victim.

What is freedom? It is born during the overcoming of addiction. A new kind of dependence by mankind is perceived as freedom. On the one hand, freedom reigned in primitive society. There were no courts, police, prisons, it was the freedom of collectivism, on the other hand, a person was not free from the despotism of the collective, from traditions, signs, rituals, the elemental forces of nature, which he worshiped. The realization of one's lack of freedom, the disintegration of the primitive community, the creation of the state, all this was also the acquisition of freedom from dependence on nature, from hunger, but this was the emergence of a new dependence. In ancient Greece, the destruction of tyranny led to the tyranny of the agora. The Greeks took pride in their freedom as an advantage over the Persians. Story ancient greece and Rome is full of examples of civic prowess that the surrounding monarchies did not have. But there was more stability and order. The Greeks defined freedom as the ability to achieve one's goal without outside help.

Ancient ethics defines personal freedom as a sign of a citizen.

The adoption of Christianity was experienced by the first Christians as a liberation from the fetters of a sinful, corrupt world. Man is both a beast-man and a God-man. Man is corrupted by original sin. The timid soul of a person is tempted by the devil, and from here evil deeds occur, waking up, it strives for God. During prayer, a person realizes himself a servant of God, and when sins are forgiven, he experiences freedom as freedom from sin. In this sense, if a person goes to a monastery, then he goes to the realm of freedom from the secular world, full of sin. Christianity gives rise to the concept of spiritual freedom.

In the Renaissance, the emancipation of the individual from the medieval worldview takes place; this was the onset of freedom from religious dogmas and from Christian morality. And the time has come for the revelry of base passions. The revival was the time of a string of murders, violence, robberies of mercenary units during numerous wars. Freedom turned into lack of freedom, dependence on the thirst for profit and the power of those in power. And at this time there is an extraordinary flowering of science, art and literature. The lessons of the Renaissance pose before us the problem of the relationship between external and internal freedom. Is the oligarch free with his feeling that everything is available to him, that money will always save him? Is a citizen free who opposed dishonest elections and ended up in prison? What is the relationship between outer and inner freedom?

Morality is associated with the restriction of the freedom of instincts. There was no law in primitive society, but moral laws are born, they arise as conclusions from experience human life. So sexual intercourse between mother and son, between father and daughter, brother and sister was forbidden. People were convinced that this leads to the degeneration of the clan, the closeness of a man and a woman before a hunt or a military campaign was forbidden. These examples show that moral principles are connected with the good of the whole human collective.

With the advent of morality, society rises to the next stage of its development. The direct connection between desire and action is broken. The moral law becomes between them not as a tradition, but as a limitation by reason. The ancient Greeks discovered such phenomena as goodness, virtue, courage, honor. According to the Greeks, these qualities constitute the true nature of man. Greek thought poses the problem of the relationship between pleasure and virtue. For Greek philosophers, the meaning of life, the highest moral virtue, is wisdom, like omniscience, which gives rise to equanimity, ataraxia, peace of mind. This was manifested in the sculpture of Hellas during the classical period.

In Christianity, the highest moral values ​​are love and service to God, observance of His commandments, love of poverty, love for man, since each person bears the image of God.

Morality is a phenomenon of the spiritual culture of society, it regulates the relationship of people between people in the area where law does not apply. Every person has moral feelings. This is, first of all, shame, as awkwardness in front of others, it appears in antiquity. And conscience as an internal judgment over oneself. Conscience appears in Christian culture. In a morally undeveloped person, moral feelings remain on the surface of his consciousness, as external restrictions on his will, and he always sacrifices them in conditions of impunity for the sake of profit, passion. In a morally developed person, moral feelings are included in the core of his value system. In this case, moral principles influence the motives of human activity.

Morality is an internal setting of a person that sets the boundaries of what is permissible in a person’s actions, defines what is unacceptable.

A person commits moral and immoral acts, the latter occur when, due to weakness of will or due to other reasons, a person cannot stop his egoism, an immoral act is always a moral crime in relation to another person. Overcoming one's egoism - “according to Kant - is an act committed contrary to natural inclination, i.e. directed against himself"

The attitude to morality forms a duty, as a need to do something, even contrary to your interests and even contrary to the instinct of life.

The fulfillment of moral duty fulfills the requirement of conscience. Conscience is a moral feeling that requires justice. Non-fulfillment of duty, an act contrary to one's conscience makes a person spiritually unfree, not free from himself. But a person must live in such a way as to feel free even in conditions of external lack of freedom. External freedom is a condition for committing a moral act. Spiritual freedom is the source of a moral inner act. This is an act of the soul. In Christian ethics, to forgive a person is a feat. When a person decides to fight his vices, this is a moral act. A moral act occurs in a situation of choice. This choice proceeds from the moral principles of man, and yet in morality man is subject to his own and yet universal legislation. Freedom of moral choice is the realization of the need to do only this way, and nothing else.

Perhaps one act is more moral, and the other a little less moral. An act can only be moral or immoral. If a person wants to become better, makes an effort to do this, then he develops morally, he judges himself not by his successes, but by the conformity of his actions to the moral principles that he shares. There comes a moment when he has moral requirements for the people around him. A person becomes noble when all his thoughts and actions are entirely consistent with the principles of morality. But his adherence to principles will limit the freedom of his surrounding people. If he is called principled, then this will be his verdict in our world.

Here we make the assumption that morality is static, but in fact it develops along with the development of society. Therefore, in every moral system there are obsolete principles and new ones, which gradually become dominant. In the 19th century there were moral principles of the populists and the assassination of Alexander II was a moral act in their system of values. Morality is binary, not in theory, but in public consciousness, as a unity of the old and the new at every single moment.

Nowadays, on the one hand, making a career has a negative moral meaning, but this is only in the collectivist value system, which is shared by a minority. On the other hand, to the new value system, making a career means being a businesslike, ambitious, creative person. On the one hand, buying in one place and selling more expensively elsewhere has always been called speculation, on the other hand, now it means doing business. Two systems of moral values ​​coexist in each of us: the values ​​of the past culture of collectivism and the values ​​of modern individualism.

We live in a time when one ideology has withered away, the sprouts of a new one are not yet visible. The future is not visible. All beautiful ideas are worn out, stained with self-interest. In our time there is a complete exhaustion of ideas. For young people there is no star, no universal idea that could inspire young people for social creativity. We are not free, we are dependent on advertisers and the media. Every day we are taught that the most important thing in life is to acquire and enjoy. And in the atmosphere of this poisoned herd morality, the duty of a morally developed person is to feel free from mass culture. Overcoming the herd is one of the goals of the spiritual life of the modern intellectual.